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The Power of Attraction, Persuasion and Co-operation: Soft Power Areas

The father of the concept, Joseph Nye's terminology, and an extended approach

ABSTRACT

It is now commonly held that the strengthening of cultural-ideological perspectives and networking analysis is a global phenomenon parallel to globalization. It can serve as an option alongside and against the effectiveness of economic and military hard power. One of the simplest manifestations of this is that the concept of soft power cannot be separated from the theories of international relations. Hard power is the direct way to achieve goals, the ability to change the actions of others regardless of their will. Soft power is an indirect way to achieve goals, based on the ability to shape the will of others. This ability is fueled by attractiveness, which others consider to be legitimate or have moral authority.

This paper first introduces the analytical concept of soft power and then outlines those areas of intergovernmental relations in which soft power is considered legitimate.

When developed, the meaning and scope of soft power was the static, one-directional broadcast or dissemination of national ideas and values through agents and institutions.

This paper argues that soft power is a legitimate, working concept in all areas of intergovernmental relations where through a persuasion, sympathy and identification-based cooperation framework, it is possible to achieve desired results through a dynamic and reciprocal mechanism.

Thus, besides the areas of culture, science, and development policies, soft power is also relevant for cooperation in such areas as conflict resolution - peace-building, classical diplomacy, trade and investment promotion and soft law.

Introduction

If the success of theoretical political terms could be measured by how frequently they are referred to in some/any context, soft power would have been among the first such concepts in international relations for more than twenty years since the theory's development in 2004 by Joseph Nye. The starting point of the analytical concept is the ability to influence, more precisely to persuade through attraction and sympathy – as opposed to military and economic means. Meanwhile, in his introduction, Nye emphasizes that he would be the last person to deny the importance of keeping America's military strength and weight. The three sources of soft power are culture, political values and foreign policy.

The neo-liberal Joseph Nye chooses US liberal democracy and its culture as an universal value as model for analysis. The US is indeed the only powerful modern state that was not founded on an ethnic, linguistic or territorial basis but rather on an ideology, mainly on the liberalism of John Locke and the republicanism (on which British and French Enlightenment were also partially grounded). The "American Dream" belief in human freedom and individualism based on human rights is enshrined in the Constitution of 1787, which lays the foundations for republic, federalism, separation of powers and for the system of checks and balances. US citizens are free individuals, the descendants of their forebearers, who resumed their lives from scratch. They rebuilt their lives and built their country into a world power.

Within popular culture perhaps „Western” films transmitted most coherently these values uniquely deemed to Americans: individualism, desire for freedom, the uninterrupted search for it, while upholding the concept of fair play, the struggle between "good" and "evil",

resulting in the victory of the „good” without exception. The idea of "American" in Central and East European countries, had serious influence, at least until the military intervention in Iraq of 2003. The intervention, in which America unilaterally held power, was shocking. Nye developed his soft power concept at that time. Since the work and this analytical concept has appeared, it is a reference point, a subject of enormous disputes and discourses. It remains the foundation of international cultural organizations and cultural diplomacy. In addition, the emerging political polarization of economically and politically ever more influential Asian powers (traditionally Japan, China, India, South Korea) or Eurasian power, Russia to counterbalance political and economic loss, attach strategic importance to soft power.

An inescapable issue for any foreign strategy today - time has proved – in the new era of the global arms race, is there a role for soft power, and if so exactly what it is.

My claim is that soft power is a legitimate, working concept in all areas of intergovernmental relations as well where it is necessary and possible to achieve the results of cooperation based on persuasion, sympathy and identification. Everywhere, that is, where the key elements of the concept could function and be effective. Thus, the concept cannot be regarded as having only a static, one-directional capability to influence, but also as a dynamic, reciprocal effect.

The introduction of the concept of soft power and the theory of Joseph Nye

After the end of the Cold War - the breakup of the bipolar world order - the United States became "the" unipolar global power, according to most international analysts. (Charles Krauthammer, the neoconservative writer, developed perhaps the strongest ideology for the USA of 1990-1991 in his article "The Unipolar Moment." According to this article, the United States is/was the only country with sufficient military, diplomatic, political and economic capacity to be involved, and play a decisive role, in any conflict worldwide.

During the first euphoric period, in 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote "The End of History", which article became a point of regular reference. The article argued that the collapse of the Soviet-type socialist system was the last obstacle to the global expansion of the most advanced form of government in the history of humankind, Western-type liberal democracy. The article also holds that this form of government that satisfies the "deepest and most fundamental needs of mankind" and thus the struggle of opposing ideologies had ended.

For a moment, one also seemed to see that the science of geopolitics based on (partially conflict-) relations between the great powers had become outdated (O'Brien 1992)

At this time, in 1990, in this theoretical milieu, the neo-liberal Joseph Nye sought *to develop a conception of power that is applicable in the context of US foreign policy making. More precisely, Nye sought to explain how the USA can maintain its preponderance of power within the international system.* So the scholar introduced the concept of soft power in international relations. According to this, soft power is the basic element of the power of the state and the most subtle instrument of influence, it enables cooperation with partner countries and recognition of a wide range of people, through attraction and sympathy via persuasion, without the use of economic or military force (Nye 1990: 188).

The Nye's masterpiece of 1990 „Bound to Lead: The changing nature of the American power" highlights the fact that the US is not only the most powerful military and economic power after the collapse of the bipolar world but the power of the third dimension, so-called soft power. (Think of even the most subtle levels of everyday life, the influence of Coca-Cola, Hollywood, blue jeans, and finance/business-centricity. On the other hand, Nye already pointed to the dangers of misunderstanding, misusing or to trivialize if one identifies only these effects a soft power.)

In 2001, when America was "the only superpower of the unipolar world, but failed to prevent September 11," Nye returned to the concept in "The Paradox of American Power".

Then, in 2004, one year after the four-week military intervention in Iraq, which proved to be the biggest failure of the messianic unilateralism of the Bush administration in international politics, Nye published the "Soft Power" analytical concept in a separate volume. At this point of the world history, the unexpected dangers of the intervention and potential consequences were visible. The intervention resulted in the extraordinary unpopularity of the Bush administration. The expansion of the military superpower and its messianic unilateralism had failed (not just morally).

First of all, I would again like to emphasize that in the introduction of the Harvard professor's masterpiece, he highlights that - also in the face of recent foreign policy failures and missteps - he would be the last person to deny the importance of maintaining America's military power.

In his book he combines scientific analytical methods of the theory of international relations and psychology (behaviorism). It distinguishes between two basic elements to define power. One is the possession of abilities and resources, the other is the driving force of behavior: motivation. (In one of his other writings, responding to criticism, Nye also signifies the two drivers of motivation that determine one's choice, opinion and judgement, as these represent interests and values (Nye 2010: 215, 226)). The power of a country depends on its population, territory, magnitude of natural resources, size of economy, military power, and its social stability. On the other hand - and in connection with the static perceptions of the power concepts -, he assigns a more decisive element of power to the ability to influence the behavior of others and thereby direct events.

According to Nye, power can be exercised by differing methods that form a spectrum of three basic -- and many complementary -- methods of influencing the behavior of others. The first and at the most extreme end of the spectrum is coercion (by command or compulsion), the second and more moderate is by inducement (by payment, or negotiation) and; and third and most moderate is, by attraction and co-operation in order to empower the influencers of the other party.

He reiterates the definition of his earlier work: soft power is the alternative force that appears as a counterpoint to traditional hard power („sticks and carrots" strategy) based on attraction rather than coercion or inducement.

During the Cold War, well before Joseph Nye coined the term soft power, it was proved that the methods of material/hard power could not articulate a second characteristic of US actions, namely non-material factors -- soft power -- that could influence behaviour through attraction. So soft power refers to the power derived mainly from cultural and 'imagological' sources, exercising its influence more through persuasion or by attracting the weak one to a particular model rather than by coercion. This talent is fueled by the attractiveness of a country's culture, its political ideals and international organizations. Such attractiveness is what others consider to be legitimate or to have moral authority. In this context, culture involves universal values, promoting values and interests that others also identify with. In order to achieve goals, „to get what you want", in most cases, changing the position of the other party is required.

Hard power is a direct path to achieving goals. Soft power, the other face of power, is the indirect way to achieve them. A country can achieve the desirable result in world politics by wanting another country to follow (admire its values, follow its example, strive to achieve its prosperity and openness).

Commanding power is the ability to change the actions of others. Cooperative, co-optive power is the ability to shape the preferences and will of others. Co-optive soft power can be seen in the interaction exerted by a given agent and his capacity (the conduct of agent) to

define political agendas. Beside official state agents, these are non-official agents, such as large corporations, sport figures, pop culture symbols, high-level universities and foundations etc., that create soft power of their own. In this point, Nye draws attention of 'the state' to the importance to think of public diplomacy as interactive, involving contacts and listening rather than just broadcasting values and policies that may be interpreted differently in other cultures. Thus Nye highlights – repeating the view of Edward R. Murrow -, that the most important part of public diplomacy is the last three steps of face-to-face interaction. These interactions will have to be more like Web 2.0 where peer-to-peer interactions generate much of the content. (At this point, the study would note that the effectiveness of American soft power during the Cold War period was the result of a coordinated, conscious, precisely-planned propaganda.)

As mentioned above, the power associated with social structures such as common values, institutions, or culture is clearly crucial to Nye's account of soft power. The scholar often suggests that such social structures can be possessed by a particular actor. He speaks of America's universal values as representing a source that can be deployed by the USA (Nye 2004:11) Afterwards he highlights the value of generating consent for one's policies through the exercise of soft power not in terms of this being somehow more ethical than the exercise of, for example, military force, but instead because it is a particularly efficient form of power. (Nye 2007: 169-70)

Already Nye's famed three-dimensional chess game metaphor (Nye 2002:29) intended to underpin the fact that changes in the global environment in the age of a global information society justify the extension of the traditional, force-based perception of strength. According to this, the agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game. It distinguishes the three levels of transnational affairs between nations. The upper level is classical military affairs, the level of unipolarity (Nye's starting point in 2002 and 2004 is that the US is the only superpower of the unipolar world.) The middle level is the level of economic affairs where the distribution of power is multipolar.

The lower level is a group of terrorism, international crime, climate change, infectious diseases and other issues where power is widely distributed and chaotically organized between state and non-state actors. These factors are constantly being entered into the world of great strategies and challenges. According to Nye's releases, the huge mistake is that focus is mostly on military solutions. Meanwhile, achieving a favorable result at the top transnational level often requires the use of soft power tools.

Although exercising power is an asymmetrical phenomenon and practice in any case, Nye himself calls attention to the fact that 'soft' is more vulnerable to circumstances and situations than any other 'power factor'. If cultural or ideological difference is too great, it is not effective. Soft power alone is incapable of functioning in foreign policy. That is why he developed the concept and foreign strategy of smart power introducing the notion of contextual intelligence and drawing attention to the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft attractive power. (Nye, 2007, 2008, 2013; though the introduction of the concept - emphasizing its unifying power - is a timely development of soft power concept.)

The critics and opponents of the analytical concept

It is extremely instructive to briefly outline the main criticisms of the soft power. The concept has been the subject of heated debate from the beginning. On the basis of ideological analysis, a significant part of the critics object to the practical „mission to accomplish” of US foreign

policy during and in particular subsequent to, the Cold War as Joseph Nye's concept of the dissemination of American liberal democracy as a 'supreme value'.

Meanwhile, Nye himself also draws attention to the limits and boundaries of soft power. (It can not be used as a single force and may be dangerous and harmful effects in areas of too dissimilar cultures. In "Soft Power" published in 2004, he refers to a 2003 Financial Times report that the US Iraqi intervention pushed the Pakistani elite closer to to hard-line Islam.)

Some analysts also resent the violent, "supply-driven" enforcement of the American model on nations or ethnic groups for which local conditions have not developed and advocate taking into account viewpoint of local demand (Nawaz 2011)

The other controversial point is whether soft power represents a truly distinctive tool or merely a natural consequence of the American experience as a side effect. The most obvious question in these approaches is the "softness" of the means by which Washington fights for the hearts and minds of peoples and to what extent it is merely a "machiavellian craftsmanship in Wilson's robe"? (Greenwald 2010)

Kristian L. Nielsen, in relation to the European Union's soft power foreign policy, does, in fact, ask the same question, only applied to given locations and conditions. Namely, 'The financial incentives and positive condition, that ... considered as the EU's soft power are fully in keeping with the notion of civil power, in that negotiation, contractual relations and economic incentives are central elements. ' (Nielsen 2013: 729)

However, the true opponents of the soft power concept were neoconservatives, including Robert Kagan. Furthermore, at first glance, but only initially so strenuously, the doyen of the critical realist school, Henry Kissinger.

Neo-conservative patriots and Wilsonian liberal internationalism are not very far away from Joseph Nye's similar foundation, in their support of the American creed, the American mission. Only while the soft power concept of Nye is free of all violence and the execution of violent missions, for the dissemination of US liberal democracy, neo-conservatives do not shrink from violence or militant force.

Neo-conservative trends are quite heterogeneous, but share the four common beliefs of patriotism; rejection of any "world government"; a clear distinction between friends and enemies (Robert Kagan - Irving Kristol's hallmark expressively developed the Reaganist conception of "good" and "evil"); and the fact that the notion of "national interest" extends beyond national boundaries and is ideologically charged.

Already in 1991, it was warned that in an altered security environment caused by technological and communication innovation opportunities as a by-product of globalisation, restrictions on self-defence by international law could have fatal consequences. Particularly in the case that an international terrorist group or movement gains weapons of mass destruction.

The writing of William Kristol and Robert Kagan published in Foreign Affairs in 1996, compares the foreign policy-ideological atmosphere of the 1990s to the 1970s: the Clinton-type (similar to Carter) Wilson-style multilateralism and Kissinger's Republican followers' (in their words) „unimaginative” realism. According to this, America again needs the foreign policy upheld by Reagan based on both military and moral-ideological supremacy.

After 9/11, this trend became the driving force behind world politics in American foreign policy under the presidency of George W. Bush's – in contrast to building on Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition. A conservative political philosophical approach to security and problems is a central focus, a clearly elitist standpoint. They consider themselves anti-philosophers and intellectual heirs of Leo Strauss. Their favorite source of foreign policy inspiration is Thukydides's writing on the Peloponnesian War. (The war also is a parable that the most developed Greek cities were only able to maintain their economic development by aggressive foreign policy.) Among recent US politicians they regard Roosevelt and Reagen as heroes (Kristol 2003). During intervention in Iraq, the intervention was in the name of universal

good, universal values, against evil. They believed that „America would succeed in building a democratic Iraq” (Kagan-Kristol 2003)

In addition to these diverging views, all neoconservative trends assumed the unilateral global power of the United States during this period. (As announced by Nye earlier, "Bound to Lead" - and did not question it in 2004.)

One source of US unilateralist thought was the degree of divergence between the post-Cold War American and European geopolitical thinking.

Europe (and possibly in part due to its lack of military potential) chose humanitarian principles and soft power strategy as the guiding principles of its foreign policy. Robert Kagan's famed work "Of Paradise and Power; America and Europe in the New World Order" of 2003 holds that the Europeans, who came from Venus in the absence of force, had to resort to the need of *virtus*, while the Americans, who came from Mars, realized that the world is a jungle rather than a garden.

This often-cited dichotomy suggests that Europeans would like to live in the Kantian world, while Americans consider Hobbes' international anarchy much more appropriate to describe today's international situation. (Kagan 2003)

The mission of Henry Kissinger, the critical realist political scientist and diplomat, in his newest book, „World Order”, is to formulate a true, global world order, in which "participants, while retaining their own values, must also acquire a second culture that is global, structural and lawful", and the basis of which "could be the modernization of the Westphalia system". He believes that the role of America in solving challenges will naturally be imperative in both philosophical and geopolitical terms. (Kissinger 2014: 373)

Twenty years earlier, Kissinger began "Diplomacy" with the key sentence: „in every century, there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values.” (Kissinger 1994: 17)

The XXI. century's new system conceptualized in his „World Order” continues to rely on a balance of power, but it - according to the shifted conception of Henry Kissinger - can only be realised by the order. The two aspects of order, power and legitimacy (moral, values) can be balanced, he believes.

On this point, he wrote that the European Union, which has made soft power and humanitarian principles the strategic principle of its foreign policy - was to be written in 2014 - can be drawn out from the power pole line. Of course, the power element is missing from the balance, as if Kissinger was emphasizing the importance of a *'smart power' strategy*.

On the basis of methodological and technical analysis, other critics have noted that Nye's conception of soft power, at least in its early form, tended to ignore the role of the subject of power and it continuously conflates the relational and structural forms of power.

According to Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos (Zahran-Ramos 2010: 19, 24.) in their study „From hegemony to soft power: implications of a conceptual change” argues that „the relevance” of the three sources of soft power (culture, political values, foreign policies) „rests only on the acceptance, attraction and legitimacy given by the subject, not by acting state.” Furthermore, Nye characterizes US universal value, but a „more neutral analysis would recognize that any set of principles and values are always relative, they originate in a given society or culture, they are not absolute and universally mean different things for different people.” Of course, the authors also agree that „values, principles and ideas can be universalized, acknowledged by others and legitimated (or imposed) by a series of processes, through consent or coercion”

Edward Lock (Lock 2010: 36, 37) in his critique entitled „Soft power and strategy: developing a 'strategic' concept of power” highlights that soft power in the conception of Nye is an agent – focused form of power exercised through the mechanism of attraction and often

conflates two very different forms of power within the concept of soft power. One associated with the agency of actors such as US, the other associated with the social structure that determines what is meant to be attractive. What Nye ignores is that social structures are properties of a society (the power is 'exercised' by social structures such as shared norms and values) rather than resources owned by individual actors. Lock emphasises that „therefore, while we may often associate certain democratic principles with the USA, and even acknowledge that such principles may in part have originated within the USA, this does not mean that either the meaning or the legitimacy of such principles are or can be controlled solely by the USA”

Nye wanted to explain how the USA can maintain its preponderance of power within the international system, the most relevant critiques even criticize that he only divides coercion and consent so conceal the relation between them.

The diversity and complexity of soft power concept and theory after 2010

Within the sphere of culture, the exceptional impact of popular culture, especially music and major sporting events such as the Olympics, could be mentioned 'exclusively' - these events reach and touch the most people. I have not yet heard any presenter talking on China to a wider audience and not cite the 2008 Beijing Olympics as an example. Contrary to the views and ideas developed by Joseph Nye, Lord Hodgson of Astly Abbotts - a member of the British House of Lords, and member of the 2013-14 select committee of House of Lords on the Soft Power and the UK's Influence - recently told me that he does not consider soft power as a political category but rather separate from politics. He believes that soft power only is effective over the long term and primarily in sport and music events in addition to areas of international law.¹ (Not many members of the committee had such a 'pronounced' view according to a White Paper it published entitled "Persuasion and Power in the Modern World"² containing "Recommendations for Decision-makers".

Whilst Nye sought to develop a conception of power that is applicable in the context of US policy making, in 2004, Nye defined the broadest culture, political values and foreign policy as the three sources of soft power. The three elements from which it is fueled include culture, values and ideas through dissemination and promotion and with respect to international organizations.

As a consequence, national or regional/global values, identity (image) and institutions' foreign/external dissemination may belong or could belong to the soft power meaning and scope.

The study extends this standpoint that soft power is a legitimate, working concept in all areas where it is necessary and possible to achieve the results of cooperation, collaboration and consent based not on military or economic power, but on persuasion, sympathy and attraction.

Intangible and institutionalized forms of soft power, which also play an intergovernmental role

I. Promotion of values

A. The most obvious field of the concept is cultural diplomacy. Analysts and independent organisations identify cultural diplomacy with soft power or consider cultural diplomacy an element of soft power or soft power a part of cultural diplomacy. Cultural foreign policies

regard soft power as an integral element of specialty diplomacy. The mainly American, Canadian, and British analysts¹, international (UNESCO, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy) or regional (mainly European and EU) organizations that identify cultural diplomacy with soft power or as part of soft power do not consider sovereign nation states or governments to be the actors or main actors of cultural diplomacy. Some of them directly interpret the cultural diplomacy as part of the public diplomacy that attributes the major, essential role to civilian actors, so it can have a different role and does not, by its very nature, respect principles of non-interference (mainly British and American analysts).

Of course, this does not mean that state-directed or co-ordinated cultural (as well as scientific and economic) diplomacy would not have non-state actors with a very significant role. (This is only possible in a communist or individual state socialist countries, but not in the globalized world.) Traditionally famous, for example, the role of the British Council in achieving the foreign policy, cultural and, indirectly, economic goals of the United Kingdom. We could also mention the role of the Goethe Institute and the Institut français /French Institute (s)/, Alliance Française, in diplomatic terms. In France, the general support of the "rayonnement culturelle" (cultural aura) across political parties is the foundation of the country's cultural diplomacy. Few know that the French Academy statute of 1635 tasked members with defending the French language and promoting French culture. Since the reign of XIV. Louis and his minister, Colbert, French diplomacy has repeatedly promoted French culture, literature and language.² Many analysts, including French geopolitical experts, emphasize the XIX. century, which was characterized by the exceptionally strong recovery of the Pax Britannica, to counterbalance the growing British hegemony.

Currently the British Council is a public body functioning independently of the government but for which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Foreign Ministry) has ultimate responsibility, it can be interpellated in the Parliament; the Goethe Institute is a public body financially supported by the Foreign Ministry; the Institut français (French Institute) from January 2011 is a central institution under the exclusive support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The institutionalized body of global, multilateral cultural diplomacy mediation is UNESCO, the mission of which is to promote peace, sustainable development, and cultural diversity while reducing poverty using the power of persuasion, the intrinsic tendency to innovate, the power of openness (ie, the tools of soft power) through educational, scientific and cultural cooperation and exchange. Its objective is to promote mutual understanding and cooperation.³

The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy adopted the concept of cultural diplomacy of political scientist Milton C. Cummings, according to which cultural diplomacy is the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture between nations and their actors, for the purpose of enhancing mutual understanding. Civil organizations and other actors have at least as much influence as governments. The form of operation is soft power.⁴

B. The new diplomacy of the European Union in the first half of the 2010s laid the foundation for soft power and democratic governance. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1 2009, committed it to the transformation of its foreign policy and diplomacy. The emphasis on strengthening soft power is also reflected in the leading officials' statements.

The EU's first Foreign Affairs High Representative, Catherine Ashton, speaking on during Hungary's EU Presidency on 25 February 2011 at Corvinus University of Budapest, stated that soft power as projected by the EU sets a good example and promotes its values but does not force them on others. ("... the EU has soft power with a hard edge - more than the power to set a good example and promote our values, but less than the power to impose its will.")

Herman van Rompuy, former President of the Council of Europe in his speech in Zurich on November 9 2011 said that the EU's "hard power capacity is limited, but its soft power is undervalued. In the case of soft power the hard truth is that it is neither easy to exercise nor automatic. Soft power is not an affirmation of easy life and does not equate to spending money. Effective projection of soft power requires a comprehensive 'game plan' through which our goals, resources and their application is transmitted."

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Austrian diplomat, from 2004 to 2010 EU commissioner, former UN official (chief of protocol) said: "The EU principal source of power ... is 'soft' rather than 'hard' ... but no less potent."⁵

In 2015, for the first time, the EU announced foreign policy development goals. In the same year, on July 14, the historic Iran Nuclear Deal was adopted by Iran and the six world powers (five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany).

In parallel with these measures, three EU member states - the United Kingdom, France and Germany ("E3") -, have signed a treaty agreement with Iran. Furthermore, the EU and three other states, namely the US, Russia and China („EU + 3”), held diplomatic talks with Iran on the issue of nuclear proliferation. As a result of the negotiations, the parties agreed on a joint action plan on the same day. This plan sets out concrete steps during the ensuing years to ensure Iran's nuclear program is used solely for peaceful purposes. The European Union's most important foreign policy role can be seen as a mediator in these negotiations, following which its economic presence has also increased significantly in the Middle East.

(Until the Donald Trump's announcements of the end of 2017 and of this year - the continuation of sanctions against Iran, and renouncing the Iran Nuclear Deal -, it seemed that the agreement could have such an historic significance in maintaining peace and preventing nuclear arms proliferation similar to the negotiations on initiating a peaceful nuclear reactor during the Cold War).

In 2016, Federica Mogherini, successor of Catherine Ashton as Foreign Affairs High Representative, and her team responded to attacks on the EU's foreign policy challenges in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe". While pointing out that the EU is extremely proud of its own soft power policy, (as confirmed by the Nobel Peace Prize committee in 2012) for Europe the combination of hard and soft power is the key („go hand in hand”) to addressing new foreign policy challenges, when the declared main interest of the Union is to promote peace and the security of its citizens and territories. The diversity of Europe is referred to as the main intensity of the strategy that makes EU strong. Combining all cultures of the union is a daily challenge to reach shared goals and represent common interests.⁶

In order to strengthen its status, Federica Mogherini emphasized in the European Union ambassador's meeting three months after the launch of the strategy in September 2016 that "... military means alone never solve anything ..."⁷.

C. In an era when technical and technological achievements determine or at least greatly influence geopolitics, it would be difficult to imagine that science and academic diplomacy would not have basic soft role(s) as well. Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, Professor at the L'Université Le Havre Normandie and Sorbonne, in what I believe to be the first comprehensive analytical essay on the topic, shows the possible avant-garde role of science in diplomacy. In addition to soft power, he introduces the notion of diplomacy of influence (*diplomatie d'influence*) into the toolkit of scientific diplomacy. It defines diplomacy as its "art"/tool to find common ground, connections between different interests and avoid conflicts. Through diplomacy of influence, we can reach common interests through persuasion and conviction. (The study would note: keywords of soft power are persuasion – attraction and sympathy.)

The scholar borrows the words of Michel Foucher, according to whom diplomacy of influence „is the force” by which states act as decision-makers and are perceived by others ("agir comme décideur et être perçu comme tel, avec quelques autres") (Ruffini 2015: 15-6)

Ruffini regards great geographic explorers as the first scientific diplomats, and names science in addition to or instead of weapons as a language of understanding and influence that has a facilitator role. At the first meeting of Ronald Reagan and Mikael Gorbachev, in Geneva at the end of 1985, they agreed to build a pilot atomic nuclear reactor for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Ensuing summits included agreements on mutual decommissioning.

Barack Obama, who also announced the application of soft power strategy, in the first month after the 2009 elections, gave a good sense of this in his "A New Beginning" speech at the University of Cairo, in which he emphasized common interests and respect, which were dislodged since the 2003 intervention that froze American - Middle Eastern relations. (US presidents generally regard the Middle East as a prioritized area.)

Scientific co-operation has played a very effective peacemaking role from the Cold War up to today. Two efforts have been particularly effective: the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN: L'Organisation européenne pour la recherche nucléaire), founded in 1952 and the group of intergovernmental experts for climate change (GIEC Group of Experts Intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du Climat), founded in 1988.

CERN is considered to be one of the most influential scientific organizations, as a result of which, a similar organization was established in the Middle East in 1997. GIEC is the most independent organization of the scientific relations, despite (or perhaps because) of its intergovernmental nature.

D. Development policies targeting economically-socially underdeveloped countries have been a very effective (and morally unchallengeable) means of gaining positions for decades, both for the powers of the European Union, Europe and Asia. The European Union declared 2015 as the European Year for Development, and with this for the first time in the organization's history identified non-EU operations and the role of the EU in the world as a major priority. Asia's leading economy and power, China, targeted strengthening its position in Southeast Asia and Africa with the revival of its "Harmonious World" mission in 2005. Several experts believe that a new era of geopolitics and geocology began when the People's Republic of China announced in 2013 the "New Silk Road" initiative, also known as the Belt and Road. The initiative sets out to develop Eurasia and, in some respects, Africa, extending developments and networks, in particular land and sea transport and infrastructure corridors. (Péti 2017: 9)

E. Electronic and social media as well as print media, cannot be forgotten as the mediators, promoters and propagandists of values and ideologies. (Significant amounts of literature deal with the power of the media and press as well as the potential of social media.)

II. Collaborations and co-operations

After alignment of the soft power features of diplomatic branches, the study takes the bold stand that everything that has a more serious co-optive power can in a broad sense be considered soft power. Nye himself states that cooperation is a 'level', which is affected by attraction or repulsion / dislike. ("... cooperation is a matter of degree, and that degree is affected by attraction or repulsion")

A: All international and European regional organizations have as a basic aim peace policies, which can clearly be referred to as soft power.

B. Diplomacy itself ('negotiated management', 'finding links, finding common ground between different interests, avoiding conflict') can also be considered as such.

Let me introduce, as an example, two personal cultural experiences to the role of diplomacy in the homeland of its ancestor, France.

In the first months of 2017, I was visiting researcher at Sciences Po in Paris. On my arrival, I was able to see the Petit Palais "L'art de la Paix. Secrets et trésors de la diplomatie française" ("The Art of Peace. Secrets and Treasures of the French Diplomacy") exhibition and the related volume "La France et la Paix" ("France and Peace") on how the idea of peace (and of soft power) was embedded in international order and what role it played in France. All of this was written by the most famous experts. To my mind, the Petit Palais exhibits and their theme choices always show - from a global perspective - how Paris, "the" French position itself, what it emphasizes in its history, culture, and fine art. One of the most important values for France today is the achievement of its diplomatic role. This was confirmed largely by an international scientific soft power measurement method for 2017.⁸

In 2014, Volker Schlöndorff's film "Diplomacy" was released. It deals with the historical moment that is perhaps the greatest triumph of art, culture and civilization over war and destruction. In denial of Hitler's instructions on the night of August 24 1944, on August 25, 1944 the newly-appointed General Dietrich von Choltitz took the decision from the extremely elegant Hotel de Meurice not to blow up the neighboring Louvre, which had been mined with explosives. An exceptionally rich and beautiful collection of civilization's cultural history was saved. (The attraction of Hitler's Germany to the values of Paris is well known.)

The film mixes real historical fact with fiction. The basic story is fiction based on the diplomatic negotiation of Raul Nordling, the accredited Swedish consul in Paris, and the governor of Paris, von Choltitz. (During the war, the Paris consul of independent Sweden indeed did much for the success of the negotiation between the resistance and occupiers, and met several times in the last week of the occupation with von Choltitz. Memoirs written by both of them show that diplomacy had a role - not a small one - in the ending of German occupation without the destruction of Paris. (The decision of von Choltitz may have also eased later negotiations between de Gaulle and Adenauer)

The art of maintaining diplomacy and peace without military means is a very real, co-optive theme today - in the new era of a global arms race - when, on the other hand, the US naval aircraft carrier appears with the text on posters: "90,000 tons of diplomacy"⁹

C. A philosopher from Königsberg, the father of German idealism, Immanuel Kant wrote in his essay entitled "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", at the end of the XVIII. century, that the spread and growth of international trade is needed in favour of peace, as trading states would have no interest in waging war on each other. Towards the end of the second decade of the XXI. century, if one could not classify commercial relations as soft power - these have economic means and may seem more of a hard than soft power - but economic factors as competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise and commerce can contribute to soft power.

D. In the above cited work by the master of Königsberg, the existence of international law as listed as a basic condition for peace. Especially in the new phase of the arms race, if not entirely under international law, but - beside human and civil rights - soft law, is worth mentioning as a possible means, manifestation, and "revelation" of a soft power strategy.

The very controversial and debated category of international law compresses the recommendations and reports of international and regional organizations, non-binding documents, soft clauses, soft agreements, and conferences such as the exclusive clubs of the

G7, G8 or G20. Some analysts say that these informal international institutions are new aristocrats, like oligarchs vacillating between diplomatic cooperation and competition. Others say that these organisations represent the summits of global governance. Still others believe that these organisations serve as a place for serious dialogues, providing a forum and chance to meet. In France, Bertrand Badie, Professor of Science at the Sciences Po, PhD Program Director for International Studies, made a very pronounced stance on these organisations (Badie 2011). In English, perhaps, the director of the G7 Research Group in Canada, John Kirton, the G20 Research Group's co-director and the professor at the Toronto University, is the most well-known, most-referenced expert.¹⁰ (By all means, the last G20 summit in Hamburg at the beginning of July 2017 was slightly degraded by more frequent bilateral meetings.

Furthermore, the dénouement of the G7 Summit of 2018 was shocking. Although following the extremely tense meetings of the second weekend of June, President Donald Trump agreed to sign on the communique traditionally cobbled together by the countries at the end of the summit, which at previous summits was a formality. Reacting to a post-summit news conference of the hosting Canadian president, Justin Trudeau, president Trump in a Twitter message repudiated his earlier agreement.)

The possibilities and abilities of co-optive power of soft law is given by groupings, joint declarations, recommendations and documents. According to Nye, co-operative ability is the ability to manipulate the list of political choices in a way (by attractive culture and values) that forces the other party not to represent their other preferences because they no longer seem realistic. ("This is the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a way that does not allow others to express different preferences because they seem to be unrealistic.")

With a small game, paraphrasing the words of Joseph Nye, non-binding, soft law documents have the ability to manipulate the list of political choices in a way that forces the other party not to represent their other preferences because they are seen overestimated or seem undesirable for the other party (too). The same can be said of both peace policy and diplomacy.

Conclusion

Whether through cultural diplomacy that communicates values or the avante-garde role of science and education or negotiated management of international relations, or diplomacy or the institutions of soft law, they have all been promoted by soft power. On the other hand, and in addition, the European Union's foreign policy strategy published in the summer of 2016 also indicates that soft power alone is not effective.

In the new age of arms competition, when it comes to competition for the hearts and minds of the people, when hybrid war, military power, and the deterrent presentation of the military are on the agenda - and is promulgated globally through the media - it is especially important to pay attention to soft power options and limitations.

NOTES

The diversity and complexity of soft power concept and theory after 2010

1. Expert interview with Lord Hodgson of Asthly Abbots, member of House of Lords on 5th December, 2017. In his office at Fielden House
2. Persuasion and Power in the Modern World. House of Lords Select Committee on the Soft Power and the UK's Influence Report of Session 2013-14 London: Authority of the House of Lords 155 p.
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldsoftpower/150/150.pdf>

Intangible and institutionalized forms of soft power, which also play an intergovernmental role

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- Canadian (Bélanger, Louis (1999) *Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada*. *Political Psychology*. Vol. 20, No. 4 pp. 677-699)
- British (Bound, Kristen – Briggs, Rachel – Holden, John – Jones, Samuel (2007): *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: DEMOS; Gray, Lolin S. (2011): *Hard Power and Soft Power – The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute pp. 2-7.)

The following works deal with the issue more directly from Hungarian literature:

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- Szörényi András (2010): A társadalmi diplomácia (public diplomacy) újraértelmezése a 21. században. *Külügyi Szemle* tél, pp. 137-157

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- All quotations are quoted by Nielsen, Kristian L. (2013) *EU Soft Power and the Capability – Expectations Gap* *Journal of Contemporary European Research* Vol. 9, No. 5 p. 724, p.729
- Mogherini, Federica et al (2016): *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy p.4,p.7 <https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/shared-vision-commonactionpbOF0116825/?pgid=GSPefJMEtXBSR0dT6jbGakZD0000jYq4k3i;sid=Q6RTYINndYdTZNNrwTNx-n>
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- *The Soft Power 30. A Global Ranking of Soft Power* Los Angeles: Portland, USC Center on Public Diplomacy 2017 p. 42.
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- Sokolski, Henry D. (2012) (ed.): The Next Arms Race. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute *data*: at the General Assembly of the United Nations Association of Hungary, a presentation on May 23 of 2017, entitled „A globális fegyverkezési verseny új szakasza és Magyarország” (‘New phase of the Global Arms Contest and Hungary’) by Zoltán Szenes
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- Kirton, John – Larionova, Marina (co-ed.) (2015): The G8-G20 Relationship in Global Governance London: Routledge

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