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**The Europe – China Dialogue in a Historical Perspective
(European challenges – Chinese answers)**



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Abstract: This book based on documents investigates and compares two civilizations, the Chinese and the European, through European eyes in a historical perspective. Both civilizations were based on similar moral and social organizational principles. However, the different geography, differences in ways of thinking, and local specificities led to very different realizations of these principles. The Chinese civilization was the first to develop, and it had its influence on the development of its European counterpart. Later, primarily in the 19th and 20th centuries, it was the European trend of modernization that influenced and challenged Chinese development. This documentary essay deals with the interpretations of some important European political thinkers of the values and principles of the Chinese civilization, as well as the thoughts of their Chinese contemporaries. It also investigates the answers given by some important Chinese thinkers to the challenge of European modernization in the area of state and international organization in the 19th and the 20th centuries. The goal is to contribute to the dialogue between the two civilizations.

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Foreword

This book based on documents deals with the history of the encounter and of the cooperation between the Chinese and European civilization in the field of state and international organization ideas. It also touches upon legal and political practices through European eyes. Its goal is to serve as an introductory study material to the problems of the Europe-China dialogue in a historical perspective. It is important to investigate this subject: indeed, the general knowledge on China is relatively poor in the European Union in spite of the fact that a new world system is in the making where both China and the European Union are bound to play an important role.

Both the European and the Chinese civilizations contributed to the state and international organization of humanity. But China and Europe represent different models of social organization. As a consequence, their contacts and mutual influences were useful and educative for both. Having said that, the same contacts included a lot of painful elements, primarily in the period of European colonization and imperialism. In some ways, the China-Europe relationship can also be regarded as a contact as well as a “clash” of civilizations.

The main chapters of the book present the differences and similarities between the European and Chinese civilizations based on the narrations and ideas of European travellers, missionaries, political thinkers (before and after the period of colonization and imperialism). The book also investigates the challenge created by the European modernization and the answers given thereof by important Chinese political thinkers. Finally it drafts the history of the EU–China partnership.

The introductory first chapter presents some of the similarities and important differences in Chinese and European thinking. It compares the ideas of Confucius on state and community organization with the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. It concludes that the roots of the ancient Chinese civilization of philosophers has a lot of similarities with the European.

The second chapter deals with the first phase of the contacts between the two civilizations. In this period Europeans highly appreciated Chinese rationalism and natural philosophy. Confucianism was an important subject of European missionaries as a collection of basic moral rules directing the behaviour of persons. While studying Confucius Europeans discovered natural philosophy, and launched the movement of Enlightenment (Ricci, Leibniz, Wolff, Voltaire, Montesquieu).

The third chapter investigates the period of European colonization and modernizing expansion when the European view on Chinese culture radically changed into a negative direction. Based on the successes of European expansion and the perceived European values European thinkers started to overestimate their own culture. Marx, Hegel, Legge, and Weber, for example, developed ideas on European superiority and Chinese stagnation, eternal standstill, and retard. They viewed Chinese civilization as being unable to develop without the adoption of Western ideas and methods.

That chapter also shows how European modernity, economic, trade and market expansion, and the European imperialism challenged the traditional Chinese civilization. Chinese society

was a rationally organized, peaceful agricultural society concentrating on livelihood when it met the Europeans. Confucian moral principles, education, self-cultivation, respect for the elders, ancestor worship, filial piety, a patriarchy, and the examination system all played an important role. These principles appeared in rituals which were necessary to ensure the livelihood of the persons in an agrarian society that was not profit oriented.

The fourth chapter presents how some European thinkers (Russell, Dewey) tried, after the First World War, to understand and solve the problems of China that developed during Western expansionist modernization. In his lectures Dewey aimed to convince the Chinese to adopt Western democracy. Russell was more understanding regarding the problems of China. In his book on the problems of China he realized that both Europeans and Chinese have to face the necessity to search alternative ways of modernization and democracy. He emphasised that the dialogue between the two civilizations could contribute to establish peaceful relationships in the world.

The fifth chapter investigates some of the most important Chinese answers to the European market economy and profit oriented capitalism that emerged as universal world system in the period of imperialism. Chinese thinkers realized the necessity to reform if they wanted to be involved on equal terms in a world economy and safeguard what they had achieved (K'ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen). They accepted Western knowledge and technology but did not sympathise with Western colonial mentality, imperialism, racism, and an uncontrolled focus on profit that served the interests of a ruling elite only. An important discussion on modernization took place among Chinese philosophers and politicians. There were those who realized the importance of modernization and the capitalist market economy but they rejected its colonizer and imperialist form. They were in thinking on an alternative capitalist solution serving the livelihood of the people. As, basically, Confucian thinkers they tried to find a way to use money and profit as rational tools to increase general living standards (K'ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen). There were those who went beyond the Confucian tradition and wanted to adopt European market economy and the democratic civil nation state altogether (Liang Ch'i-cha'ao). Finally, there were also those who rejected the whole capitalist system as self-destructive, and proposed communism based on the collectivity of the property and the centralized one party system (Mao Tse-tung). This chapter presents the ideas of K'ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese reform policy.

The sixth chapter deals with the renewal of the European and the international organizational principles after the Second World War, and its influence on Chinese policy. The new reform policy of Deng Xiaoping represented the vision of "Confucian capitalism". This vision was influenced by the successes of Singaporean politicians. Confucian capitalism was based on the challenge to solve the livelihood of the people by using capitalist investment policy but under the control of an expert government and critically adapting Western methods. The essence of the idea was to use money and profit for rational investments aiming at a better living standard overall. This chapter also discusses the goals of a EU-China dialogue. It presents the main phases of a partnership policy that is being developed gradually: how European and Chinese politicians try to find the necessary consensus between the two civilizations to be able to cooperate on bilateral level as well as on multilateral level within the frameworks of the UN and the WTO. The chapter also investigates the human rights dialogue between the two civilizations.

The book concludes that the contacts - in the framework of a partnership policy - between these two civilizations can positively influence the history of mankind. It can contribute to the establishment of democracy among states, and to the reform of the international organizations (UN, WTO). However, the follow up of a much more troubled relationships has not been avoided yet either. Both the EU and China need further democratic reforms to be able to influence each other peacefully and avoid renewed conflicts. China may need to elaborate

“Confucian capitalism” as a democratic alternative. The EU may need to reform the principles of the “new-type intergovernmental-supranational union of states” and overcome its “democratic deficit”.

The book investigates the history of the Europe-China dialogue on the basis of a large amount of documentary material, by comparing the different sources. Quotations from the most important books and documents on the subject help students to understand the similarities and problems between the two civilizations, and better appreciate the importance of the Europe-China dialogue.

The most important conclusion of the book is that European studies should be involved in Chinese education, and Chinese studies in European education.

I hope that it will serve as a useful study material for anybody who wants to understand the historical background and the problems of the EU-China dialogue and partnership policies.

Éva Bóka

1. Introduction: Different Ways of Thinking, Different Philosophies of the State

1.1. Different Ways of Thinking

Chinese and European (or from the Chinese point of view *Western*) civilizations are similar and different. Both are philosopher civilizations in search of reality and truth. But there are differences in the thinking processes due to historical and geographical circumstances. Therefore the narrations about state and international organization are different. Understanding the thought processes and narrations of both civilizations can help the peaceful cooperation between China and Europe.

Chinese civilization was shaped by the teachings of the moral philosopher, Confucius. European civilization is founded on Greek political thinking, Roman law and Christian religion.

China was an agrarian society concentrating on the livelihood. Rice farming required strong cooperation among people. The population was homogeneous. Politics was centralized and the country was closed. Rituals and Confucian teaching formed the thinking of the population. Regarding state and international organization Chinese orientation toward life was shaped by the blending of three different philosophies: Taoism, Confucianism and, much later, Buddhism. Each philosophy emphasized harmony and largely discouraged abstract speculation. In the shaping of Chinese civilization, Confucianism played a major role. Confucius preceded the important Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. He was less a religious leader than an ethical philosopher. He emphasized the importance of proper relations among people. His system was hierarchical and strict, serving the needs of the livelihood in an agrarian society. Each member had clear obligations toward the other. Confucianism stressed livelihood, economic wellbeing, education and self-cultivation. The individual had to work not for self-benefits but for the entire family. Family advancement was more important than self-advancement (Nisbett, 2003: 12-17).

Greece developed differently. The maritime location of Greece made fishing and trading an important occupation. Settled agriculture quickly became commercial. These occupations demanded less cooperation, and the mercantile class encountered other cultures. Greece differed from all contemporary civilizations in the development of personal freedom, individuality, and objective thought. This is due to the unique Greek political system namely the *city-state* and its politics, especially the assembly, in which people had to discuss and persuade each other by rational arguments (Nisbett, 2003: 30). Greeks were independent and engaged in verbal contention and debate to discover the truth. They thought of themselves as individuals with distinctive properties, as units separate from others within the society and in control of their own destinies. *Liberty* was the rule (Nisbett, 2003: 19). But not for everybody. Greek and Roman societies were slave-holder societies. They accepted *slavery* as a necessary basis of the livelihoods of the privileged free citizens.

In opposition to European society Chinese society was not based on slavery and privileges from birth. Confucianism was a *personalist* philosophy based on *personal cultivation*, knowledge and a competitive examination system.

Ancient Greeks and Chinese differed very much in their habits of thought. The most evident difference was that Greeks focused on the concept of contradiction, and not accepting contradictions: Greeks invented *logic*. Aristotle worked out the basic rules of logic. Bad arguments were rejected. But they ignored that logical analysis could result in *decontextualization*, and that is not without danger. Chinese and East Asians, in contrast, strove to be reasonable, not rational. They tried to avoid extremes, not contradictions. Chinese developed a type of dialecticism seeing events in *context*. They were convinced that to see things and events in isolation can lead to *mistaken conclusions*.

European logical thinking ignored the development of sciences. But the problem with European logical thinking is that it can result in a belief in false things which motivate action. For example, ancient Greeks and Romans could believe in freedom based on slaves. They did not feel the contradiction because they accepted privileges from birth and prejudices. Their descendant Europeans, building colonial empires, also could believe in the dogma of democracy based on slavery, racism, and superiority. Their law was also based on this logical contradiction till the end of the Second World War when the principles of international organization and human rights were renewed. Rethinking this contradiction of European democracy still continues to remain a challenge.

There are also differences, for example, in the field of human rights which are the result of different social development. In the West, the relationship between the individual and the state is based on human rights as an achievement of Western social organization. In the East, societies are not aggregates of individuals but molecules or organisms. As a consequence, there is little or no conception of Western type rights. For the Chinese, any conception of rights is based on part-whole and not one-many conception of society. The conception of the individual is different. There are individual units and not individuals. Rights belong to the collective rather than to the individual. But for the individual, self-cultivation is a rule. Westerners see east Asians treating people as if they had no rights as individuals. Easterners reject morally Western behavior. (Nisbett, 2003: 195-201)

In conclusion, the thinking and narration characterizing European civilization differs very much from the Chinese. European thought accepts logic based on the differentiation between good and bad categories and ignores the context. Chinese thought concentrates on context and rejects the strict logic of good and bad. They seek truth from facts which place things in context. As a result, they think that in the good there are bad elements and in the bad there is always something good. Life is a mixture of good and bad elements in a given context. This process is nicely symbolized by the *yin-yang*. The black and white represents dualistic poles joined together in an all-encompassing unity. They are dependent on each other. Dualism of good and bad is a false premise: they arise mutually with one necessarily producing the other (Radcliff, 1993: 88).

On the basis of the above mentioned some differences one thing is certain: Europeans and Chinese can creatively and successfully influence each other's thinking. The development of a new thinking and new visions through dialogue based on the best of both civilizations could be the way towards a future peaceful world.

1.2. The Basic Principles of the European and the Chinese Philosopher on State: Plato, Aristotle, and Confucius

The Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, shaped the European political culture and the ideas on state and international organization. They lived long ago, but their ideas are still relevant: studied and discussed everywhere in Europe. Confucius (551- 479 BC) predated the

Greek philosophers by about one and half century. Mencius (ca. 372-289 BC) who continued the way of the Confucian teachings was the contemporary of the Greek philosophers. Both civilizations were philosopher civilizations and they represented similar moral social-organization principles. The differences between their visions were caused by different geographical and historical circumstances which defined social organization. The social visions and narativs of the Greek philosophers were based on the functional needs of a commercial, not agrarian society, with an inquisitive and expansive mind. One of the most influential works was Plato's *Republic* (written ca. in 360 BC) which can be regarded as the 'source book' of Western democracy (Plato, 1958). Here Plato laid down the basic principles of European state philosophy and of the different state forms. Another book which shaped the political thinking of European civilization was the *Politics* of Aristotle.

Plato

Plato (428-348 BC) regarded *truthfulness* as the basic principle of Western philosophy. He was convinced that philosophers love reality. They search for reality, and by searching for reality they can realize what is good. So, he believed that the philosophers know truth and reality. Their knowledge is based on the principle of truth. The principle of truthfulness means in his words:

“Truthfulness; that is, a determination never voluntarily to receive what is false, but to hate it and to love the truth” (Plato, 1958: 176).

In Plato's view, only the philosophers were capable of understanding the real principles underlying the legislation of the city because they search for reality. They are the lovers of reality. They alone ought to be the leaders of the state (Plato, 1958: 176).

State forms

Regarding the state forms, Plato differentiated between five forms: the *aristocracy*, *timocracy*, *oligarchy*, *democracy*, and *tyranny* (Plato, 1958: 240). In his eyes, the ideal state was aristocratic ruled by philosophers and virtue. The other four forms are the result of the gradual degradation of the ideal state and the values of the persons. So, the timocratic, the oligarchical, the democratic, and the tyrannical man represent the gradual degradation of values. The aristocratic man is just and good. The timocratic man arises out of aristocracy. After comes the oligarchic man, and then the democratic man and finally the tyrannic man. The tyrannic man can be seen as the most unjust and the extreme of wickedness (Plato, 238-239).

In Plato's view the first stage of degradation of state was timocracy, then oligarchy, democracy, and finally tyranny.

Timocracy: the first step on the way to the degradation of the ideal state. Timocracy developed when the ideal state became wrong: inequality and inharmonious life arose; freemen were enslaved and became serf and servant; compulsion and not persuasion characterized education; rivalry and ambition occurred and caused troubles and wars.

The characteristics of the timocratic man: less musical; less educated, less virtuous; cruel to slaves; civil to freemen; obedient to rulers; love rule and honour for warlike deeds and warrior qualities; he is a lover of gymnastics and of hunting. He becomes more and more fond of money as he gets older; his virtue gradually becomes damaged (Plato, 1958: 244).

Timocracy changes to oligarchy:

The oligarchic constitution rests on the valuing of property, the rich rule, and a poor man is debarred from office; people try to rival each other. Money-making and fortune is important. In oligarchy there is a progress in money-making; the more men honour money the less they honour virtue. There is a strife between wealth and virtue. Wealth is honoured, virtue is not

honoured. People elect the rich man to govern them. The poor man is unimportant. Oligarchy elects the rulers on the basis of property qualification. They describe a sum of money as a precondition of bearing office. Who has no money is declared disqualified from bearing office. Arms, threats, terrorism are used to achieve the power aims of the rich people. This is the city where the poor and the rich live within the same walls and always conspire against one another. All these result in a bad government (Plato, 1958: 245-248).

The problems of democracy

Oligarchy could degrade into democracy. Democracy is established as follows:

“Then a democracy, I fancy, comes into being when the poor have gained the day; some of the opposite party they kill, some they banish, with the rest they share citizenship and office on equal terms; and, as a general rule, office in the city is given by lot” (Plato, 1958: 253).

A democratic man is free. In democracy everybody is free, there are no slaves. The great goodness of democracy is *freedom*:

“In a democratic city men will tell you that liberty is their fairest possession, and that therefore theirs is the only city where a man who has a free nature can rightly dwell” (Plato, 1958: 259).

In democracy the *permissive principle* rules: each man arranges his own life, and can do whatever he desires. The permissive principle allows all kinds of constitutions, and it looks like the fairest of constitutions (Plato, 1958: 253-254). It is permitted for people to make choices and to found a city. But permissiveness can be dangerous because a democratic man knows no order or necessity in life, he lives following his desires, pleasures and freedoms of life (Plato, 1958: 258). Permissiveness and liberty can turn democracy into tyranny. Excessive liberty can give place to excessive slavery both for individuals and the state (Plato, 1958: 261).

Some of the most important reasons for the degradation of democracy into tyranny are the followings: First of all, in democracy the leaders plunder the propertied classes, divide the spoils among the people, and keep the biggest share for themselves. So, they gradually become oligarchs (Plato, 1958: 263). Secondly, in democracy people elect one person as *president* with a large power of governing. The president can easily misuse his power. He can change from president to *tyrant*. So a tyrant can spring from presidency. In Plato's words:

“And is it not the invariable custom of the public to put one man in high presidency over them, and to foster and strengthen him till he becomes great?

It is.

This is then clear, I said, that when a tyrant is begotten he springs from this root of presidency, and from nowhere else” (Plato, 1958: 263).

A president fears of loss of power. Therefore he gradually defeats his opposition by accusations and murders. This gradually changes him into a wolf instead of man. He gradually becomes a cruel tyrant, a “cruel guardian”, who makes people slaves. (Plato, 1958: 263-268).

Aristotle

Aristotle (384-322 BC) outlined the principles of a *parliamentary democracy* based on the assembly of the people and on rules of government declared in the *constitution*. In his view, man was by nature a political animal, coming together in cities for the sake of a good life. The constitution of the city contains the rules of communal life. If the constitution aims at the common good it is just. But if it aims only at the good of the rulers, it is despotic and

perverted (Aristotle, 1962: 19). Thinking on the different forms of the state in his *Politics*, Aristotle recognized that

“The sovereign must be one or few or the many. When the sovereign rules for the common advantage, we have the three correct constitutions: *kingship*, *aristocracy*, and the so called '*constitution*' (*politeia*). Their perversions, aiming at the advantage of the ruler, are *tyranny*, *oligarchy*, and *democracy*” (Aristotle, 1962: 22).

Kingship is the customary name for a monarchy that aims at the common advantage. *Aristocracy* is a rule of more than one, but only a few, aiming at the best for the city. The so called '*constitution*' is when the majority [citizens] governs for the common advantage. In his words:

“The customary name for a monarchy that looks to the common advantage is 'kingship'. For a rule of more than one but only a few it is 'aristocracy', either from the rulers' being the best men or from its aiming at the best for the city and its participants. When the majority governs for the common advantage, this is called by the common name of all the constitutions, a '*constitution*'” (Aristotle, 1962: 23)

The perversions of the above mentioned forms are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. Tyranny is the perversion of kingship, oligarchy of aristocracy, and democracy of '*constitution*'. Tyranny is a monarchy aiming at the advantage of the monarch. Oligarchy aims at that of the prosperous, democracy at the advantage of the needy, but none of them at the common profit (Aristotle, 1962: 23). ['*Constitution*' is translated also as '*polity*' (Aristotle, 1959: 78)].

'Mean'

Aristotle was for the '*mean*'. He believed that the virtuous life based on a certain middle way, '*mean*', is the best. It is true also when it is about government. The most perfect political community must be based on the middle class; composed of citizens having a moderate fortune. The most important rule is to avoid the extremes in anythings. The middle class is the best because it represents the more stable government; there are few troubles in the middle constitution. The middle constitution (the constitution representing the '*mean*') is best as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb the community.

“The happy life is the unimpeded life of goodness. Goodness is a mean. The middle in the cities is the class of persons who are neither very prosperous nor very needy. They are the most fortunate, reasonable, and stable, class in the city. They ought to be numerous, and they ought to be in control. But they rarely are numerous, and so the middle constitution rarely occurs” (Aristotle, 1962: 95).

Therefore for Aristotle the best constitution was the middle constitution based on the middle class.

Asiatics and Europeans

About the state organization of the Asian people, Aristotle had not a very good opinion because, in his view, they were cowards and accepted eternal subordination and slavery. In his words:

“Asiatics, on the other hand, are intelligent and inventive; but being without spirit, they are always in a state of subjection and slavery” (Aristotle, 1959: 201).

People who live in cold regions, particularly in Europe, are full of spirit but lacking in intelligence and skill. They remain comparatively free but are backward as regards organization and are unable to govern others.

“The Hellenic race inhabits an area midway between the two and shares likewise in the characteristics of both; it is at once high-spirited and intelligent. These circumstances enable it to remain free and make it the best governed of all nations; indeed it might rule the world if only it could be welded into a single state” (Aristotle, 1959: 201).

So, Aristotle accepted the *mission* of the best governed nation with civilizational aims. It can civilize the others exporting the principles of its perfect state. He believed in the world-wide mission of the Hellenic people who, from their single state as a center, could govern others. But the problem with the Aristotelian idea was that Hellenic people could not solve the challenge of establishing a single state. Greek-type city states remained divided and struggling for might. Their descendants, the Europeans, continued to face the same problem.

In conclusion, Plato and Aristotle represented all those ideas and principles of state and international organization which characterize European history: different state forms, the closed nation state, confederation, democracy, freedom, mission, expansion. European political philosophers studied and continued the ancient ideas, discussed and reformed them. Therefore the European political philosophy, in Chinese parallels, can be regarded as reform-Platonist or reform-Aristotelian.

Confucius

K'ung Fu-tzu (Latinised name Confucius) (551-479 B.C.) lived 2500 years ago (On his life see: Lin Yutang, 1938: 53-100). He belonged to the public servant class. He was a teacher who aimed to prepare men for public office. Because of his teachings and personality, Confucius was highly appreciated. He profoundly shaped the civilization of China. Confucian texts were compulsory reading in the late imperial period for all who wished to enter to the civil service or government. His sayings and those of his disciples, form the foundation of the Chinese social, ethical and intellectual system. The ideas of Confucius are still relevant, and they are still admired in China. From this point of view, Chinese political philosophy can be regarded as reform-Confucian.

The moral principles of Confucius can be find in the *Analects*. It is a collection of sayings and brief anecdotes representing the spirit of Confucius. His social vision was shaped by the needs of a settled and basically agrarian society which had no conquest aims.

Confucius as a personalist thinker

Confucius loved to learn, he silently accumulated knowledge and taught others. For Confucius, learning was the most important means of self-cultivation. He taught people about the importance of *self cultivation* and *studying* in the *Great Learning* as follows:

“The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first order well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.

Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy.

From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides” (Confucius, 1990a: 266).

In the view of Confucius people have to *follow the Way*. The most important principle for this, like in the case of Aristotle, was the '*mean*' (middle way):

“What Heaven has conferred is called the nature; an accordance with this nature is called the path of duty; the regulation of this path is called instruction. 2. The path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would not be the path ... 4. While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of harmony. This equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actions in the world, and this harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue” (Confucius, 1909b: Chapter I.1, 283-284).

Turning towards the past in search of truth

One of the most important element of the Confucian teaching was to seek truth by studying the past. Confucius had a bad opinion on those who, in his age, governed China; he did not appreciate them because they were people of small capacity. Analects, 13.20. (Confucius, 2000: 52).

Confucius turned towards the past. He believed:

“If by keeping the old warm one can provide understanding of the new, one is fit to be a teacher”. Analects, 2.11. (Confucius, 2000: 7).

He wrote the following on the sources of his principles:

“I transmit but do not create. Being fond of the truth, I am an admirer of antiquity. I venture to be compared with our old Peng”. Analects, 7.1. (Confucius, 2000: 24).

“I am not one who knew about things at birth; I am one who through my admiration of antiquity is keen to discover things”. Analects, 7. 20. (Confucius, 2000: 25).

Confucius regarded the early Zhou period as a golden age. Similarly the Europeans, in the period of the Renaissance, regarded the ancient Greek civilization and the Roman Empire as an example for political organization. In the view of Confucius the Zhou could obtain the mandate of Heaven to replace the bad rulers of the Yin. After them a long decline followed characterized by anarchy. In the Analects Confucius is actually looking back to the golden age when the Way prevailed. He aimed to restore the values of the founders, and who won the approval of Heaven. In his eyes the ideal ruler was a successful administrator; skillful in the arts of peace; attractive to the outside world because of the cultural achievements of his regime. The idealized ruler, Zhou, for example

“Paid careful attention to weights and measures, investigated the laws and regulations ... What he most stressed was people, food, mourning, sacrifices. Since he was tolerant he won over the multitude. Since he was of good face faith, the people gave him responsibility. Since he was diligent, he obtained results. Since he was just, they were pleased”. Analects, 20.1. (Confucius, 2000: 81).

Confucian values, Confucian principles

Filial piety, ancestor worship

Also belonging to a revival of past ideals was the appreciation of the *traditions* and *rituals*: *filial piety* and the *ancestor worship*. Therefore Confucius believed that anybody who

appreciates filial piety indirectly participates in government. In the Analects we can find the following about this:

Someone said to Master Kong: “Why do you not take part in government? The Master said: “The Book of Documents mentions filial piety, doesn't it? “Only be dutiful towards your parents and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to the existence of the government”. These virtues surely constitute taking part in government, so why should only that particular activity be regarded as taking part in government?” Analects, 2.21. (Confucius, 2000: 8).

In his explanation *filial piety* consisted of duties towards both the living and the dead. In the Confucian view filial piety can be applied to those who observes the intentions, the acts of his father, and makes no change from the ways of his father for three years. Analects, 1.11. (Confucius, 2000: 4); Analects, 4.20. (Confucius, 2000: 15).

Filial piety is one of the most questionable principles of the Confucian teaching in European eyes. The concept of filial piety was recognized as an excellent preserver of social stability. It preserved the family and the clan system on which the state depended. (Dawson, 1981: 48).

Self-cultivation, self-study, self-perfectionism

The most important teaching of Confucius is *self-perfectionism*, the *cultivation of the person* by *self-study*, learning, and *self-cultivation*: Confucius was fond of learning. He believed that life is a learning process. In his words:

“I silently accumulate knowledge of things; when I study, I do not get bored; in teaching others I do not grow weary – for these things surely present me with no difficulty”. Analects, 7.2 (Confucius, 2000: 24).

“When I walk with two others, I always receive instructions from them. I select their good qualities and copy them, and improve on their bad qualities”. Analects, 7.22. (Confucius, 2000: 26).

“The failure to cultivate virtue, the failure to put into practice what I have learnt, hearing what is right and being unable to move towards it, being unable to change what is not good – these are my worries. Analects, 7.3. (Confucius, 2000: 24).

“Extreme is my decline”. Analects, 7.5 (Confucius, 2000: 24)

“Set your heart on the Way, base yourself on virtue, rely on humaneness, and take your relaxation in the arts”. Analects, 7.6. (Confucius, 2000: 24)

“As for being a sage or human man, I would surely not presume to be such? On the other hand it may simply be said that I do not get tired of aiming for this and do not grow weary of teaching others”. Analects, 7.34. (Confucius, 2000: 27).

Confucius believed that one is good if there is a *harmony* between *knowledge*, *humaneness*, *dignity* and *rites*. Analects, 7.6, 15. 33. (Confucius, 2000: 63).

He emphasized the importance of *education*, *ritual*, *humaneness* and *virtues*, the *duty of personal perfection* as a member of society, *filial piety*, *gentleman-like behavior*, and the *government serving the livelihood* and the interests of the people.

Education

In his view *education* should concentrate on moral training. Social differentiation was based on *knowledge* and not on privileges of birth. In Confucius' words:

“Those who know things from birth come first; those who know things from study come next; those who study things although they find them difficult come

next to them; and those who do not study because they find things difficult, that is to say the common people, come last”. Analects, 16. 9. (Confucius, 2000:67).

Ritual

In the Confucian philosophy *ritual* directed human conduct: it can be regarded as codes of behavior based on precedent. Ritual became the means of controlling social behavior and preserving political hierarchies. The correct performance of ritual by the ruler served the harmony of the Cosmos. The most important rule was not to do things which are contrary to ritual. For example rulers could secure universal harmony by rituals. In his words:

“In the practice of the rites harmony is regarded as the most valuable thing, and in the ways of the ancient kings this is regarded as the most beautiful thing. It is adopted in all matters, both small and great. But sometimes it does not work. If you behave harmoniously because you understand harmony, but do not regulate your conduct with ritual, surely that cannot be made to work”. Analects, 1.12. (Confucius, 2000: 4).

Humaneness

Confucius used *humaneness* as a philosophical term. Humaneness means *courtesy, tolerance, good faith, diligence, and kindness*. Analects, 17. 5 (Confucius, 2000: 69-70). The most important is to be able to *love others*; to understand others and do not do to the others what a person does not want for him or herself:

“Do not impose on others what you would not like for yourself” Analects, 12.2 (Confucius, 2000: 44)

or

“Do not inflict on others what you yourself would not wish done to you” Analects, 15.24. (Confucius, 2000: 62).

A person is human if he is able to submit to ritual and behave following the *right principles*:

“To subdue oneself and return to ritual is to practice humaneness” Analects, 12.1 (Confucius, 2000: 44).

The most important secret of humaneness is the *harmony of thinking, speaking, and acting*. Analects, 13.20. (Confucius, 2000: 52). One can make mistakes but the realization and correction of them is important:

“If one commits an error and does not reform, this is what is meant by an error” Analects, 15.30. (Confucius, 2000: 63).

To humaneness belongs *self-perfection* which means attacking one's bad qualities.

The Gentleman

Confucius believed in the idea of the *gentleman* (the aristocrat). The gentleman was the most perfect person in the Confucian world: The gentleman holds in awe three things: the awe of the decree of Heaven, the great men, and the word of sages. Analects, 16. 8. (Confucius, 2000: 67). A gentleman was a highly qualified wise man, having wideranging studies in culture restrained by the requirements of ritual. Analects, 6. 27. (Confucius, 2000: 22). Confucius meant that the gentleman has to concentrate on the following nine things: in seeing he has to concentrate on clarity, in listening on acuteness, in expression on warmth, in demeanour on courtesy, in words on loyalty, in deeds on reverence, in doubt he asks questions, in indignation he concentrates on the problems, and when he sees opportunity for gain he concentrates on what is right. Analects, 16.10. (Confucius, 2000: 67).

Virtuous government serving livelihood

The most important goal of the government is to deal with the *livelihood* of the people, and to safeguard social *peace*.

“Enough food, enough weapons, and confidence of the people” The most important is confidence: “a people without confidence in its rulers will not stand” Analects, 12.7. (Confucius, 2000: 45).

Government was thought as a matter of instruction and example. The government has to fulfill the function of a specialist ruling group. Consultation with the people was possible in the interests of political harmony.

“To govern means to correct”. If you take the lead by being correct, who will dare to be corrected?” Analects, 12.17. (Confucius, 2000: 46).

What sort of person must be in order to take part in government:

Master Kong believed that if one honours the five excellences and puts away the four abominations, one may take part in government. The five excellences are the followings:

“When the gentleman is not wasteful although he is bounteous, when he is not resented although he gets people to work hard, when he is not greedy although he has desires, when he is not arrogant although he is dignified, when he is not fearsome although he is awe-inspiring”. Analects, 20.2. (Confucius, 2000: 82).

The five abominations: ruthlessness, harshness, oppressiveness, niggardliness in giving, officiousness. Analects, 20.2. (Confucius, 2000: 82).

“If one does not understand fate, one has no means of becoming a gentleman; if one does not understand the rites, one has no means of taking one’s stand; if one does not understand words, one has no means of understanding people” Analects, 20.3. (Confucius, 2000: 82).

Virtuous ruler

Confucius, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, speaks only about the monarchical form. He does not mention other forms because, in his view, there is always a ruler or president at the top. He believed that government had to be based on a virtuous ruler. In his words:

“When the way prevails in all under Heaven, the rites, music, and punitive expeditions emanate from the Son of Heaven” Analects, 16. 2. (Confucius, 2000: 66).

When the way does not prevail in all under Heaven then feudal lords, their grandees or their subordinate officials govern and control the state. Their rule represents a gradual decline. They are lost within a few generation because of many discussions, anarchy and a struggle for power. Analects, 16.2. (Confucius, 2000: 66).

Confucius believed that the best government is when a *virtuous emperor*, like the Son of Heaven, bearing the mandate of Heaven, rules in the service of the people. Feudal lords and officials represent decline, anarchy and contribute to the dissolution of the state. The most corrupted form of monarchy is absolute monarchy, the authoritarian or tyrannical rule. Confucius emphasised the importance of a morally correct relationship between the emperor, the government and the people. The ruler and the government are for the people. Their duty is the *livelihood* of the people.

The ruler has to follow the rites and the moral principles:

“If their superior loves the rites, the people will be easy to command”. Analects, 14.41. (Confucius, 2000: 59).

The true ruler has to be humane. He should bestow humane government upon their people. The true ruler, through his humaneness, could convert the whole country to virtuous behavior:

“If there existed a true king, after a generation humaneness would certainly prevail”. Analects, 13.12. (Confucius, 2000: 50).

Rejection of the tyrannical ruler

Is there a single saying with which one might ruin a state? Master Kong replied: “A saying cannot be quite like that. But there is a saying among men which runs “I have no pleasure in being a ruler, except that nobody opposes me with his words”. As far as his good points are concerned, it is surely good, isn't it, that nobody opposes him? But as far as his bad points are concerned, if nobody opposes him, is this not close to ruining a state with a single saying?” Analects, 13.15. (Confucius, 2000: 51).

How to deal with the people?

The people must be properly instructed:

“The people may be made to follow something, but may not be made to understand it”. Analects, 8.9. (Confucius, 2000: 29).

The government has to gain the respect of the people:

“If you oversee them [the people] with dignity, they will be respectful. If you are dutiful towards your parents and kind to your children, then they will be loyal. If you promote the good and instruct the incompetent, then they will be encouraged” Analects, 2. 20. (Confucius, 2000: 8).

“If you promote the straight and set them above the crooked, then the people will be obedient. If you promote the crooked and set them above the straight, then the people will not be obedient”. Analects, 2.19. (Confucius, 2000: 8).

People have to *respect the ruler*, and they have to be *obedient*:

“If the ruler desires good, the people will be good: “The nature of the gentleman is like the wind, and the nature of the small people is like the grass. When the wind blows over the grass it always bends.” Analects, 12.19. (Confucius, 2000: 47).

The principles of the Confucian patriarchal state

1. Government is a matter of setting a moral example

The ruler must deal with the people with dignity than they will respect the ruler:

“If you oversee them with dignity, they will be respectful”. Analects, 2.20. (Confucius, 2000: 8).

2. Everybody takes part in the government through filial piety and guarding morality:

Who had no political power could also contribute to policy by securing harmony in the family: Dutifulness towards the parents and friendliness towards the brothers contribute to government and constitute taking part in government. Analects, 2.21. (Confucius, 2000: 8).

3. The ruler must instruct and encourage his subjects as a father instructs and encourages his children. (He must practice filial piety):

“To govern means to correct. If you take the lead by being correct, who will dare not to be corrected?”. Analects, 12.17. (Confucius, 2000: 46).

4. Brotherhood

“All men can have brothers if they are correct in dealing with each others”
Analects, 12.5 (Confucius, 2000: 44-45).

5.Regarding foreigners, and alien people Confucius emphasised cultural differences and demanded correct behavior with them:

The master said: “Courtesy in private life, reverence in handling business, loyalty in relationships with others. They should not be set aside even if one visits the barbarian tribes” (Analects, 13.19. Confucius, 2000: 51-52).

6.Confucius’s antipathy to litigation

Confucius believed that, if everybody observed the moral code, there would be no need to invoke the process of law.

“At hearing legal proceedings I am no different from anybody else, but what is surely necessary is to bring it about that there is no litigation”. Analects, 12.13 (Confucius, 2000: 46).

7. The people should be led by *virtue* rather than by fear. Confucius emphasized the importance of moral power and moral influence in governance.

“If you lead the [people] by means of virtue and keep order among them by ritual, they will have a conscience and will reform themselves”. Analects, 2.3. (Confucius: 2000: 6).

8. Men’s life should conform with the Way

“Riches and honours – these are what men desire, but if this is not achieved in accordance with the appropriate principles, one does not cling to them”. Analects, 4. 5. (Confucius, 2000: 13).

A great minister is obedient as long as the ruler accepts and follows the rules. But if the ruler breaks the rules, resistance is possible:

“What I call a great minister serves his ruler in accordance with the Way, and when it is impossible to do he resigns”. Analects, 11.22. (Confucius, 2000: 41).

Conclusions

In conclusion, the teachings of Confucius can be regarded as the basis of Chinese civilization. Therefore, it is possible to speak about a Confucian China as a Confucian civilization. The education-conscious Chinese people regarded Confucius as their model. He had a great influence on traditional China and he influenced modern China, too.

The cultural heritage of Confucius was much discussed in the period of modernization in China as it was in the West, and due to similar reasons: On the one hand, Confucius was rejected as the cause of stagnation, on the other hand he was appreciated as a founder of a society based on self-education. He was blamed for the rigid and hierarchical society of the past (subordination of the children to the parents (filial piety, respect for the elders). He was blamed for being the cause of Chinese stagnation and the lack of scientific, technological and military development. On the other hand, he was admired because of his emphasis on self-education of the persons which undermined the old aristocratic predominance. This attitude of Confucius was alive and is alive in Chinese history: self-cultivation and moulding of the personality (Dawson, 1981: 86). In our days his teachings, in a reformed form, are regarded as the basis of an alternative Chinese model to the Western model.

Confucius was a personalist thinker. His ideas were based on self-education, self-cultivation and moulding of the personality; political correctness; right thinking. He gave persons principles and helped them how to behave, how to deal with problems. In personal cultivation

he emphasized the importance of education - teaching and learning – because “the process of teaching and learning stimulate one another” (Lin Yutang, 1938: 242).

Confucius was for a government headed by a virtuous superior man (prince or ruler) cultivating his own character as a humanist. In his view character was the foundation and wealth the result: if the ruler neglects the foundation and attends to the outwards results he will lead the people in mutual robbery or competition for profit. The material prosperity of a nation depends on the balance of material prosperity and righteousness (Lin Yutang, 1938: 149, 152). In Chinese society the emperor, as the representative of the mandate of Heaven, had to play the role of a good and wise ruler dealing with the livelihood of the people and the establishment of peace and harmony in society. In Western thinking, based on Plato's idealist philosopher state, there were more forms of state. But the idea of a virtuous ruler was the same in the West, too. Erasmus, for example, aiming to establish peace among Christian rulers, emphasized that a Christian ruler has to be virtuous, representing similar values to a Confucian ruler. So, the goal of having virtuous social organizational principles serving as the basis of human behaviour and the principles themselves, are similar in both civilizations.

At the heart of Confucianism there is humanism and morality. Politicians – during the imperial age - used the message of Confucius to serve an autocratic state. In the period of Chinese modernization Confucianism was reformed with more or less successes. People have preserved the original vision of the master. So Confucius has shaped his country's civilization. He became the example to his fellow human beings. Therefore Chinese civilization can be regarded as a Confucian civilization.

Reading the Confucian principles one can find a lot of similarities with the European moral principles. Undoubtedly the two civilizations have similar moral roots. The influence of Confucius was important in the period of Enlightenment when the principles of a renewed European society were being shaped. The Confucian principles sound familiar for a European: personalism, self-cultivation, virtue, gentleman behaviour, family background, virtuous government.

2. Chinese Civilization as Seen by Europeans

2.1. Periods of European Views on China

Because of geographical differences, European and Chinese society developed differently. But till the beginning of Western colonization, alongside the differences both had more similarities. The European view on China has three main phases:

In the first period, the 16-18th century, the Europeans highly appreciated Chinese civilization.

In the second period, the 19th century till the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, Europeans regarded China as a society in stagnation. The period of Mao's personal cult and the Cultural Revolution was strongly criticized and rejected in Europe.

In the third period, starting with the reforms of Deng Xiaoping till the present day, the EU-China partnership is in development based on a dialogue between the two civilizations. The EU regards China as a rising great power and aims to be present in the Chinese market.

In the first period Europe was less developed than China. Chinese civilization was highly appreciated by European thinkers. The study of Confucianism contributed to the European Enlightenment.

In the second period, thanks to colonialism and more highly developed weapons, Europe was economically strengthened: science and technique developed; Britain became the center of the world economy. European colonial imperialism produced two world wars and destroyed European civilization. After the Second World War European civilization renewed its state and international organization principles thanks to the successes of the supranational – intergovernmental integration process.

In the third period the Communist block gradually collapsed, the EU as a peaceful economic and trade block was established and the eastern enlargement started. Parallel to all of these China started to open up and to participate in the world economy and trade. Chinese reforms resulted in a booming economy and trade and the gradual establishment of a EU-China partnership. China is in search of a Confucian capitalist model as an alternative social organization model.

2.2. Discovering China and Confucius

Marco Polo

In the classical age of ancient Greece and Rome, practically nothing was known of China. Under emperor Augustus, China was known as the Land of Silk, Chinese as the silk people. Before the foundation of the Mongol Empire (from Ukraine to the borders of China) by Ghengiz Khan in the 13th century, Western Europe and China knew about each other's existence, but they knew nothing concrete. Fantasy and fables dominated.

The true discoverer of China for the West was Marco Polo. He was born in 1254 into a Venetian merchant family. His father, Nicolo, and his brother, Maffeo, had been to the court of the Mongol Khan Khubilai in order to trade and had set up a regular trading association between the Far East and Venice.

Marco Polo was the first to tell Europe about the political organization and about the material civilization of the great empire of Eastern Asia. His account contains most important material concerning the Mongol Empire of which China was a part. He was the first European who described China from his own observation. Hang-chou (Kinsai), the capital of the Southern Sung dynasty, made a great impression on Marco Polo. Two of the longest chapters of his account describe it.

About Kinsai, whose name means the City of Heaven, Marco Polo wrote that it was an important commercial center (Polo, 1959: 184-203). In the city there were many bridges, ten principal and innumerable local market places, large store buildings in which all the merchants who came from India and elsewhere stored their wares and merchandise. In the market people could buy everything which they needed. Economic life, business and commerce, sugar, salt and silk production were organized in guilds. There were splendid palaces, abbeys and monasteries. Life was very attractive, and it was a good place for pleasure seekers. Peoples of Kinsai were idolaters, subject to the Great Khan. They used paper money. Men as well as women were fair-skinned and good-looking. In the city there were 3000 public baths and people were very clean (Marco Polo, 1959: 184-194). He writes also about the palace of the fugitive king, the one time lord of Manzi, which is the most beautiful and splendid palace in the world: "No words of mine could describe its superlative magnificence" (Marco Polo, 1959: 196-197).

What Marco Polo wrote is a proof that China, up to the 15th century, was far ahead, not only of the West but also of most oriental civilizations in the sphere of natural science and technology. Much more invention came from China to the West than from the West to China (sailing carriage, magnetic compass, paper, printing, movable-type printing, porcelain, and much else).

Matteo Ricci

The Italian Jesuit father, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), who founded the Chinese mission, also proved that there was a highly developed civilization on the other part of the Eurasian continent. He arrived in Macao in 1582 and, between 1599 and 1610, he lived in Peking. He regarded Chinese economic, industrial and commercial life to be highly developed: Chinese could produce everything and they did not need to import anything. He emphasized that the Chinese were endowed by nature with a talent for trading (Ricci, 1953: 10, 19). Ricci studied Chinese customs, language and culture to be able to achieve results in the conversion of the Chinese to Christianity. While doing this he was able to discover the Chinese intellectual life and the main characteristics of Confucianism. In his eyes, China appeared as a wonderful empire where the literary class, the philosophers had an important influence over the rulers. He appreciated the Chinese moral philosophy which was highly developed. But he criticized the Chinese because of a lack of the conception of the rules of logic (Ricci, 1953: 26, 30).

Ricci discovered and highly appreciated Confucius as a philosopher. In his words:

"The most renowned of all Chinese philosophers was named Confucius. This great and learned man was born five hundred and fifty-one years before the beginning of the Christian era, lived more than seventy years, and spurred on his people to the pursuit of virtue not less by his own example than by his writings and conferences. His self-mastery and abstemious ways of life have led his countrymen to assert that he surpassed in holiness all those who in times past, in the various parts of the world, were considered to have excelled in virtue. Indeed,

if we critically examine his actions and sayings as they are recorded in history, we shall be forced to admit that he was the equal of the pagan philosophers and superior to most of them. He is held in such high esteem by the learned Chinese that they do not dare to call into question any pronouncement of his and are ready to give full recognition to an oath sworn in his name, as in that of a common master” (Ricci, 1953: 30).

“Not only is this true of the philosophers as a class, but even the rulers, during the past ages, have paid him the highest homage due to a mortal. He was never venerated with religious rites, however, as they venerate a god. They gratefully acknowledge their indebtedness to him for the doctrines he bequeathed to them, and even today, after so long a lapse of time, his descendants are held in high esteem by all” (Ricci, 1953: 30).

From Ricci, Europeans could learn that Confucius collected the basic moral rules of the ancient well-governed China in his books. He wrote that Confucius, called the Prince of Chinese Philosophers, compiled four volumes of the works of more ancient philosophers and wrote five books of his own. These five he entitled “The Doctrines”, and they contain the ethical principles of right living, precepts governing the conduct of political life, customs and examples of the ancients, their rites and sacrifices and even samples of their poetry and other subjects of this nature. Besides these five books there is another one composed of the precepts of the great philosopher and of his disciples and compiled without any particular arrangement. These are chiefly directions for proper moral proceedings in the light of human reason with a view to virtuous conduct on the part of the individual, of the family and of the kingdom in general. This volume, being a summary in excerpts from the four books mentioned, is called the Tetrabiblion. The nine books of Confucius, making up the most ancient of Chinese libraries, of which all others are a development, were written mostly in hieroglyphic characters, and present a collection of moral precepts for the future good and development of the kingdom (Ricci, 1953: 33).¹

Ricci writes about the examination system, too. In his view this system makes China an empire of philosophers, where learning is highly appreciated, and the number of private teachers is great:

“There is a law in the land, handed down from ancient kings and confirmed by the custom of centuries, stating that who wishes to be learned, and to be known as such, must draw his fundamental doctrine from these same books. In addition to this it is not sufficient for him to follow the general sense of the text, but what is far more difficult, he must be able to write aptly and exactly of every particular doctrine contained in these books. To this end he must commit the entire Tetrabiblion to memory, so as to be a recognized authority thereon. There are no schools or public academies in which these books are thought or explained by masters. Each student selects his own master by whom he is instructed in his own home and at his personal expense” (Ricci, 1953: 33).

Ricci writes in detail about Chinese education and the examination system (Ricci, 1953: 26-41). He regarded it as a strange and perhaps somewhat inefficient method because the judges of all examination, whether it be in military science, in mathematics, or in medicine were always chosen from the philosophy experts:

¹ The Five Classics (Classic of Changes, Classic of Poetry, Classic of Rites, Classic of History, and the Spring and Autumn Annals) is a corpus of five classic Chinese books used by Confucianism as a basis of studies. According to tradition they were compiled or edited by Confucius himself.

“The wisdom of those who excel in the profession of ethics is held in such high esteem that they would seem to be competent to express a proper judgment on any subject, though it be far afield from their own particular profession” (Ricci, 1953: 41).

At the same time Ricci acknowledged that the Chinese made progress, not only in moral philosophy, but in astronomy and in many branches of mathematics as well. Chinese medicine is also well-known, but different from the Europeans.

Writing about the administration of China Ricci emphasizes, as the most important difference between the Chinese and the European state concept, that the Chinese did not know the Platonic and Aristotelian forms of the state. In China in his words:

“From time immemorial the monarchical government was the only one approved by the Chinese people. Aristocracy, democracy, plutarchy, or any other such form was not even known by name” (Ricci, 1953: 41).

About the state system he wrote that the Chinese form of government was monarchical but it was to some extent an aristocracy. The King had to confirm all decisions, but he had to consult the magistrates in all important decisions. Chinese imperial power passed on from father to son or to other royal kin, as did the European. They worshipped Heaven as the Supreme Being. For them, the emperor was the son of Heaven, the son of God. But China was not under despotic rule. The country consisted of provinces. The provinces were divided into different regions or districts called Fu, and each district had its governor. The districts were subdivided into cities, or towns, which were centres of the market and economic life. The administration of China was dependent upon the capital city. Customs, ritual, and ceremony were important.

Regarding the Chinese foreign policy he remarks that the extent of the Chinese kingdom is so vast that Chinese think the whole world is involved in their kingdom (Ricci, 1953: 58). However Chinese are suspicious with the foreigners. Under no conditions will they permit to foreigners to penetrate to the interior of the country. It is a centuries old custom which is based on natural fears of the foreigners (Ricci, 1953: 43).

Ricci mentioned two important differences between the Europeans and the Chinese:

The first was peace and harmony, directing the Chinese empire in their foreign relations.

The second was the rule of philosophers and the great value of study and knowledge.

Regarding peaceful social organization Ricci believes that it was quite remarkable that in China, which is a huge country with an innumerable population and well equipped army and navy, neither the king nor his people ever thought of waging a war of aggression. He regarded it as the most important achievement of a civilization. In his words:

“They are quite content with what they have and they are not ambitious in conquest. In this respect they are much different from the people of Europe, who are frequently discontent with their own governments and covetous of what others enjoy” (Ricci, 1953: 55).

So Ricci used the Chinese Empire as an example for the Europeans who wanted to dominate by means of subjugating neighboring nations. The Chinese did not conquer and they did not extend the boundaries of the empire by conquest, and they could not really understand why did the missionaries want to change their thinking and belief. Why were they, the missionaries, convinced that Christianity represented the best way of life? Why did they believe in this preconception without knowing Chinese civilization?

Regarding the rule of philosophers Ricci emphasized that the entire kingdom was administered by the Order of the learned, commonly known as the philosophers. The orderly

management of the empire was their vocation, and they were highly respected by the people (Ricci, 1953: 55).

As a result of the respect for learning in China the study of letters is more acceptable to the people than the profession of arms. It is understandable because Chinese has little or no interest in extension of the empire (Ricci, 1953: 56).

In summary, Ricci's merit was interpreting Chinese society and culture on the basis of his Chinese studies through Christian European eyes. He was able to understand the importance of Confucianism in Chinese social organization. He was the first who started to compare Confucianism with Christian European state philosophy. He discovered that one is able to know and understand his or her thinking and social organizational mentality only by comparing it to the others. Therefore Christianity can be happy that Confucianism existed as a civilizational challenge.

The first meeting between Chinese and Christian European civilization in the interpretation of Ricci was successful. Ricci was convinced in his Christian belief, and tolerated and appreciated Confucius, too. This approach gradually disappeared as European colonizers became more and more powerful in China and world-wide.

2.3. The Influence of Confucianism on the European Enlightenment, 17th-18th Centuries

In 1662, Jesuit missionaries published the first translation of a part of Confucian teachings in Peking. They played an important role in transferring the Confucian ideas towards the Europeans. This new knowledge of China produced a powerful impression in the West. The European academic world, first of all the French, appreciated Chinese culture. Eminent thinkers such as Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715), Fénelon (1651-1715), Montesquieu (1689-1755), Voltaire (1694-1778) and others, among them Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), were very interested in China and the Chinese ideas.

Chinese practical philosophical ideas and Chinese social and political ideals influenced the Enlightenment. Leibniz, for example, studying the Confucian teaching became enlightened and initiated the European Enlightenment. Wolff emphasized that Confucianism is a moral philosophy which contains the spirit of reform following the needs of livelihood. Voltaire was convinced that, in China, the theory of a universal religion of reason existed. He appreciated Chinese patriarchal society as rational and democratic. In opposition to him, Montesquieu regarded the Chinese patriarchal state as despotic. The discovery of Chinese civilization served as a means of comparison and critique of the European feudal privileges, prejudices, stereotypes, and missionary expansionist mentality. As such it influenced the European Enlightenment.

2.4. Leibniz on Chinese Natural Philosophy

It was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) who, on basis of the Jesuits missionary literature, realized that Confucianism was based on natural philosophy and reason. He was very enthusiast about China. Leibniz strongly criticized the Western morality and admired Chinese natural philosophy and natural theology. He believed that it would be a help for Christian society if the Chinese sent missionaries to Europe to teach natural theology and rationalism. In his words:

”Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology”(Leibniz, 1994a: 50-51).

Chinese civilization as the Eastern equivalent of the European civilization

Searching for a solution for religious conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, Leibniz, in his *Novissima Sinica historiam nostri temporis illustratura* (1697/99), wished to reconcile Catholics and Protestants. He used Chinese philosophy as a guide for this. He emphasized that his philosophy was fully compatible with (early) basic beliefs of the Chinese; therefore Chinese basic beliefs are fully compatible with those basic beliefs shared by Catholics and Protestants and therefore those Christian doctrines, in disputes between Catholics and Protestants, should be seen as relatively unimportant in the larger scheme of things, and could be adjudicated to the satisfaction of all on the basis of reason – with a resulting international peace and harmony among and between all of the world's peoples (Leibniz, 1994: Introduction, 3).

Leibniz was convinced that the ideal of the peaceful great harmony did not only in the European thinking exist. It was closely related to the Chinese idea of *ta t'ung*, the great unity or one world. Therefore the two civilizations could contribute to the universal understanding of human civilization (Franke, 1967: 62). He believed that Europe and China could become the highest civilization of mankind. China could be regarded as a kind of oriental Europe at the opposite end of the earth. If these most highly developed nations which were separated, reached out their arms to one another, everything that lay between them would gradually be brought to a higher way of life (Franke, 1967: 62-63).

Leibniz clearly recognized that European civilization and Chinese civilization were of the greatest significance for the whole world. In his words:

“I consider it a singular plan of the fates that human cultivation and refinement should today be concentrated, as it were, in the two extremes of our continent, in Europe and in Tschina (as they call it), which adorns the Orient as Europe does the opposite edge of the earth. Perhaps Supreme Providence has ordained such an arrangement, so that as the most cultivated and distant peoples stretch out their arms to each other, those in between may gradually be brought to a better way of life” (Leibniz, 1994a: 45).

Comparing European and Chinese culture, Leibniz admitted that Europeans were equal with the Chinese in the industrial arts, they were ahead of them in contemplative sciences but Chinese surpassed Europeans in practical philosophy, that is, in precepts of ethics and politics adopted to the present life and use of mortals. In his words:

“But who would have believed that there is on earth a people who though we are in our view so very advanced in every branch of behavior, still surpass us in comprehending the precepts of civil life? Yet now we find this to be so among the Chinese, as we learn to know them better. And so if we are their equals in the industrial arts and ahead of them in contemplative sciences, certainly they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of mortals. Indeed, it is difficult to describe how beautifully all laws of the Chinese, in contrast to those of other peoples, are directed to the achievement of public tranquility and the establishment of social order, so that men shall be disrupted in their relations as little as possible” (Leibniz: 1994a: 46-47).

Leibniz highly appreciated the importance of peace and harmony in Chinese thinking. At the same time he criticized Chinese behavior because they could not defend themselves against the Europeans who were superior in making wars. Therefore, Leibniz thought that Chinese were mistaken in ignoring military science because they could not defend themselves and evil could easily gain.

[Chinese] “yield to us in military science, not so much in ignorance as by deliberation. For they despise everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men, and almost in emulation of the higher teachings of Christ (and not, as some wrongly suggest, because of anxiety), they are averse to war. They would be wise indeed if they were alone in the world. But as things are, it come back to this, that even the good must cultivate the arts of war, so that the evil may not gain power over everything. In these matters, then, we are superior” (Leibniz, 1994a: 46).

Discovering Enlightenment

The most important challenge for Leibniz was to explain Chinese *natural philosophy*. He highly appreciated Confucius, whom he regarded as a natural philosopher. He based this belief on his conviction that, when the Chinese literati rendered honors to Confucius, they considered it a civil ceremony rather than a religious cult (Leibniz, 1994b: 61). For him Chinese literati were *atheists*:

“The Chinese literati are atheists: they believe the world is the result of chance; all is governed (according to them) by the random motion of bodies and the souls of the departed return into the vacuum of the first principle” (Leibniz, 1994c: 68).

Leibniz realized that Chinese philosophy was never organized in a systematic form: there was a lack of philosophical terminology and nothing prevented interpreting what the ancient taught about divine and spiritual things in a more favorable sense. Therefore the free interpretation of the ancient teaching about divine and spiritual things was possible (Leibniz, 1994c: 72).

In his *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese* (1716) Leibniz analyzed and tried to understand Chinese natural philosophy on the basis of the writings of Father Nicolas Longobardi and Father Antoine de Sainte Marie (Longobardi, 2002: 113-158; Sainte Marie, 2002: 157-223). Father Longobardi became the Director of the Mission of China after Ricci and he lived there many years until his death. Leibniz realized that both Longobardi and Sainte Marie were writing against Chinese doctrine following their religious preconceptions and beliefs. So Leibniz was aware that he had used insecure sources. He regretted that there was not so much written about China and the Chinese classics were not properly translated. He expressed his wish to improve this situation because Chinese civilization was the primary important civilization of mankind. Therefore Europeans had to study it (Leibniz, 1994d: 78-79).

Leibniz knew that Chinese natural philosophy was ancient. Chinese philosophical doctrine had been established and authorized for about 3000 years, long before the philosophy of Greeks whose works nevertheless were the earliest which the rest of the world possessed, except of course for the Sacred Writings of Christianity. Christian missionaries, without knowing the Chinese culture, were prejudiced and stereotyped it as untrue and false. Leibniz was convinced that this mentality of the Christian Europeans was not correct, therefore it was necessary to study and understand the basic principles of the Chinese life. He expressed this as follows:

“It would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part, having newly arrived compared with them, and scarcely out of barbarism, to want to condemn such an ancient doctrine simply because it does not appear to agree at first glance with our

ordinary scholastic notions. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that one could destroy this doctrine without great upheaval. Thus it is reasonable to inquire whether we could give it a proper meaning” (Leibniz, 1994d: 78).

Based on the informations of Nicolas Longobardi, Leibniz understood that the first principle of the Chinese is called *Li* which means *reason*:

“The first principle of the Chinese is called Li, that is reason, or the foundation of all nature, the most universal reason and substance; there is nothing greater nor better than the Li. This great and universal cause is pure, motionless, ratified, without body or shape, and can be comprehended only through the understanding. From the Li qua Li emanate five virtues: piety, justice, religion, prudence, and faith” (Leibniz, 1994d: 79).

[Li] “is not only the principle of the physical basis of Heaven and Earth and other material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of virtues, customs, and other spiritual things. It is invisible, it is perfect in its being to the highest degree, and it is itself all perfections” (Leibniz, 1994d: 80).

Longobardi says also that Chinese called it the “Summary Unity” because unity was the basis and the essence of the universe which was absolutely unitary. The Universe is not divisible but it was the aggregate of the most perfect multiplicity. The Li principle contained the essences of things as they are in their germinal state (Leibniz, 1994d: 80).

Father de Sainte Marie interpreted Li as

“The law which directs all things and it is the intelligence which guides them. It is the law and universal order according to which Heaven and Earth have been formed; the origin, source and principle of all which has been produced” (Leibniz, 1994d: 79).

Consequently Chinese Li was an intelligent nature which saw all, knew all, and could do all. This principle comprehended all ways and laws of reason (Leibniz, 1994d, 79).

Based on all this information, Leibniz realized that Chinese Li had the same qualities as God in the Christian religion. Therefore he raised the question whether the Chinese Li was the sovereign substance which the European revered under the name of God? (Leibniz, 1994d: 83).

Finally Leibniz concluded that *Chinese Li* is the *Reason and Order of the Nature*, and the nature was God. Therefore nature played the role of God for the Chinese (Leibniz, 1994d: 85). Consequently Chinese religion was natural religion. The Chinese believed in all those basic moral principles which directed the behavior of a true Christian. The most important difference was that they regarded these principles as having their origin in nature. Confucius represented the principle of Reason as natural principle without attributing it a divine character. In his thinking nature represented the real world and man was in search for truth. On the basis of Confucian teaching the Chinese were governed by knowledge, reason and order represented in Li. For them things were created by nature and harmony and things in the world happened following the order of the supreme reason.

Discussing the opinions, the criticism, and rejections of the Jesuit missionaries of Confucianism and Chinese natural philosophy, Leibniz discovered the importance of natural philosophy and reason. With this he laid the foundations of the European *Enlightenment*. In this way European discussions on Confucius and the Chinese philosophy contributed to the emergence of natural philosophy and the Enlightenment in Europe.

The most important achievement of Leibniz was that, by studying the world's oldest culture, he discovered the harmony between Christian doctrine and Chinese beliefs. This proved the universality of his views. He emphasized the importance of the study of Chinese civilization.

2.5. Christian Wolff on Confucius as a Reformer

Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was also influenced by China. This was evident from his university lecture in Halle in 1721 on the theme *De Sinarum philosophia practica*. In this he praised the morality of Confucius and placed it on the same level as Christian morality. For this Wolff was accused of atheism by the Protestant theologians in Halle and had to leave Halle and Prussia for a short time. Frederick the Great recalled him to Prussia (Franke, 1967: 63).

Wolff's images on China were the same as Ricci's, and Longobardi also influenced him. He appreciated Chinese rationalism and wisdom. He realized that Chinese wisdom rejected the necessity of religious service in moral things because the Chinese morality was based on the nature of man. It cultivated the good in the nature of man and not the struggle against bad as in the case of Christian morality. The Chinese believed that morality had to be based on reality and not on theological thinking.

Wolff highly appreciated Confucius, but he did not regard Confucius as the founder of the Chinese wisdom. The founders of the Chinese state were the legendary emperors from Fu Xi (Fu-hsi). They based the state on moral principles and on the idea of a virtuous ruler serving as an example for the people. When Confucius lived this state idea had already collapsed. Confucius' merit is not the discovery of the Chinese wisdom but its restoration. Confucius looked to the past. He realized that livelihood and the virtuous ruler were the most important ideas of the ancient Chinese wisdom. In the view of the legendary emperors, the state was a big family in which the emperor (prince), like a father, served as an example for the people, and the people were obedient to him because they loved and appreciated him. Wolff appreciated this patriarchal state concept. He believed in the existence of this ideal past, which was a period of ancient Chinese history. The *Spring and Autumn Annals* (The chronicle of state of Lu) of Confucius proved it. He believed that the ancient kings and emperors, who founded China, were philosopher kings who realized all those ideas that Plato represented later on the best form of state: a state in which philosophers ruled and rulers philosophized. But this ideal state of philosopher king collapsed, anarchy and the struggle for power dominated Chinese history. Confucius restored the moral principles of the ancient state. But he could not achieve China being organized following these principles. China continued to be organized in the same way after Confucius as it had been before. The rulers ignored the Confucian principles.

In his *Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica*, published in 1726, (Frankfurt am Main) Wolff wrote that Confucius was not the founder of Chinese philosophy. Long before Confucius the Chinese state was well organized and based on wise laws. The founders of China realized Plato's ideal state where the philosophers ruled and the rulers were philosophers:

“Nimirum prisca Sinarum Imperatores & Reges iidem erant Philosophi: Quid ergo / mirum, juxta istud Platonis beatam fuisse Remp. ubi Philosophi regnabant, Reges philosophabantur? Primus in his laudatur Fo hi, quem scientiarum ac imperii in China fundatorem venerantur Sinae” (Wolff, 1985: 12-14).

But the Chinese state collapsed, and Confucius restored the Chinese state:

“Resp. Sinarum collabitur. ... Confucius res Sinarum collapsas restaurat” (Wolff, 1985: 14-15).

Confucius studied the Annals of the ancient kings and emperors, restored the old principles of the state and taught them to his disciples. But he did not create any new principle. On the basis of this Wolff concluded:

“En Confucium sapientiae Sinicae non autorem, verum restauratorem!” (Wolff, 1985: 18).

But the kings and Emperors ignored the example of the old wise rulers and they did not rule the people following the Confucian principles.

2.6. Voltaire Versus Montesquieu on the Chinese Patriarchal State

Chinese civilization was the subject of the French philosophers despite the fact that there was not enough knowledge about China in Europe.²

Montesquieu

Montesquieu (1689-1755) was not influenced by the enthusiasm about China inspired by the Jesuit missionaries in Europe. In his successful and influential book entitled *Esprit des lois*, published in 1748, he presented China as a despotic state (*état despotique*) (Montesquieu, 1979: 1. 260-261). In his view the Chinese religion, laws, manners and customs were based on morality and virtue which appeared in rites:

“Les Chinois sont gouverné par le cérémonial chinois” (Montesquieu, 1979: 2.307).

The Chinese learned these rites and practiced them their whole life. China was well governed when the rites were strictly observed. When the principles of the Chinese government were discarded and morality was banished, the state fell into anarchy and revolutions succeeded. Chinese politicians aimed at peace and tranquility in the empire, violence was forbidden. Everyone had to obey and everyone was employed. All this was necessary in order to be able to sustain oneself in an agricultural country. The maintenance of subordination through filial piety (duty) and ancestor worship also protected the system. The Chinese established many rules and rites to honour parents and the elders. A veneration for parents was necessarily connected with a suitable respect for masters, magistrates and the sovereign if they behaved following the moral principles. In Montesquieu's view the Chinese established a government of a family on the basis of paternal authority and rites. The whole state was a big family. The emperor and the magistrates were considered as the fathers of the Chinese people (who were their children). A paternal relationship existed between the princes and the subjects. Montesquieu thought that this state was not stable because it was enough to change one of the habits and the state could collapse (Dawson, 1967: 196-198; Montesquieu, 1979: 1. 221, 258-261).

In conclusion, Montesquieu regarded China as a despotic state, and the emperor as a sovereign pontiff (“souverain pontife”) (Montesquieu, 1979: 2.169).

2 Voltaire, for example, used the following important sources (the books which he read): Bouvet: *État présent da la Chine*, Paris, 1697; Le Comte: *Nouveaux mémoires sur l'état présent de la Chine.*, Amsterdam, 1692-1698; Le Comte: *Des cérémonies de la Chine*, Liege, 1700; *The Works of Confucius in French translation*; Pater Gaubil: *Obsevation mathématiques, astronomiques, géographiques, chronologiques et physiques etc.*, Paris, 1729-1732; Gentil de Barbinai: *Nouveau voyage autor du monde*. German translain, Hamburg, 1781; Greslon: *Histoire de la China etc.*, Paris, 1671; Louis de Guzman: *Historia de las misiones etc.*, 1601; Du Halde: *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique, de l'Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*, Paris, 1735; Athanasius Kircher: *China monumentis qua sacris qua profanis etc.*, Amsterdam, 1667; A.M. De Mailla: *Histoire générale de la Chine*, Paris, 177-1781; Paw: *Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois*, Berlin, 1773; *Reisebeschreibungen des Marco Polo (bekannt durch Ramusio: Navigazioni et Viaggio*, 1556-1565); *Übersetzung des “Orphelin de Tchao” von Prémare*. *Vergleiche du Halde*, Paris, 1735; Matteo Ricci: *Tieu hio rey*, 1630; *Semedo: Relazione de grande monarchia della Cina*, Romae, 1643 (Engemann, 1932: 43-144)

Voltaire

Voltaire was in discussion with him. He believed, in opposition to Montesquieu, that China was not despotic: it was a *patriarchal monarchy*. The nobility played the role of public servants based on ancient tradition and the examination system. For Voltaire the Chinese constitution was the best in the world. It could survive 4000 years. Chinese members of the government were experts having taken an examination, and not hereditary rulers. The emperor, the tribunals and the mandarins worked together in harmony. Tax was not high, life was well organized, concentrated on the needs of the people (Engemann, 1932: 55).

Voltaire believed that authority in China was not absolute as in France. Patriarchal monarchy, representing the idea of a virtuous king was a better solution than absolute monarchy. Therefore Voltaire used the Chinese example as a critique of French absolute monarchy. He thought that Chinese culture and morality was highly developed, and Chinese thinking was based on the law of nature. In his words:

“Je ne vois guère, parmi les anciens empires, que les Chinois qui n'établirent pas la doctrine de l'immortalité de l'ame. Leurs premières législateurs ne promulguèrent que des lois morales; ils crurent qu'il suffisait d'exhorter les hommes à la vertu, et de les y forcer par une police sévère“ (Voltaire, 1962: 80).

Voltaire has read Confucius in French translation. He appreciated Confucius first of all for cultivating the principle: Ne fais pas aux hommes, ce que tu ne voudrais pas qu'on te fit. He writes on Confucius as follows:

“Leur Confutzée, que nous appelons Confucius, n'imagina ni nouvelles opinions, ni nouveaux rites; il ne fit ni l'inspiré ni le prophète: c'était un sage magistrat qui enseignait les anciennes lois. Nous disons quelquefois, et bien mal a propos, la religion de Confucius; il n'en avait point d'autre que celle de tous les empereurs et de tous les tribunaux, point d'autre que celle des premiers sages. Il ne recommande que la vertu; il ne prêche aucun mystère. Il dit dans son premier livre, que pour apprendre à gouverner, il faut passer tous ses jours à se corriger. Dans le second, il prouve que Dieu a gravé lui-même la vertu dans le coeur de l'homme; il dit que l'homme n'est point né méchant, et qu'il le devient par sa faute. Le troisième est un recueil de maximes pures, où vous ne trouvez rien de bas, et rien d'une allégorie ridicule. Il eut cinq mille disciples; il pouvait se mettre à la tête d'un parti puissant, et il aimait mieux instruire les hommes que de les gouverner ... Il est vrai que les lois de la Chine ne parlent point de peines et de récompenses après la mort: ils n'ont point voulu affirmer ce qu'ils ne savaient pas. Cette différence entre eux et tous les grands peuples policés est très étonnante. La doctrine de l'enfer était utile, et le gouvernement des Chinois ne l'a jamais admise. Ils se contentèrent d'exhorter les hommes à révéler le ciel et à être justes“ (Voltaire, 1962: 82).

For Voltaire China was an ideal state because there was a patriarchal relationship between the ruler and the people. There was no animosity, the well-being of the people was the goal of the government. Voltaire regarded the Chinese empire as a great family, and the emperor played the role of a father. The emperor was the ruler, the religious leader, and a philosopher; he represented morality and education (Engemann, 1932: 53). So, Voltaire did not regard China as a despotic state because of patriarchal circumstances and rites. He could understand that patriarchalism based on morality is a useful means to organize the livelihood of the people. In contrast to Montesquieu, he emphasized that Chinese moral principles were so attractive that, after the conquest of China by Genghis-khan (Gengis-kan), the Tatars, the conquerors, took over the Chinese moral principles. This fact served for Voltaire as a symbol against the European conqueror mentality. The question that was raised was what would happen when the

European conquerors met the peaceful Chinese and damaged the Chinese logic of patriarchalism and rites?

Conclusions

China enjoyed the last golden age of its cultural and political life in the 17th and 18th centuries. Conditions there were in many respects better than in Europe (Thirty Years War, religious conflicts). Jesuits painted an idealistic picture of China where peace and harmony ruled based on morality. In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, China, and its practical philosophy, became a dominant theme in European political and philosophical discussions. China also played a decisive role in European art and the elegant Rococo style (Chinese porcelain, lacquered work, painted silk). European thinkers appreciated Chinese civilization. As positive characteristics they regarded Chinese peace and harmony orientation, Confucian moral principles, Chinese natural philosophy, patriarchal monarchy of the virtuous ruler dealing with the livelihood of the people and the rule of philosophers, - as Plato had imagined it.

At the beginning of the 19th century all this changed. Chinese civilization lost its value in European eyes. Commerce, trade relationships, money, profit dominated in the period of colonization. The renaissance of Greek and Roman antiquity, the development of technology, science, colonization and the search for money and profit dominated European life. With the successes of colonization and imperialism Europe gradually became Eurocentric. Eurocentrism was based on the belief in the superiority of European civilization. China gradually became a half colony of the Europeans thanks to Europe's more developed technology and arms (Franke, 1967: 65). "Eurocentrism" resulted in the contrary view of all those things which had been admired by the 17th and 18th century thinkers. China was presented as uncivilized: the lack of military technique, the dogmatism of Confucianism, the stagnation of development, autocratic centralized monarchs and the rule of old fashioned knowledge were emphasized.

3. Changing European opinion: European Views on China During Colonization

3.1. The Principles of European Colonial Expansion in China

The Chinese-European relationships in the fields of trade, economics, diplomacy and politics were characterized, from the beginning, by ignorance of each other's intellectual and cultural background. It resulted in mutual misunderstandings and it has formed a decisive element in the relationship between China and Europe to the present day (Franke, 1967: 66).

The Portuguese, the Dutch and, after them the British established dominant positions in China. Canton, for example, became a flourishing commercial metropolis in the 18th century. The conditions of trade for the foreigners were determined and laid down by China. Chinese merchants traded with the foreigners as agents of the government. Foreign merchants were not allowed to enter the city (Franke, 1967: 67). The British Empire gradually became more powerful. The British did not want to tolerate Chinese rules and Chinese superiority, and a dispute started. One of the most important lucrative businesses for the British and the Chinese was opium. Therefore the question of the import of opium became a powerful source of conflict. Opium trade served as financial source to pay the British administration: British government gave a free hand to the opium traders. The Chinese government attempted to oppose the import of opium and silver. The opium trade caused two wars between Great Britain and China. The first was between 1839 and 1842, the second between 1856 and 1860. Out of these wars came the treaties which were the foundation documents governing relations between China and the West for a century or even longer until China resumed full control of the last outposts of the Western empire on the China coast: Hong Kong and Macao, in the last years of the 20th century (Gregory, 2003: 87).

The first *Opium War* was a decisive military encounter between China and the West. In this war the superiority of Western weapons and tactics became obvious. The *peace of Nanking* laid down the pattern for those unequal treaties which followed in the next decades and represented humiliation for the Chinese. The British gained territories: Hong Kong was ceded to Britain and Canton, Amoy, Fuchou, Ningpo and Shanghai were opened to foreign trade as treaty ports. The Chinese were forced to make concessions because of their military weakness was becoming obvious. They were also forced to make these kind of unequal treaties in the future with the United States, France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Portugal, and later with Russia and Prussia (Franke, 1967: 68- 69).

The Opium War and the Peace of Nanking encouraged the Western powers to behave more aggressively. In 1854 the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs were established under foreign administration. Conflicts were provoked by Britain and France with the aim of having more concessions, more advantages and making more profit. In the *Treaty of Tientsin* of 1858 China was forced by the British and French military expedition to make fresh concessions. Two years later the British and French troops destroyed the Summer Palace outside Peking. For this the Chinese regarded them as uncivilized barbarians. Profiting from their military superiority and success, Westerners could extend their trade and profit till 1860. As a next step, the Western strategy of power policy demanded establishing positions of strength to help

economic expansion. The great colonial powers of the West wanted to extend thus their colonial empire towards China and its tribute states and involve them as colonies in their economic system. Japan could also join in this colonial policy. Western powers could successfully force China to cede its South-East Asian Chinese tribute states: in 1885 France occupied Annam (Vietnam); in 1886 Burma was ceded to Britain; subsequently Formosa and Pescadores were ceded to Japan; Korea declared its independence from China and was annexed by Japan; Germany occupied Tsingtao; Russia Port Arthur, and so on. Foreign powers could obtain extensive economic concessions (mining, the construction of railways) in every part of China. Central China around the Yangtse valley became a British sphere of influence. South and South West China became a French interest sphere. Fukien was reserved for the Japanese. The Russian sphere of influence included the whole of Manchuria and extended to the Chihli (Hopei) province. The Germans were firmly established in Shantung.

Thus at the end of the 19th century China seemed close to being divided among foreign powers in the same way as Africa. The imperialist powers (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan) continued their struggle of power amongst each other in China for Chinese territories. Chinese people resisted the Western presence. There were anti-missionary protests and the Boxer uprising, in 1900, attempted to drive out the foreigners by force (Franke, 1967: 70).

Westerners profited from the cultural differences, too. The traditional Chinese tribute system and modern Western colonization struggled with each other in China. Misusing China's tolerant tradition they succeeded in seriously restricting Chinese sovereignty by means of the so called *unequal treaties*. The most important means characterizing unequal treaties were the followings: *exterritoriality*; the *restriction of the level of customs duties* (custom duties were carried out by the foreigners, Chinese could not use protective tariffs); *foreign settlements* (Chinese territories under foreign administration); *concessions* and *leased territories*; foreign powers had the right to station troops in the international settlements and in the concessions; freedom of movement for foreign ships in Chinese inland and territorial waters.

In addition to all this there was also the notorious *most favoured nation clause*: it meant that all the rights which the Chinese had conceded to other nations would be automatically included in the new treaties. So, the US and other European countries profited from the privileges which Britain and France had obtained, in part by force of arms. Chinese accepted this clause because they believed that all barbarians should share equally in the favour of the Chinese emperor. Chinese realized only later the disadvantages of this because China was deprived of her freedom of political action, particularly with regard to trading policy. This Chinese policy rooted in the fundamental principles of the Chinese Empire which did not recognize the equal rights of foreign nations. Therefore they wanted to remain separated from the foreigners. This enabled the foreigners to build up *colonial bases* and to expand their territories in China (Franke, 1967: 76).

China's superior behaviour was expressed by the *kowtow ritual* and the *tribute system*. It symbolically represented China as the center of the world and the prototype of civilization. The meeting of the traditional Chinese superior behavior expressed by diplomatic protocol and the Chinese tolerant tribute system with the Western colonial methods resulted in the complete paralysis of China. Chinese politicians did not realize that they gradually transferred their sovereign rights to the Westerners who could act following their interests supported by arms: unequal treaties rooted in the differences between Western and Chinese culture and the more developed Western military power.

As a result of the unequal treaties China was opened by force. It became a member of the international community of sovereign states which was controlled by the Europeans. China lost its former position as a center of the East Asian countries. It became a member of a larger family of nations which was exclusively centered on Europe (Franke, 1967: 76).

3.2. Marx on the Importance of the Opening up of China

Among the European political economic thinkers it was Karl Marx who realized the real importance of the Opium War and the opening of China for the future history of mankind. This discovery was based on his studies of the pre-capitalist economic formation. He was convinced about the necessity of a change of the world system because of colonization. In his words:

“The Asiatic form necessarily survives longest and most stubbornly. This is due to the fundamental principle on which it is based, that is, that the individual does not become independent of the community; that the circle of production is self-sustaining, unity of agriculture and craft manufacture, etc. If the individual changes his relation to the community, he modifies and undermines both the community and its economic premise” (Marx, 1964: 83).

For example, wars and conquest can break the real bond on which the community rests as in the case of Rome. Thus Marx believed that pre-capitalist agrarian forms of society are in *stagnation*:

“In all these forms the basis of evolution is the reproduction of relations between individual and community assumed as given – they may be more or less primitive, more or less the result of history, but fixed into tradition – and a definite, predetermined objective existence, both as regards the relation to the conditions of labour and the relation between one man and his co-workers, fellow-tribesmen, etc. Such evolution is therefore from the outset limited, but once the limits are transcended, decay and disintegration ensue” (Marx, 1964: 83).

For example, concentration of landed property, exchange, a monetary economy, conquest can change the original social order.

Based on these ideas, Marx regarded the success of the British weapons in the Opium War one of the most important events of world history in the long run. The British expansionist capitalist economy, which was based on the necessity of opening new markets or on the extension of the old markets, could involve the Chinese market in international commercial and financial life. With this a new age started in world history. Marx emphasized, already in 1853, that Europe's future would depend on what would happen in China; what effect the Chinese revolution would exercise upon the civilized world. In his words:

“Before the British arms the authority of the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces; the superstitious faith in the eternity of the Celestial Empire broke down; the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilized world was infringed; and an opening was made” (Marx, 1951: 2)

“It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire – the very opposite of Europe – than on any other political cause that now exists – more even than on the menaces of Russia and the consequent likelihood of a general European war. But yet it is no paradox, as all may understand by attentively considering the circumstances of the case” (Marx, 1951: 1).

“Complete isolation was the prime condition of the preservation of Old China. That isolation having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air. Now, England having brought about the revolution of China, the question is how

that revolution will in time react on England, and through England on Europe” (Marx, 1951: 4).

3.3. Changing Opinions: Western Superiority – the Eternal Standstill of China

The “*opening of China*”, as Europeans call it, using the above mentioned means, resulted in a paralysis of the functioning of the former Chinese economy and social organization. It took time before the Chinese could respond to the Western challenge. The Western hegemony guaranteed by the provisions of the unequal treaties (Treaty of Nanking, the Treaty of Tienchin) gradually reduced China to a semi-colonial status. The number of treaty ports increased from 5 to 35 up to the end of the 19th century. A colonial atmosphere started to dominate the relationships. Extraterritoriality made it possible for the foreigners to regard themselves as a colonial ruler anywhere in China and, consequently, they looked down on the native people as far inferior to them. Foreigners lived largely separately from the Chinese environment. In treaty ports a colonial style of life was developed. British interest in the extension of foreign trade, for example, saw unlimited possibilities in China. They wanted to convert the whole of China into an enormous treaty port under foreign control. So British colonialists demanded from the government at home a constant readiness to take military action in order to extend British trading interests. The intention was to make the whole of China, or at least the Yangtse provinces, into a second India (Franke, 1967: 85, 89). However British diplomats saw clearly that, if China become a second India, it would create extreme difficulties and enormous expenditure. Therefore they tried to avoid taking over the burden of Chinese administration. They aimed to realize their goals using the help of the Chinese government (Franke, 1967: 89-90).

The strengthening of the Western positions in China resulted in the changing of Western images of China. The colonizers' racial morality and arrogance gradually started to dominate. Westerners started to regard China through the eyes of colonizers. They developed negative stereotypes of this ancient civilization of mankind which helped to justify colonization policy. The evaluation of Confucianism and Chinese social development changed into negative. For example Confucius to European eyes, became the representative of undemocratic conservatism resulting in stagnation.

3.4. Hegel on Chinese Stagnation

After the end of the 18th century, the West concentrated on Europe. There scientific, technical, industrial and economic development was unique. Britain became the center of the world economy. Searching for the causes of European development, European intellectuals started to believe that only European civilization was able to progress. China, for example, was in stagnation. A *Eurocentric view* of history of social development gradually emerged.

It was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) who started to regard China as being in *stagnation*. His judgment influenced the opinion of his contemporaries in the 19th century. Hegel criticized the fusion of the moral and legal principles by the Chinese. Chinese regarded the Western separation of morality and law as barbaric and unacceptable. This Western dualism has been highly criticized by the Chinese, even today. In Europe, Kant also discussed the division of morality and politics. He emphasized, in his writing on perpetual peace, that morality and politics cannot be divided.

Under the influence of the Jesuit father De Mailla's work entitled *Histoire générale de la Chine*, published in 1777-1783, Hegel concluded that there was no development in the Confucian Chinese state: everything remained the same as in the ancient period of its history. Convinced of the superiority of European civilization, Hegel wrote in his *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* that the history of China had showed no development. The oldest state had no history, because it existed at the present time in exactly the same way as in its antiquity. Consequently China was in stagnation, and had no real history. China was outside world history.

In his words:

“Mit dem Reiche China hat die Geschichte zu beginnen, denn es ist das älteste, soweit die Geschichte Nachricht gibt, und zwar ist sein Prinzip von solcher Substantialität, dass es zugleich das älteste und das neueste für dieses Reich ist. Früh schon sehen wir China zu dem Zustande heranwachsen, in welchem es sich heute befindet; denn da der Gegensatz von objectivem Sein und subjectiver Daranbewegung noch fehlt, so ist jede Veränderlichkeit ausgeschlossen, und das statarische, das ewig wiederer erscheint, ersetzt das, was wir das Geschichtliche nennen würden. China und Indien liegen gleichsam noch ausser der Weltgeschichte (Hegel, 1923: 275).

...

„Insofern hat China eigentlich keine Geschichte. Wie es jetzt ist, so ist es das Resultat seiner Geschichte; wir sprechen hier nicht bloß von einem vergangenen, sondern auch von einen noch gegenwärtigen Reiche, und indem wir von seiner ältesten Geschichte sprechen, zugleich von seiner Gegenwart. Dies ist das Prinzip des chinesischen Staaten, und über seinen Begriff ist er nicht hinausgegangen; doch besitzt er in diesem seinem Bestande eine hohe Kultur“ (Hegel, 1923: 277-278).
„Wenn wir also mit China anfragen, so haben wir vor uns den ältesten Staat und doch keine Vergangenheit, sondern einen Staat, der ebenso heute existiert, wie wir ihn in alten Zeiten kennen lernen“ (Hegel, 1923: 278).

Ranke, Jaspers

Ranke also thought China belonged to the nations of eternal stagnation. This prejudice of Hegel's and Ranke's was criticized only after the Second World War.

It was Karl Jaspers who rejected Hegel's stagnationist view on China. He believed that Europe and the Asian civilizations had common cultural grounds and everything in civilizations was in a permanent change and mutuality. Therefore China had also to be involved in the process of world civilization as active partner of the West (Jaspers, 1949: 75, 78, 80-81).

To summarize, Eurocentric thinkers believed that China was in stagnation. This belief helped them to prove European *superiority* and *missionary/civilizer* thinking and behaviour. The British ruled the whole world with their trade and arms. They had opened East India and China to Europe and all these empires became subservient to the European spirit. Eurocentric thinkers believed that only the European spirit could advance the development of China. The successes of European colonialism in the Far East were interpreted as the result of the superiority of European civilization, in the first place of its British, Dutch, French, and German parts.

3.5. James Legge on Confucius as a Conservative Traditionalist

James Legge (1815-1897), a Scottish protestant sinologist, and missionary in China played an important role in the shaping of the British image on Confucius. He was the first professor of Chinese at Oxford University. He translated into English the Chinese Classics and published them. In the first volume he wrote an essay on the life, the doctrine and the influence of Confucius (Legge, 1909: 55-115). Legge did not regard Confucius as a great man because he was not religious and he was against progress. He criticized Confucius, first of all, for not being religious and for making possible to his followers the identification of God with a principle of reason and the course of nature. His non-religious influence was unfavorable to the development of true religious feeling among the Chinese people (Legge, 1909: 100, 103). He criticized Confucius further because of his lack of sympathy with progress: he did not announce any new truth and did not initiate any new economy. He turned to the past and aimed to preserve the maxims of the golden age of China by transmitting the ancient wisdom, truth and rules to the people (Legge, 1909: 96, 105). In this way he aimed to improve the prevailing lawlessness of his age. The Chinese bowed down at the temple of Confucius as a wise man because of his personal excellence, social virtue, and political wisdom which was taught everywhere in the country (Legge, 1909: 99).

Legge criticized Confucius conservatism, first of all, from the governmental point of view saying that

“The government which Confucius taught was a despotism, but of a modified character” (Legge, 1909: 108).

He believed in personal virtue and benevolent rule: Heaven made for the people rulers and teachers who administered a government beneficial for the people and producing tranquility. The ruler as a minister of God [Heaven] had to be virtuous. If he ceased to be a virtuous ruler people could depose him. So, Confucius rejected the oppression of the people. He regarded it as the duty of the ruler to serve the people's livelihood. He was for the self-respect. Legge believed that the modified despotism of Confucius was suitable for a primitive, unsophisticated state of society. In Chinese society there had been a tendency to advance, but “Confucius has all along been trying to carry the nation back” (Legge, 1909: 109). His teachings contributed to the stagnation of the development in this country:

“The consequence is that China has increased beyond its ancient dimensions, while there has been no corresponding development of thought. Its body politic has the size of a giant, while it still remains the mind of a child. Its hoary age is but senility” (Legge, 1909: 109).

Legge criticized the Confucian method because of the lack of a foreign policy. Therefore China was closed, arrogant and it was not able to build up equal contacts with other nations. For Confucius China was 'The middle Kingdom', 'All under Heaven'. Beyond it were only rude and barbarous tribes who were not equal with the Chinese.

“Of independent nations the ancient classics have not any knowledge, nor has Confucius” (Legge, 1909: 110).

Confucius demanded 'indulgent treatment of men from a distance' who were regarded as guests, visitors or traveling merchants. Legge deplored Confucius because he did not establish any principle for dealing with foreigners. Therefore, on the one hand, there was nothing to check the arrogance of the Chinese government. On the other hand there was nothing to defend China against the Westerners. Legge was convinced that, because of the lack of preservative or restorative elements defending China against the Westerners, “China was sure to go to pieces when it came into collision with a Christianly-civilized power” (Legge, 1909: 110-111).

He thought that Confucianism could not defend China from the disorganization and troubles which the collision with the Europeans would cause. The ancient state would collapse. As a convinced protestant missionary, Legge believed that Chinese could be safeguarded only if they looked away from their ancient sages and became Christian (Legge, 1909: 111).

Legge emphasized that Christianity and Confucianism had similarities regarding moral principles. Both had the same basic golden rule which was the following:

“Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you” (Legge, 1909: 111).

This principle had been inculcated by Confucius, in the same words, four centuries before. This maxim occurred twice in the Analects:

“What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others” (Analects, 15.23. Legge, 1909: 226) and “What I do not wish men to do to me, I also wish not to do to men” (Analects 5.11. Legge, 1909: 141, 111-112).

Besides his criticism Legge appreciated Confucianist China because there education was highly prized from the earliest times. He regarded the competitive examination system as a good thing. However he criticized the Confucian conservative content of the examination material because it hindered progress.

Making his final conclusion Legge did not regard Confucius as a great man. In his words:

“I am unable to regard him as a great man. He was not before his age, though he was above the mass of the officers and scholars of his time. He threw no new light on any of the questions which have a world-wide interest. He gave no impulse to religion. He had no sympathy with progress. His influence has been wonderful, but it will henceforth wane. My opinion is, that the faith of the nation in him will speedily and extensively pass away” (Legge, 1909: 114-115).

Legge had a great influence on Western thinking on Confucianism. Based on his views Confucianism was regarded as a conservative philosophy blocking Chinese progress. Similar ideas were repeated among people who did not really know China. This tells a lot about Western thinking in general and the stereotypical images of the European mentality in particular. There are few who could realize that Legge was a 19th century protestant missionary representing the values and principles of European protestant missionaries serving the economic interest of their homeland.

In conclusion, Legge contributed to the acceptance of the superiority of the Westerners who believed in their progressiveness and democracy. They believed also that their religion was superior and therefore the conquest of China was morally legalized and served the interest of the Chinese. He was convinced that only Western protestants could make China a progressive and democratic country.

3.6. Weber on the Chinese Caesaro-papist State

The famous protestant *Eurocentric* thinker, Max Weber (1864-1920), regarded China as a “*Caesaro-papist*” society. He based this belief on the lack of dualism between state and church which existed in Europe. China was a patrimonial state ruled by a monarch and bureaucratic administration. The central monarch had a charismatic and pontifical position: The emperor as the son of Heaven was the representative of Heaven. Based on this belief Weber interpreted the position of the Chinese emperor as a pontifex maximus in a universal secular-ecclesiastical state, which he called a type of Caesaro-papist state. (Franke, 1967: 55; Weber, 1968: 85).

In Weber's view there was no capitalist enterprise and bourgeoisie in the Chinese economy. Therefore China represented a different state conception from that of the West. The basic unit of the state was the family and the local autonomy functioned as a *sib association*. The familial community system (sib) was the opposite of Western corporate enterprises. The state was directed by the Confucian bureaucracy. The Confucian examination system was based on classical texts. It made the development of the society and of thinking impossible (Weber, 1968: 85). The social character of the educated stratum determined its stand toward economic policy. According to its own legend, the polity had the character which was in line with so many other typical traits of patrimonial bureaucratic structures bearing theocratic stamps (Weber, 1968: 136). It was a self-sufficient and socially homogeneously composed world empire based on the conviction that the welfare of the subjects depended on the charisma of the ruler. Patrimonialism and an aversion to too sharp social differentiation characterized Chinese society. The merchant guilds did not enter into the economic balance because there were no expansive capitalist interests. Merchants did not represent sufficient strength, as in England, to be capable of forcing the state administration into their service (Weber, 1968: 136-138).

Weber, comparing Confucianism and the puritan mentality, emphasized the basic differences between the two mentalities which influenced social organization:

The *typical Confucian* used his own and his family's savings to achieve a literary education and to have himself trained for the examination. Thus he gained the basis for a cultured status position.

The *typical Puritan* earned plenty, spent little, and reinvested his income as capital in rational capitalist enterprise out of an ascetic compulsion to save.

Both were rationalist. But the Puritan was economic rationalism. The philosophical literary education, the highest ornament of the Confucian, was for the Puritan an idle waste of time (Weber, 1968: 246). Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world based on *vocation*. Confucianism rejected vocation. The Christians wished to be a tool of God: to rationally transform and master the world. Confucians rejected this kind of aim. Weber finally concluded that China was not able to create capitalism but was able to assimilate capitalism. The circumstances which made possible the emergence of capitalism did not exist in China. China could not be a developer but only an adopter (Weber, 1968: 248-249).

3.7. Chinese Society Before the Opium War: T'ang Leang-Li

In both civilizations there was a lack of appropriate information on the one side and the appropriate interpretation of the information on the other side. It took time till the Chinese could achieve and understand information on the West and the Western views. The Western interpretations were very one-sided and Eurocentric. Later, when Chinese thinkers started to study Western ideas in translations and studied at Western universities, they realized that Western thinkers could not understand how Chinese society had been before its opening.

It was T'ang Leang-Li who tried to explain to the Westerners the differences between Chinese and European state organization in his book entitled "*China in Revolt. How a Civilization Became a Nation*" (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927). Russell, the British philosopher, in his foreword to the book appreciated it because it helped him to understand how the Chinese society was organized before the Opium War, *the period of peace*, as T'ang called it. Chinese society was based on the virtue of persons and the Confucian principles. Western thinkers - Leibniz, Wolff

and Voltaire - could well understand it. But the thinkers of the 19th century, representing the concept of stagnation, were mistaken.

T'ang believed that Westerners could not understand the followings: the role of the emperor; the organization of the state which was not absolute monarchy; the social organization of the autonomous village community; the family state as the basic unit of the state; the autonomous academic and examination system as a means of social democracy; relationships with aliens.

The role of the emperor

T'ang rejected the Western view on China as a despotic state. In his words:

“There is a current misconception in the West that the system of government in *China in peace* has always been an absolute despotism: the Chinese emperor has always been supposed to be an autocrat with power over property, life and death” (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 21).

In his view the Chinese emperor reigns, he does not rule. He occupies a similar position to the King of England in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The British Empire is also governed by an unwritten constitution. The Chinese emperor's power is restricted by Confucian ethics. The violation of the Confucian tradition cost many emperors the throne and the privilege of representing Heaven to the people. The people are the most important. The emperor is only mandatary. If, for some reason, the emperor loses the mandate Heaven will not tolerate him and the people have the right to revolt against him. This right of revolt was not imaginary. It worked in Chinese history: there were twenty-four revolts in Chinese history each of which succeeded in replacing one dynasty by another. So the doctrine of popular sovereignty became reality (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 22). T'ang believed that among the Westerners, Voltaire was close to understanding the role of the emperor when he called imperial China a kind of *patriarchal monarchy*. He emphasized that it was based on self-government and the purely ceremonial character of the central government. The emperor was the Son of Heaven and the Father of the people. His power was subordinated to the Confucian moral principles.

On the Chinese state, the village community, the family, the examination system, the traditions of the Chinese society he writes the followings:

The organization of the state

Normally China was governed in a hierarchical order with the central government at the top. The emperor, as the representative of Heaven, is vested with supreme authority and, during his term of office, is answerable to Heaven only. Beneath this central Government are the provincial governments and, within the province, the Viceroy or Governor is nominally supreme controlling finance, the army and the administration of justice. The province is divided into districts. These districts are subdivided into prefectures, etc., till we reach the simple village or township, the government of which is independent of the authorities appointed by the Central Government and constitutes an autonomous unit (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 22-23).

The social organization of the autonomous village community

In its working a village is like a little republic. Apart from paying a nominal land tax, the village is entirely independent of the Central Government. It has perfect freedom of industry and trade, of everything that concerns the government, regulation and protection of the locality. Whatever may be required for its well-being is provided, not by the agents of the Central Government, but by voluntary associations. Such duties as education, police, public health, poor relief, old age pensions are carried out, not by local authorities, as in modern Europe, but by the villagers themselves – by the families, the guilds, the gentries, all of whom

act merely in accordance with immemorial custom and have no place in the official administration of the country (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 22-23).

Education and economy were regarded as belonging to the autonomous sphere of the people. There was no Educational and Agricultural Ministry. Culture and livelihood depended on the persons and local governance. The emperor's duty was to ask the support of Heaven for livelihood.

The family state as the basic unit of the state

In China the most important political and social unit is the family and not the individual. The family often means a whole clan working through its natural mandatory: the pater-, or mater-, familias. It is really a small state, a complete entity executing civil and judicial functions. Theoretically, supreme power is vested in the father as head of the family but, in practice, this power is collective, i.e. it is exercised by the family council.

The Chinese view on the family system is based on the thought of Confucius:

“The ancients who wished to attain the happiness of the world, first ordered well their own States. Rightly governed states depend on well regulated families, and these, in turn, are made possible by the self-development of the individuals” (The Great Learning, c. 4, T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 22-23).

The Chinese family system is closely linked with *ancestor worship*. The continuity of generation has made the immortality of the soul a reality. Ancestor worship is a source of progress. The family is a well organized small political unit. It deals with livelihood, the education and the security of the members (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 24-27).

In China there is no hereditary aristocracy. The family member have equal rights and duties in ancestor worship. The doctrine of advancement is based on merit.

When several families group together in a rural district, they form a village. The elders form the village gentry who maintain the ordinary local government services including education. It also forms the judicial authority both in civil disputes and criminal cases. Only exceptional cases are brought to the notice of the magistrate by the village elders.

The system of government in the town does not differ in essence from that of the village or family. People organize guilds which enforce discipline, arbitrate in trade disputes, provide for maintenance of the poor members and the education of children. The guilds maintain orphanages and poor-widow institutions.

In the province a similar situation prevails. The administrative power is in the hands of the provincial gentry and not in the hands of the imperial governor. The imperial governor needs the protection of the local gentry (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 26-27).

The autonomous academic and examination system

It worked as a means of democracy in a knowledge based social structure which was the most important achievement of ancient China. The *Han Lin Academy* was independent from the government. It dealt with public examinations and the supervision of the academies of higher learning. It was the highest possible honour to belong to this academy based on personal merit. It was like the Royal Society and the Académie Française. The high imperial officers were selected from the Han Lins. From among the Han Lins a Court of Censors of some forty members was appointed. The Censorate was the highest supervisory body in the Empire. No one, even the Emperor himself, was free from its criticism and censure. They were trained in Confucian ethics, and they were absolutely independent. They were the guardians of the liberties and morals of China (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 28-29).

Despite its defect the *examination system* made China a democratic country. China recognized a supremacy of the intellect and refused the hereditary aristocracy of birth. Confucian ethics

were based on reason and human justice. China was never dominated by a theocracy. In China there was a respect for learning, and moral virtues (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 32). The problem with the examination system was the content and the spirit of teaching material, and the conservatively biased interpretation of the classics. Chinese classics contain a store of all kinds of ideas from the most conservative to the most revolutionary. The interpretation of them depends on the established order. Liberal and moral training in the form of competitive examinations cannot be opposed (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 32). The British Civil Service competitive examinations are similar to the ancient Chinese. K'ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Deng Xiaoping, for example, wanted to safeguard the examination system in a reformed form and using a modern teaching material.

The structure of Chinese society

The aristocracy was founded on a democratic basis. It was open to anyone, regardless of origin, to attain a scholarly rank by successful examinations. Personal merit and not birth gave status for the Chinese. There was a freedom of occupations in China. Slavery never was a social and economic institution like in the West (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 34)

The central judiciary

In China there was no written and official civil code, for civil disputes were generally settled by compromise and agreement between the family elders. In commerce the different guilds elaborated rules which took the place of a commercial code and were very strictly enforced. If the family or the guild could not find a solution they asked the magistrate to solve the problem on the basis of local custom and precedent (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 29). A person's duty was to be educated and virtuous.

Chinese doctrine of collective responsibility existed and it was well-known. Written agreements were not necessary.

Relationship with the aliens and other thinkings

Soldiers had no status in China. Militarism as such, the worship of brute force and of organized homicide, has never been popular in China and never will be. For Chinese society has always been organized for peace and the soldier has always been used merely as an instrument of defense and has never become the dominating factor of Chinese life (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 34).

Conquering, colonizing and missionary mentality does not exist in China: China had her period of conquest. These conquests were not directed by domination, but mostly by self-defense. China's wars of conquest have never been wars with the desire to exploit the conquered people. In this respect – writes T'ang - China may be hailed as an example to the people of Europe who invariably reduce the native populations to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 34). China on the other hand, as history proves, had a benevolent influence on the peoples she subdued. ... China never tried to interfere in the native customs and social arrangements:

“Not possessing the missionary instinct, China has, for instance, never preached the doctrines of Confucius except by the force of example and good conduct, nor willfully destroyed existing native institutions” (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 34).

In conclusion, T'ang Leang-Li believed that China, before the Opium War, could solve a lot of problems which Europe faced. There was no theocracy, aristocratic nobility, feudalism, slavery, conquering, exploitation, wars, and missionary belief. The principle of personal merit, education, the mandate doctrine of the emperor, self-government, freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of association, right to education, and toleration were represented by Chinese state organization before its opening. T'ang aimed to emphasize to the Westerners that the government in China left much freedom of action to its citizens: China's

imperial government was based on self-government. The central government had a ceremonial and supervisory character. Therefore China was a “country with no government”, an “*anarchy*” - an anarchy, however based on reason and justice, where the capacity of inward discipline and self-jurisdiction was so perfectly developed that she could afford the absence of all judicial, priestly and military castes (T'ang Leang-Li 1927: 27).

“China in peace (before the opium war) is for practical purposes an anarchy in which the people are left to themselves, carrying out their purpose in life, in peace and order, without any reference to the fear of God or the fear of law” (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 35).

Tang Leang-Li believed that this approach toward a social Utopia had been realized in China, and not in the West. This is the main difference between the Western state and the Chinese state conception before modernization. Where China failed in modern Western standards was in her dealing with the problem of production. Her solution of the problems of distribution and consumption was without parallel in the world. Confucius based Chinese society on moral teaching, on the real nature of man, and the search for truth. This is why China was able to create a Utopian social system in the period of *China in peace* (T'ang Leang-Li, 1927: 36-37).

4. The Image of China in Europe After the First World War

4.1. Russell on the Problem of China

T'ang Leang-Li believed that among the Westerners, it was Bertrand Russell who could understand China's problem of facing the Western challenge of colonization and modernization. Sun Yat-sen also believed that Russell could understand the Chinese mentality. In his words:

“With the exception of philosophers like Russell, no foreigners can at first sight of China understand her civilization, and only who have spent ten or more years in China can appreciate her age-old culture” (Sun, ca. 1960: 43).

Russel (1872-1970) visited China and gave lectures at Chinese universities between 1920-22. In Russell's view, Western civilization was built upon industrialism, militarism, love of progress, missionary zeal, imperialism, a passion for domination, and excessive energy. The Chinese, on the contrary, went too far in practicing wisdom and morality and they neglected technology and science. He was convinced that Westerners and Chinese represent two opposite attitudes. Therefore the cooperation between them could be very successful (Russell, 1922: 197).

Russell strongly criticized the Western imperialist and colonialist mentality and practice. In his words:

“The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The Chinese have discovered and practiced for many centuries, a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the world happy. We European have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some of that wisdom for which it despises the East” (Russell, 1922: 17-18).

Russell regarded as the most important merits of the Chinese civilization: Confucianism and the examination system. In his view Confucianism can be regarded as a code of civilized behavior, an “etiquette book”. Confucius taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. He taught how to behave, save face, moderation, absence of hate, control of the actions and toleration. In Europe these principles existed but perished with the French Revolution. Romanticism, Rousseau, and the guillotine put an end to them (Russell, 1922: 43).

He appreciated the examination system which profoundly affected the Chinese system: it encouraged a respect for learning; the possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; selection of capable administrators able to deal with industry; the preservation of Chinese

civilization in spite of barbarian conquests. But it made it hard to accept modern needs. The examination system – as the system of selecting officials – was better than nepotism, bribery, or insurrection. Russell expressed his hopes that these values would not perish in the struggle with the foreign exploiters (Russell, 1922: 46-47).

Russell believed that China had to be saved by her own efforts, and could not rely upon outside help (Russell, 1922: 240). He gave the following advises to the Chinese reformers:

In China an enlightened spirit was necessary: willing to learn from the foreigners, but not letting them dominate.

A spirit of patriotism was absolutely necessary to regenerate China.

If China wanted to become politically independent it had to do three things: the establishment of an orderly government; industrial development under Chinese control; the spread of education (Russell, 1922: 240-241).

China had to become independent from the European Powers in all fields. Chinese had to recover the Treaty Ports, control of the tariff; they had also to free themselves from extra-territoriality (Russell, 1922: 245).

China had to protect *state socialism* because state socialism was acceptable in economically but not culturally backward countries like China. There were many arguments for state socialism: it was easier for the state to borrow than for private persons; it was easier for the state to borrow foreign experts; and it was easier for the state to make sure that vital industries did not come under the control of foreign powers. The state could also prevent the growth of the evils of private capitalism.

On basis of all these Russell believed:

“If China can acquire a vigorous and honest state, it will be possible to develop Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening power of *private capitalists* by which the Western nations are now both oppressed and misled”(Russell, 1922: 246).

He emphasised that for modernization it would be necessary to do the followings:

To develop the public spirit in place of family ethic.

To transfer the honesty which existed in private business to the public service.

The Chinese had to learn to become technical experts and skilled workers. It was wise to import Western skilled workers to give instructions to Chinese workmen in all new industrial branches that it desired to develop.

To become a democracy universal education was necessary in China. Chinese experts educated in European and American Universities became foreigners. It was better to develop Chinese Universities because education influences thought processes.

To assimilate what was good in the Western culture but safeguard the own culture. China needed other types of leaders than Lenin and Marx.

To fight for the independence of China and to safeguard it

To elaborate an alternativ social model

Russel emphasised that China needed Western science but they did not need to adopt the Western philosophy of life. If China adopted the Western philosophy it would become able to defend itself against foreign aggression, but it would start expansions and destructions. The great military nations of the modern world could not abstain from destruction so they brought about their own destruction. If China joined in this madness, China would perish like the rest. If Chinese reformers could have a moderation to stop when they had made China capable of

self-defense, and they abstained from foreign conquest then the Chinese would be able to develop an alternative economy and establish a new peaceful culture for mankind. It might be that China would be able to defend itself and to stop foreign conquest. So they could establish a better economic system which would give mankind a new hope. (Russell, 1922: 247-251).

Finally Russell was convinced that Westerners and Chinese could learn from each other: The Chinese might learn the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency and the Westerners might learn from the Chinese something of that contemplative wisdom which had enabled the Chinese to survive and persist whilst all other nations of antiquity had perished (Russell, 1922: 197-198).

Russell mentioned his own example as a proof:

“When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn from them” (Russell, 1922: 198).

He wished that the two civilizations could successfully influence each other. In his words:

“I wish I could hope that China, in return for our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind” (Russell, 1922: 198).

4.2. Dewey's Lectures in China on Western Democracy

At the same time as Russell, the American pragmatist political thinker and educator, John Dewey (1859-1952) also lectured in China. Dewey – like Russell - delivered more than one hundred lectures in English throughout twelve provinces in China between 1919 and 1921. His speeches were translated and printed in Chinese newspapers, journals, and governmental bulletins. Dewey arrived at a very important moment in China in 1919. Confucius and his greatest modern defender, K'ang You-wei, were under the assault of the modernizers led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih. Dewey could feel the vacuum left by the discredited Confucianism. It was the supreme moment of intellectual communication between the Chinese and the Americans. Dewey's ideas on Western democracy strongly influenced Chinese intellectuals (Dewey, 1973: 5).

Dewey had spoken about Western social and political philosophy; about the philosophy of education; about ethics, Greek philosophy and experimental logic. He propagated the implementation of the Western model in China.

Hu Shih

The Chinese thinker, Hu Shih - who was influenced by Dewey - believed that the meeting of Western civilization with America, the Slav World and East Asia resulted in important changes in world history. East Asia was the meeting point of all three routes of this aggressive civilization:

“It is in East Asia that the grand finale of this drama of world conquest is to be staged. For it is here that the civilization of the West is brought into direct contact with the two principal centers of the civilization of the East: the continental empire of China and the island empire of Japan. Upon the final Westernization of these two empires depends the completion of the world conquest of this new civilization” (Hu Shih, 1934: 2).

Hu Shih emphasised that China's reaction to Western civilization was radically different from that of Japan. Japan was westernized nation-wide under the Meiji reform. As a result it started

to pursue industrial and commercial expansion and military and naval rivalry like the Western powers. China wasted a century in futile resistance, hesitation and ineffective reforms, disastrous wars of revolution and internal strife and today, a once great nation helplessly struggled to stand on its own feet again and find a solution to those problems which were caused by the impact of the irresistible civilization of the West (Hu Shih, 1934: 3).

5. Chinese Responses to the Challenge of European Modernization

China gave its answers to the Europeans (Westerners). The main phases of the answer were the followings: the self strengthening movement; the Reform Movement of K'ang Yu-wei, 1898; the abolition of the traditional Chinese examination system and the opening of the educational system to Western culture in 1905; the revolution of 1911-12 and the abdication of the last dynasty; Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic; the new evaluation of the West: the May Fourth Movement of 1919; the anti-imperialist movement, 1925-1927; the formal ending of the "unequal treaties" between China and the Western powers; the People's Republic of China, 1949; the expulsion of most Westerners by the Chinese government, 1949.

After the Opium War the Chinese government realized the necessity of having appropriate knowledge about Europe. In 1861, they established a special department to deal with foreign affairs: Tsungli-Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the School for the study of foreign languages, the T'ung-wen kuan (here the government staff were trained in foreign languages). Special interest was shown in military matters, ship-building and in international law. In the Tsungli-Yamen the importance of international law was recognized. The knowledge was gained from translations of European/Western works. However, reforms remained within the traditional framework. Chinese did not want to give up traditional principles; they did not want to change thinking. But they realized the need of change: to implement Western forms and study Western knowledge. They were aware that they could save what they had by way of educational, economic, industrial, commercial, and military reforms (Franke, 1967: 101).

The first question was: why were the Chinese weak? When the military weakness had to be realized after the Opium War the so called self-strengthening movement (tzu ch'uang) started. It aimed to safeguard Chinese learning but to learn Western practical knowledge, first of all on modern technique, modern arms and shipbuilding. Actually, they aimed to learn the strong technique of the Westerners to be able to survive and control them. But there was a fear of reforms in traditional Chinese society because of the possibility of losing status and power. Therefore the leading elite wanted to gradually renew the old but, at the same time, to safeguard status and position.

5.1. K'ang Yu-wei, the Constitutional Monarchical Reformer

Chinese thinkers realized the necessity of studying European thought, which they called also Western thought. Yen Fu and Yen Yung-ching translated some important European writers into Chinese at the turn of the century. Yen Fu was very interested in Western liberalism and contrasted it with his own culture. Chinese could study, in his translation, important Western books among them, for example, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and the *Spirit of the Laws* written by Montesquieu (Schwartz, 1964; Ch'en, 1979: 179-180). The knowledge of the Chinese thinkers about the West was based on the translations of Yen Fu at that time.

The launcher of the Chinese reform movement, K'ang Yu-wei, also used translations as a source of his knowledge of Europe. K'ang was a Confucian wise man continuing and at the same time renewing Chinese civilization. He regarded himself as a Confucian reformer continuing the work of Confucius. In his view, Confucius rediscovered and reinterpreted the rationalist principles of the wise ancient Chinese philosopher emperors. Based on his concept of "Confucius as a reformer", he aimed to reform the Chinese society of his age it being in anarchy and under foreign pressure. Foreigners wanted to partition the Chinese Empire (K'ang, 1967: 54-56; Liang: 1970: 94-95). With the aim of safeguarding and modernizing China, K'ang organized the Society for Protecting the Nation (Pao-kuo-hui). K'ang was for following the example of the Japanese Meiji dynastic reform and the reforms of the Russian Peter the Great. He studied the political reforms in Germany, France, and England (K'ang, 1967: 100-101). He admitted that European civilization scientifically and technically was more developed because it had been able to develop its civilization by inventing new things, by writing new books, and by exploring new lands" (K'ang, 1967: 102).

Launching the Reform

The most important moment in K'ang's life was his audience with the emperor, Kuang-hsü, when the period of reforms started, in China, in June 1898. In his audience with the emperor and in his reform memorial, he proposed to Emperor Kuang-hsü to renew Chinese knowledge and implement the most important achievements of Western technique and science and change the institutions as the Japanese had done. He also emphasized the necessity of the abolition of the old-type examination system: more precisely to abolish the *eight-legged essays* and replace it with useful knowledge. In his words:

"The cause for the lack of enlightenment in the mind of the people stems from the system of writing 'eight-legged' essays as a means of selecting officials. Those who learn the writing of 'eight-legged' essays do not read any books published after the Ch'in and Han periods and they do not study the affairs of the other countries of the world yet they can still rise to high offices. Today there are large numbers of high officials but there are non on whom we can depend to carry out the reforms" (K'ang, 1967: 97-98).

Therefore - K'ang proposed - to abolish the old examination material and change it with a study material containing useful knowledge. Emperor Kuang-hsü supported the reform of the examination system.

K'ang aimed to revive Chinese knowledge by a renewed study of Western ideas. He believed, that by involving Western subjects in the study material, officials, chosen by the examination system, would be able to deal with the new problems of the changing world. So K'ang aimed to reform classical Chinese society by modernizing education, the study material and changing the thinking of people. In practice it also meant changing the old state system, the collapse of the old Confucian state, and the gradual establishment of a new system based on modern knowledge and a new type of examination system. This was the essence of the Confucian state reform represented by K'ang.

K'ang's merit was that he initiated involving modern Western learning in the traditional Confucian examination-system. The idea of involving modern knowledge in the classical examination system is very important and it proved to be very useful. Later others accepted and elaborated this idea (Sun Yat-sen for example) (Franke, 1967a: 313-318).

K'ang could achieve in practice that the "eight-legged" essays were abolished in the provincial and metropolitan examinations and replaced by essays on governmental affairs (K'ang, 1967: 101). From 1898 till 1904 the examination system was gradually reformed by introducing new material in the schools; school and state examination were integrated and the old style of literary examination was abandoned in 1905. The year of 1905, when the

examination system was abolished, represented a decisive turning point in the relationship of China with the West in the intellectual and cultural field (Franke, 1967: 119). China became open to modern scientific and intellectual studies and Western social and political ideas.

In struggle for a constitutional monarchical state

Regarding the new state form, K'ang was for a constitutional monarchy. For the realization of his reforms he wanted to achieve the protection of the emperor. But the emperor was weak and the conservative forces of the court could stop the reform movement of K'ang. The empress dowager deposed the emperor who was later killed in 1908. K'ang could escape and he lived in exile. The anti-reformers could continue in the conservative way. Despite the failure of the reform of 1898 K'ang's ideas influenced the Chinese opposition and the overseas Chinese. K'ang's merit is that he could give an appropriate answer to the Western challenge. But the Chinese government was not ready to protect the modernization of the country following the example of the Meiji dynasty or the Russian Peter the First. The Chinese ruling dynasty was not able to establish a constitutional monarchy following the plans of K'ang.

K'ang You-wei opposed the republicanism and the revolutionary attitude of Sun Yat-sen. In opposition to Sun he believed that Chinese society could be changed only gradually and not by revolution. Revolutions could result in troubles and dead-locks as French history proves. European monarchies, like the British or Dutch, represent social stability which is necessary for the success of reforms. So, K'ang believed that China had to continue the example of the European democratic constitutional monarchies because the monarchs could insure social stability. He proposed considering the so called "*titular monarchical republic*" as the state form for China.

In 1911 K'ang wrote a long article, entitled *The Political Structure of a Republic (Kung-ho cheng-t'i lun)*, on the government of China during the transitional period. The ideals of democracy, he pointed out, could be found expressed in the *Book of Changes (I-ching)* and in the chapter on the *Evolution of Rites (Li-yun)* in the *Book of Rites (Li-chi)*.

"The ideals of popular government are what Confucius strove for and what I had hoped and worked for. I wrote the *Book of Great Unity (Ta-t'ung shu, 1902)* expressly to expound this ideal. But as the time [for the establishment of a republican form of government] had not arrived, I proposed a constitutional [monarchical] system" (Lo, 1976: 218).

He believed that since the people of China demanded a republic, there were many forms of democracy for China to adopt; but to imitate the French or the American system would lead to civil war, chaos and disintegration, as the examples of the Latin American republics had shown.

"The establishment of a political system should take place in proper order of sequence just as the progress of mankind advances in stages. To disregard the order of sequence and to leap over the stages is like permitting a savage to fly an airplane. He would only kill himself" (Lo, 1967: 218).

K'ang then proposed the establishment of the system of government practiced in England and her dominions and in Belgium, in Romania, in Bulgaria, in Norway, and in Greece – a system he termed "*titular monarchical republic*" (*hsü-chün kung-ho*). Under this system the monarchy would be hereditary but powerless. The monarch would be revered but would be "no more than a temple idol, a thing of mud and wood, no more than the bearer of an august but empty title." The real power would rest in the parliament with executive authority centered in a cabinet headed by a prime minister chosen from the majority party. The presence of the monarch would preserve order during changes of government so that the state would

not fall into anarchy. Thus the state would be stable and disputes would be fought out in parliament and not on the battlefield. He concluded:

“Thus, from the standpoint of popular rights, the constitutional system I propose and a republic are very close in form. Even though there is a monarch, he is as different from an absolute monarch as ice is different from burning coal. Thus, under a republican monarch, the country would, be nonetheless, a democracy. In an absolutist monarchy, the essence is absolutism. In a constitutional monarchy, the constitution is the essence while the monarch is unimportant. In a titular monarchical republic, the republic is the essence while the titular monarch is unimportant. ... The Europeans, in their political systems, have constitutional monarchy and republic, but they have no name [for the system I propose], so I have decided on the new term “titular monarchical republic” (Lo, 1967: 218-219).

K'ang favoured the British system where the power rested in parliament ((Lo, 1967: 231).

In the first year of the Republic, in 1912, K'ang wrote his essay *On the salvation of China* (*Chung-hua chiu-kuo lun*). He urged the revival of morality in government, respect for law, the restoration of peace and order and the preservation of the territorial integrity of China. He emphasized that a republic should rest on morality and the material well-being of the people. The republic should be established gradually. He again pleaded for the reduction of the autonomous powers of the provincial leaders and the creation of a strong centralized government composed of experts with a responsible parliament wherein political differences would be decided by debates between parties, not settled on the battlefield by provincial armies (Lo, 1967: 224).

5.2. K'ang on Great Unity – Liang's Interpretations

One of the most well-known and most discussed works of K'ang is his *Utopia on the Great Unity* of mankind. It is a plan for the future. His work can be regarded as part of those Utopias and political plans which were written on universal peace. Before and after the First World War there were a lot of plans for the establishment of a world organization with the aim of achieving world peace. Among them the most important were Wilson's ideas leading to the League of Nations. These plans contained and elaborated, on the one hand, the traditional ideas of the European federalist/confederalist antiwar political thinkers and, on the other hand, the European Utopian traditions. The *Ta-t'ung shu* (*Book of the Universal Commonwealth or Book of Great Unity*) written by K'ang Yu-wei (K'ang, 1958) can be regarded as the most important Chinese version of these utopias. K'ang formulated the scheme of the book about 1884 or 1885. According to Liang it was composed in large part in 1902. It is difficult to point to one Western source of his ideas. But his Utopia is based on Western and Chinese thinking. In 1919 the first two chapters of his *Book of Great Unity* (*Ta-t'ung shu*, 1902) were published in book form (Lo, 1967: 238).

K'ang drafted his ideas on “Great Unity” in 1884 when he had withdrawn into solitude in the mountains for two years to create his own school of learning. “Great Unity” was based on his belief in three epochs in the life of mankind: *the epoch of disorder; the epoch of rising peace; and the epoch of universal peace*. In his view his age belonged to the epoch of disorder, in which one could speak only of a “partial security”. But during his meditations he dreamed about the Great Unity of mankind. In his autobiography he wrote on the genesis of his great peace plan as follows:

“I made benevolence the center of my philosophy, which was to follow the will of Heaven in bringing about unity to the earth, the unity of nations, the unity of

racess, and the unity of religions. I also speculated on the changes in the speech, writing, food and drink, clothing, and housing of mankind after the world is united, on equality for men and women and universal laws for everyone, so that a paradise on earth for all men might be attained” (K'ang, 1967: 40-41).

K'ang realized that the world in his age was full of suffering and troubles. He believed that gradual reform of the state and international organization was the only and necessary means to improve the situation of people with the aim of diminishing suffering. He regarded the period when he lived as a period of troubles. The establishment of the League of Nations meant for him the beginning of the period of rising peace. He believed that, to establish the Great Unity of mankind, it would be necessary to elaborate gradually on the following things:

- Abolishing national boundaries and uniting the world
- Abolishing class boundaries and equalizing all people
- Abolishing racial boundaries and amalgamating the races
- Abolishing sex boundaries and preserving independence
- Abolishing family boundaries and becoming 'Heaven's people'
- Abolishing livelihood boundaries and making occupations public
- Abolishing administrative boundaries and governing with complete peace and equality
- Abolishing boundaries of kind and loving all living things
- Abolishing boundaries of suffering and attaining utmost happiness (Kang, 1958: 5)

The main ideas of K'ang's Ta T'ung Shu (Book of Great Unity) may be summarized as follows:

1. No nations; the whole world should set up a single government and be divided into several regions
2. Both the central and regional governments should be elected by popular vote
3. No family and clans; a man and a woman should cohabit not more than a year together; upon expiration of this term, there should be a change of mates
4. Pregnant women should go to an institution for pre-natal education, and babies should go to nurseries after birth
5. Children should enter kindergarten and respective schools according to age
6. Upon coming of age they should be assigned by the government to various duties in agricultural, industrial, and other types of productive enterprise
7. The sick should go to hospitals, and the aged to Homes for the Aged
8. The establishment for pre-natal education, the nurseries, the kindergartens, the hospitals, and the homes for aged should be the highest institutions within the regional [government]; those who enter them should obtain the highest satisfaction
9. Adult men and women should as a rule serve in these establishments for a certain number of years, as they do at present in the military
10. Establish different classes of public dormitories and dining halls so that each may freely enjoy and use them according to his working income
11. Reproach for idleness should be the severest form of punishment

12. Those who make new discoveries in learning and those who serve with special distinction in the five establishments of pre-natal education, etc., should receive specific rewards
13. There should be cremation of the dead and fertilizer factories in the neighborhood of the crematoria (Hsü, 1971: 308-309).

These ideas and principles represented by K'ang correspond in many ways to internationalism and socialism. K'ang was aware that it was a plan for the future. It could only serve as a guide for directing the acts of his era. He thought that, in his era the most important step toward One World was to start peaceful cooperation between states.

He realized that there were three types of union of states: the type in which equals are allied; the type in which each states carries on its internal government but the overall administration is united under the overall government; and the type in which the names and boundaries of the states have been abolished, and there independent (i.e. locally self-governing) districts and prefectures are formed, united however under the control of the universal government. He admitted that these three types each derive naturally from the conditions of the times, and it is impossible to force union on the world all at once. In his view these three types corresponded to the three stages of gradual evolution toward One World or Universal Union (K'ang, 1958: 86). The three stages in the development of cooperation among states were the period of troubles, the period of rising peace, and the period of complete peace and equality.

Founding of a public (universal) parliament is the first step towards One World. Establishing a public government to govern all nations is the middle step towards One World (K'ang, 1958: 91-104). The universal parliament, for example, has two chambers: the upper house represents the states, the lower house represents the world. Following his plan in the first period, the representatives of the parliament represent their own states; in the second period the representatives of the upper house represent the states, the lower house the world; in the third period the members of the public parliament represent only the people of the world and not any particular region (K'ang, 1958: 110-111).

Liang Ch'i-cha'ao on Ta-t'ung shu

K'ang's Universal Commonwealth could be regarded as a plan for the future. He did not want people to think that he wanted to make it a political program for his age and therefore he tried to keep it secret. His student, the famous Chinese democratic thinker Liang Ch'i-cha'ao, read it and he was enthusiastic. He emphasized the importance of the *Ta-t'ung shu* which he regarded as K'ang's own creative work, not the reinterpretation of the older Confucian learning. He regarded K'ang Yu-wei as a Confucian reformer. Therefore Liang believed that K'ang, in his Utopia, interpreted the *Li Yiin* [The Evolution of Li], in terms of the three epochs of the *Ch'un-ch'iu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*) and asserted that the epoch of rising peace was partial security and the epoch of universal peace was a universal commonwealth. In the Evolution of *Li*, K'ang represented the following ideas of Confucius:

“When the Grand Course was pursued, a public and common spirit rules all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. ... They [accumulated] articles [of value], disliking that they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. [They labored] with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exciting it [only] with a view to their own advantage. ... This was [the period of] what we call the Grand Union [Universal Commonwealth]. “ [Translation taken from James Legge (1885): *The Sacred Books of China*. Part III, The Li Ki (Book of Rites), Oxford, 364-366 (Liang, 1970: 140 (ch. 24. note 2)].

Liang commented all this as follows:

“If we translate this paragraph of the Book of Rites in modern terms than it contains the ideas of democracy [“a public and common spirit rules all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability”], a League of Nations [“their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony”], public upbringing of children [“men did not treat as children only their own sons”] ... communism [“they accumulated articles of value ... but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification”], and the sanctity of labor [“they labored ... but not with a view to their own advantage”] (Liang, 1970: 96-97).

So, Liang believed that K'ang translated the ideas of Confucius in modern terms, and on the basis of this he wrote his book on Universal Peace (Ta-t'ung shu).

In Liang's interpretation the main ideas of the Ta-t'ung shu are the followings: no nations; the whole world should set up a single government and be divided into several regions; both the central and regional governments should be popularly elected; no family and clans; the state government should organize the life of the people (kindergarten, schools, workplace, hospitals, nurseries, public dormitories, etc.). These ideas corresponded in many way to the internationalism and socialism of his age (Liang, 96-97). K'ang was aware that his epoch was the epoch of disorder in which one could only speak about a partial security and not the epoch of universal peace. He proposed his reform ideas for improving the situation of his age in harmony with his Ta-t'ung shu.

Liang highly appreciated his teacher's Utopia. But he opposed K'ang's ideas on a constitutional monarchy. He supported the revolutionary and republican cause against the Manchus. He was not in agreement with K'ang on the necessity of the establishment of a renewed Confucian cult. K'ang Yu-wei vigorously advocated the creation of a Confucian Association, the establishment of Confucianism as a state religion and the worship of Confucius together with Heaven. Liang believed that, in China, new thoughts should be developed in the future (Liang, 1970: 104-105). Liang was interested in politics and political practice. He always maintained that all the doctrines of the world should have free entry [into China] (Liang, 1970: 105).

On the European civilization Liang thought that it was an enlightened civilization and the representative of social progress. But he changed this opinion after the First World War. After this he saw Europe as a sick and declining civilization, the victim of its own obsession with science, materialism, and mechanization: Europe had fallen victim to its own illusions. Liang did not believe in the inevitable progress of China imitating the West any more. He continued to believe in science and material progress. But parallel to this he thought that China's historical mission was to preserve a balance and to establish a new humanistic civilization based on the Western and Chinese values. Clearly he wanted the best of both world. Western science and material progress and Chinese capacity for harmonizing opposing extremes (De Bary, 1960: 846-847).

5.3. Sun Yat-sen, the Republican Reformer

In 1911, during the hundred day revolution, when the Manchu government was overthrown, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the leader of the republican revolution showed the way towards a new democratic republican state with foreign support. He was called upon to become the president of the new Republic of China. In his memoirs, Sun tells us how the republican revolution could triumph: He tried to find help in America, France, Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and Russia. These governments did not really help the revolutionary movement.

But people sympathized with it. Finally, Sun could find support with the help of the British government which annulled all loans to the Tai-Tsing dynasty. (The Banking Consortium of the Four Powers paid loans to the dynasty). Sun asked them to pay this loan to the new government. They promised it, if it would be established. Finally he could succeed and, in 1912, the Chinese Republic was established (Sun, ca. 1960: 193).

“The revolution was my principal aim in life” - Sun wrote in his Memoirs (Sun, Memoirs, ca. 1960: 193). He aimed to change the old China into a modern democratic republican state. As a politician, Sun was a mixture of a Western type republican politician and a wise Confucian philosopher. His political program was based on *the three Principles of the People, San Min Chu I*, (nationalism, democracy and livelihood). He explained his three Principles of the People in a series of popular lectures (Sun, ca. 1960). His program was based on the analysis of the Western interpretation of these principles in a Chinese framework. From the Western ideas on state and international organization Sun tried to safeguard what he regarded as good and proposed to implement only what was useful for Chinese society (Sun, ca. 1960: 38, 41).

For Sun the most important problem was how to improve the international situation of China. He realized that China was not only a semi-colony but in his words:

“In reality we are being crushed by the economic strength of the Powers to a greater degree than if we were a full colony. China is not a colony of one nation but of all and we are not the slaves of one country but of all. I think we ought to be called a “hypo-colony” (Sun, ca. 1960: 10).

On basis of historical reality Sun emphasised that Westerners used two means to destroy China: military force and diplomacy. These methods worked because foreigners realized that China was not united politically. In his words:

“Foreigners are constantly saying that Chinese are a “sheet of loose sand” (Sun, ca. 1960: 31).

He believed that the most important thing was to find the way to become economically and politically independent and united in a democratic state by arousing the national spirit and seeking solutions for the problems of democracy and livelihood. To unite China, Sun proposed his *principle of nationalism*. In his interpretation the much discussed Western national principle was placed in the Chinese tradition and reality. His national principle had three components: national unity composed of families and clans as the basic national/state units; the renewal of the Confucian moral principles and state wisdom as national values; and adopting useful Western values, science and technology. To establish democracy he proposed a government composed of experts in the service of the sovereign people chosen by using the renewed form of the old examination system. To achieve livelihood Sun proposed “*state capitalism*” which was based on the idea of using profit for improvement of the living standard of the people under the direction of the government.

The principle of nationalism

The *principle of nationalism* had three components: *national unity*, *Confucian values* and the adaptation of *Western science and technology*.

Regarding the first component, *national unity*, Sun realized that there was no national feeling in China because *clan/family feeling* dominated. In the West *unitary national states*, in some cases representing the centers of national empires, were established. Nationalism played the role of identity formation of the people. Sun realized the lack of *national feeling* and *national identity* in China and concluded that the unity of the Chinese state could be built only upon the dominating *clan feeling/identity*. In China there were *clans, families*, as traditional units.

Therefore Chinese ignored their country, they did not know who was the emperor, but they did everything for their clans. Based on this fact Sun proposed a very questionable solution. Namely, to chose clans as units of the state and to build up Chinese national unity based on ethnicity, families, clans and not on the individual citizens. In his words:

“If we take the clans as our social units and, after improving their internal organization, join them together to form a state, our task will naturally be easier than that of foreign countries which make the individual the unit”. Where the individual is the unite, there will be at least millions of units in a country, four hundred millions in China; the knitting together of such a huge number of separate units would naturally be very difficult (Sun, ca. 1960: 32).

Therefore Sun proposed the followings:

“Let us take the clans as small foundations and work at building up the nation upon these. Suppose China has four hundred clans: it would be just as if we were working with four hundred individual people. We would make use of the original organization that each family name already has, and, in the name of the clan, begin to rally the people together, first in the neighborhood and prefecture, then in the province, and finally throughout the country, until each family name had become a large united group” (Sun, ca. 1960: 33).

All members bearing the surname of Chen could create a clan unit: Chen clan. When every clan was organized in this way, as a next step increasingly larger units could be created. He believed that the only safeguard was to cooperate and establish the *Republic of China as a nation*.

The second component of Sun's principle of nationalism was morality and the wisdom of the old learning, - the *Confucian values*. Sun aimed to restore, as the Chinese national value, the ancient morality which he regarded as a basic value of the Chinese civilization. In his view China's old moral standards, ancient virtues were the following: “*Loyalty, Filial Devotion, Kindness, Love, Faithfulness*”(Sun, ca. 1960: 41), and *Harmony and Peace*: Loyalty to the nation and the people; Filial devotion, or filial duty, or filial piety covered almost the whole field of human activity; Kindness and love rejected discrimination; Love meant “universal love”, love of government; Faithfulness had to be the rule in dealing with neighboring countries. Sun emphasized that China, in her mightiest days, never utterly destroyed another state and it continued to represent harmony and peace among states and peoples as the principle of international organization (Sun, ca. 1960: 38- 41).

Sun believed that these principles were, in their very nature, superior to foreign virtues. He believed that the Chinese surpassed the people of other lands in the moral quality of peace. These moral principles could be regarded as the special characteristic and the spirit of the Chinese nation. The Chinese had to cultivate these moral principles and restore China as a state and a nation based on these principles (Sun, ca. 1960: 41). He emphasised that China had also to revive, as the national value, its old learning because, among the human theories of the state, China's political philosophy held a high place. It was systematic and clear. It was found in the *Great Learning*:

“Search into the nature of things, extend the boundaries of knowledge, make the purpose sincere, regulate the mind, cultivate personal virtue, rule the family, govern the state, pacify the world” (Sun, ca. 1960: 42).

In Sun's view the Great Learning called upon a man to develop outwards, to begin with his inner nature and not cease until the world was at peace. This wisdom of Chinese philosophy was worthy to be preserved (Sun, ca. 1960: 42).

Sun mentioned another thing which would be worthy to be preserved from the Confucian principles. It was the *cultivation of the person* (personalism in the meaning of self-education, self-cultivation, the cultivation of the own person) and dealing with the *livelihood of the masses*.

He acknowledged that it is hard for foreigners to understand age-long Chinese civilization. However there were exceptions, like the British philosopher, Russel who could understand it (Sun, ca. 1960: 43). Foreigners in general thought that the Chinese were barbaric. Only those who had spent ten or more years could appreciate Chinese culture. Regarding Chinese behavior with the foreigners he advised the following:

“On meeting foreigners not rudely trespass upon their freedom, then foreigners would certainly respect the Chinese” (Sun, ca. 1960: 43-44).

In Sun's view China had not been successful in realizing the above mentioned principles in the past hundred years. Chinese had stopped refining their principles. As a result the Chinese could not govern their own country, and the foreigners easily made use of China's weakness. In his words:

“And foreigners, seeing that we cannot do so, want to come and establish international control over us” (Sun, ca. 1960: 42-43).

He emphasized that after restoring the personal morality/personal culture and the ancient wisdom and comprehensive philosophy the Chinese had to learn the *modern science of the West*. The Chinese had invented a lot of things a millennium ago: the compass, printing, porcelain, gunpowder. The Westerners used it and improved it. As regards food, clothing and other things China had also contributed many discoveries: tea, house building and suspension bridges. Ancient China was not without capabilities. But China became backward. She needed to learn the strong points, first of all in science, of Europe and America before she could progress at an equal rate with them. Chinese had to learn the best features of Western nations.

Sun believed that China could catch up with the rest of the world. In this Japan was a good example. It had studied the European and American civilizations and, within a few decades, had been able to become one of the world's great power. Sun believed that the Chinese could follow the example of Japan in the field of technical development and their attitude towards the copying of Western technology (Sun, ca. 1960: 46-47). But, as a difference, Sun emphasized that when China became strong she could not pursue colonialist policy and could not exploit others. China had to take a great responsibility for others instead of pursuing the former means of destruction of other states. She could not continue the Western and Japanese example in this. China had to follow the principle: “Rescue the weak and lift up the fallen” (Sun, ca. 1960: 49). In his words:

“We must aid the weaker and smaller peoples, and oppose the great powers of the world. If all people of the country resolve upon this purpose, our nation will prosper; otherwise there is no hope for us” (Sun, ca. 1960: 49).

His advice is the following:

“If we want to be able to reach this ideal in the future, we must now revive our national spirit, recover our national standing, unify the world upon the foundation of our ancient morality and love of peace, and bring about a universal rule of equality and fraternity” (Sun, ca. 1960: 49-50).

Sun was convinced that China had to rise as a power by restoring the state. But China had to be responsible for the world. It had to reject continuing the destructive example of the great powers. It had to reject imperialism.

In conclusion, Sun's nationalism was characterized by searching the values of Chinese society and restoring the useful and good principles of the past represented by Confucius. He aimed to build up the new Chinese republic as a modern nation based on Chinese values, which he expanded with the best principles of the West. Therefore he emphasized the importance of the learning of the good things of the European civilization and rejecting the bad things. For him civilization was a learning process with the participation of all civilizations: for example, a few hundred years ago, Europe could not be compared with China. Now the Chinese had to learn Western science and what the Chinese were lacking. He regarded, as a future challenge for the scientifically developed modern China transcending the Western bellicose capitalist society and building up a new cosmopolitan world. He was convinced that cosmopolitanism could be built up on the basis of nationalism:

“Those desiring to pacify the world must first govern their own state” ... “We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we want to extend cosmopolitanism we must first establish strongly our own nationalism. If nationalism cannot become strong, cosmopolitanism certainly cannot prosper” (Sun, ca. 1960: 25, 27).

The problem with Sun's interpretation is that Western history did not prove what Sun believed: the national principle not in civic, but in ethnic interpretation proved to be a very dangerous deadlock in European social organization. It continues to be an obstacle to the establishment of democracy among states up to the present day.

The principle of democracy

Sun admitted that the most important Western achievement was *parliamentary representative democracy*. Americans and Europeans think that it is the highest type of popular sovereignty. But, Sun believed, the hope of foreigners that representative government would insure the stability and peace of the state is not to be trusted (Sun, ca. 1960: 107). By establishing parliamentary democracy the Western states reached the limit. There is no way further. Sun regarded the Western representative parliamentary system as an ancient idea. As an example, he mentioned that Westerners regarded Plato's Republic, written two millenniums ago, still worthy of study and of great value in modern times. Aristotle is also very influential in the West. Based on this, Sun concluded that Westerners did not discover anything new: they were Platonist and Aristotelian, and tried to realize their ancient ideas in a reformed form. Actually in Western thinking Plato and Aristotle represented the same thing that as, in Chinese thinking, Confucius.

In his words:

“Westerners who are using the newest scholarship to aid them in finding a solution have not made any worth-while discoveries in democratic theory, nor have they found any satisfactory answer to the difficulties of democracy. So the methods of Western democracy cannot be our model or guide” (Sun, ca. 1960: 109).

“In the last two or three centuries, Europe and America have passed through many revolutions and their political progress has been much more rapid than China's, yet the Western political treatises do not show much advance upon the past. For instance there lived in Greece two thousand years ago a great political philosopher named Plato; his *Republic* is still studied by scholars who say that it has much to contribute towards the political system of to-day” (Sun, ca. 1960: 109).

In Sun's view Westerners could make a rapid development in the field of physical sciences but in the field of political theory they could not:

“But in the field of political theory, we find Plato's Republic written two millenniums ago still worthy of study and of great value in modern times. So the advance of Western political philosophy has not kept pace with the advance of Western material science. There has been no radical change in political thinking for two thousand years”

Sun concluded:

“If we copy Western government as we are copying Western material science, we shall be making a great mistake” ... The reason why Western democracy has not made more progress is that Western nations have not fundamentally solved the problem of administering democracy”. ... The West has not yet found any proper method of carrying out democracy and that the truth of democracy have not yet fully manifested. ... The recent growth of democracy is not an achievement of thoughtful scholarship but the result of a popular following of natural tendencies. For this reason, no fundamental method of directing democracy was worked out beforehand, the problem was not considered from beginning to end, and so the Western peoples have met innumerable disappointments and difficulties halfway on the road of democracy. Since the Revolution, China has wanted to follow the example of Europe and America and to apply political democracy. Since Western political democracy has developed to the point of representative government, China, too, must have a representative government! But the fine points of Western representative government China has not learned; the bad points she had copied tenfold, a hundredfold! China has not only failed to learn from the Western democratic government but has been corrupted by it”(Sun, ca. 1960: 110-111). ... “From what I have already said, you must realize that Western democratic government does not have any fundamentally good method of application. So in our espousal of democracy, we should not entirely copy the West” (Sun, ca. 1960: 111).

In summary, Sun believed that the West could not solve the problem of democracy in the age of popular sovereignty. Western political treatises did not show much advance upon the past and the ancient Greek bases. Western peoples had met innumerable disappointments and difficulties halfway on the road to democracy because the problems were not considered from beginning to end. Therefore China was not able to copy automatically and entirely the Western parliamentary democratic model because the Western model did not have any fundamentally good method of application. China was different from the West. Chinese could learn science and technology from the West but in ways of democratic social organization, they should not learn only from the West. Chinese had to think out a radically new method (Sun, ca. 1960: 111).

In his words:

“The West has its society; we have our society, and the sentiments and customs of the two are not the same. Only as we adapt ourselves, according to our own social conditions, to modern world tendencies, can we hope to reform our society and to advance our nation. If we pay no attention to our own social conditions and try simply to follow world tendencies, our nation will decline and our people will be in peril. If we want China to progress and our race to be safe, we must put democracy into effect ourselves and do some radical thinking upon the best way to realize its ideal” (Sun, ca. 1960: 112).

Sun emphasised that the Chinese should investigate the best principles of their own state ideas and the best principles of the West and reject the bad principles. In his view the most important problem with the Western democracy was that it could not solve the question of a

strong democratic government composed of experts dealing with the livelihood of the people because Westerners could not yet *distinguish between sovereignty and ability* and therefore Western democracies had a democratic deficit. If China wanted to avoid democratic deficit it had to concentrate on the unfinished Western project of popular sovereignty, and realize real popular sovereignty or the rule of the people. The most important challenge in this field was to be able to realize, in state practice, the *separation of sovereignty and ability*: sovereignty of the people governed by persons working for the livelihood and welfare of the people chosen on the basis of knowledge and merit.

In his words:

“The foundation of the government of a nation must be built upon the rights of the people, but the administration of government must be intrusted to experts. We must not look upon these experts as stately and grand presidents and ministers, but simply as our chauffeurs, as guards at the gate, as cooks, physicians, carpenters, or tailors. It does not matter what sort of workmen the people consider them. As long as they have this general attitude towards them, the state can be governed and the nation can go forward” (Sun, ca. 1960: 129).

Or in another place he writes:

“On the one hand, we want government machinery to be all-powerful so that it can do any sort of work; on the other hand we want the engineer-people to be very strong so they can control the all-powerful machinery” (Sun, ca. 1960: 145).

Thinking about how to achieve strong government to govern and strong people to control the government, Sun realized that it would be necessary to balance out the powers on both sides. On the *people's side* there had to be four powers: *suffrage, recall, initiative, referendum*. On the *government's side* there had to be five powers: *executive, legislative, judicial, civil service examination, and censoring*:

“When the four political powers of the people control the five governing powers of the government, then we will have a completely democratic government organ, and the strength of the people and of the government will be well balanced” (Sun, ca. 1960: 145).

In the view of Sun the democratic government looked like this:

The political power [suffrage, recall, initiative, referendum] was in the hands of the people; the administrative power [legislature, judiciary, executive, civil service examinations, and censorship] was in the hands of the government. The people controlled the government through suffrage, recall, initiative, and the referendum; the government worked for the people through its legislative, judicial, executive, civil examination, and censoring departments:

“With these *nine powers* in operation and preserving a balance, the problem of democracy will truly be solved and the government will have a definite course to follow” (Sun, ca. 1960: 145-146).

The two new features in the *quintuple-power constitution* of Sun came from old China. China had an independent system of *civil service examination and censorship*. The imperial censors of the Manchu dynasty made a fine censorship system as a separate governmental power. The power of censorship included the power to impeach. The selection of real talent and ability through examinations had been characteristic of China for thousands of years. Examination and censorship were separate from the throne. In Western autocratic governments all power was monopolized by the king or emperor himself. In China the emperor had no authority over the power of examination and censorship. So - concluded Sun - Chinese government had exercised the *separated powers of autocracy, censorship, and examination* for many

thousands of years, while Western governments had exercised separated legislative, judicial and executive powers for only a little over a century (Sun, ca. 1960: 147).

Sun explained that what he proposed was not new. The materials for his new plan had been discovered before him. Switzerland and the USA used these methods. Switzerland, for example, had already applied three of the political powers but did not have the recall. What could be regarded as a novelty in his theory was the proposition to enlarge the three governmental powers (legislative, judiciary, and executive) with civil service examinations and censorship following the example of the old Confucian system in a reformed form and on the basis of Western science and modern knowledge. By his “*quintuple-power constitution*” an “*all-powerful government seeking the welfare of the people*” could be realized (Sun, ca. 1960: 149).

In his words:

“If we now want to combine the best from China and the best from the other countries and guard against all kinds of abuse in the future, we must take the three Western governmental powers – the executive, legislative, and judicial; add to them the old Chinese powers of examination and censorship and make a finished wall, a quintuple-power government. Such a government will be the most complete and the finest in the world, and a state with such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Sun, ca. 1960: 147-148).

This was the essence of the model proposed by Sun Yat-sen for the new democracy, for an independent, economically and scientifically strong China which needed an all-powerful government seeking the welfare of the people: using the four controlling power people could move and stop the state machinery, so the people embodied political power.

In conclusion, Sun Yat-sen tried to solve the problem of the humanization of power. He proposed the separation of sovereignty and ability which, in his view, the West could not yet do and this caused “democratic deficit”. He believed that without this separation there was no real democracy. His model of a popular sovereignty was based on the ability of the government and the control of the government by the sovereign people. Ability was controlled by civil service examinations, and censorship enlarging the legislative, judiciary, and the executive power. Sun solved the democratic deficit by proposing to re-establish the old Chinese exam system for the officials in a reformed form on basis of the modern Western knowledge and the principles of democratic state organization. He believed that, by the active involvement of people in politics, the problem of the livelihood of masses could be solved: people told the experts what to solve and the experts told the people how to solve it. There was no need for powerful politicians and authority in this process. Sun emphasized that state organization had to be concentrated in solving problems on the basis of reality and the search for truth. This was the way to transcend the privileges of the traditional power of the hereditary elite who did not dare to let the people govern. Therefore the traditional elite in Europe was unable to surpass the democratic deficit characterizing European political and legal philosophy and practice.

The principle of livelihood

Sun disagreed with Marx and he rejected his theory based on materialism. In his view Marx's theory was old-fashioned, and seriously false (Sun, ca. 1960: 165-166). Marx's social philosophy aimed to overthrow capitalists. Sun raised the question whether it was really necessary to overthrow capitalist?. History showed that the surplus value can be used other than Marx imagined. Investing profit contributed to making progress in the world and it initiated reforms daily. Freedom of enterprise is a useful working means. Everybody who had capital, or could lend money from the bank could be involved in capitalism. Therefore, in the

center of history, is *livelihood* and not material forces. Capitalism was a useful tool to solve the problem of livelihood if it was used wisely. The political, social, and economic movements of history gravitate towards the problem of livelihood:

“Livelihood is the center of government, the center of economics, the center of all historical movement” ... “We must recognize livelihood as the center of social history” (Sun, ca. 1960: 168-169).

For Sun the real problem was how to organize capitalism in the service of the livelihood of the people. In his view the principle of livelihood demanded a solution of the social problem - to avoid suffering caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and property. The solution could be concentrating on wellbeing and not on profit-making. This helped to solve the food problem. So Sun accepted capitalism as a good means to solve the problem of livelihood but he opposed the profit-oriented capitalist system. He explained the differences between the *principle of livelihood* and capitalism as follows:

“The fundamental difference, then, between the Principle of Livelihood and capitalism is this: capitalism makes profit its sole aim, while the principle of livelihood makes the nurture of the people its aim. With such a noble principle we can destroy the old, evil capitalistic system” (Sun, ca. 1960: 198).

For the realization of his ideas on capitalism serving the livelihood of the people, Sun proposed the so-called “*state capitalism*”. He believed that state capitalism was suitable for the principle of livelihood and it was realizable. He based his belief on the fact that China was poor. In a poor country the regulation of capital and taxation was not enough. China, in the first phase of state capitalism had to develop state capital and promote industry, use machinery in production, give employment. The secret of wealth was employment and machinery in production. Parallel to developing state capital, it was necessary to elaborate a plan with the aim of preventing extreme inequality which results in serious social problems (Sun, 181-182).

Sun accepted that China needed capital. Therefore it had to borrow capital from foreign countries. It also had to borrow foreign brains and experience to manage capitalism. But he emphasized that industry, communication, mining, and manufacturing had to be run by the Chinese state and not by the foreign capitalists. State capitalism could secure the participation of the people in the building of their own economy. It contributed to the enjoyment of rights and privileges by all people. The people of the country would then have a share in the profits of capital, and would not be injured by the capital (Sun, ca. 1960: 183). Sun believed that this was the way to avoid suffering caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and property in capitalism.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Sun was in favour of socialism or, in his terminology, “state capitalism”. He had in mind not totalitarian communism but a *mixed system of controlled democracy and state socialism*. All this was in contradiction to Marxism, to Western political and economic liberalism, or K'ang's ideas which had greater confidence in private enterprise than Sun (Hsiao, 1975:368). Sun was for a *strong government* because economic development needed government leadership. Latecomers to industrialization could not afford the freedom of the entrepreneurs. For late-comers it was better to have government planning and direction. The principle of livelihood demanded an *economic developer, strong and expert government* in democratic cooperation with the people concentrating on problem-solving and livelihood.

By proposing his three principles of the people Sun aimed to elaborate the theoretical basis on a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people” - that is, a state belonging to

all the people, a government controlled by all the people, and rights and benefits for the enjoyment of all the people. He believed that

“If this is true, the people will have a share in everything. When the people share everything in the state, then will we truly reach the goal of the *Min Sheng* Principle, which is Confucius' hope of a “great commonwealth” (Sun, ca. 1960: 184).

Sun actually could be regarded as a Confucian reform philosopher in the age of the Chinese Republic. But he could not properly elaborate his ideas on livelihood because he suddenly died. It remained a challenge for Chinese politicians to elaborate further his ideas on a democratic state serving the livelihood of the people.

5.4. Comparison of K'ang and Sun

The Chinese answer to the European challenge is more understandable if we compare the ideas on state organization of the two important Chinese political thinkers, Kang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen. Both believed in the classical idea of universal peace and they rejected war. Both regarded the Confucian moral principles as the basic principles of the Chinese state and they supported the safeguarding of traditional values. Both rejected the authoritarian state form but emphasized the necessity of strong and virtuous government dealing with the livelihood of the people. Both recognized and supported the study of Western science and technology. The most important difference between them was the state form which they favoured.

K'ang was for a *constitutional monarchy* in the period of the Reform movement and, later, for a *titular monarchical republic*. He regarded local autonomy as the basic unit of the state. He protected property rights, private enterprise and free trade. But he rejected foreign protection, loans and political support in the building of Chinese society. He believed that China had to find its way toward modernization alone on the basis of its own traditions and reality. K'ang rejected revolution and republican change and he was for a gradual reform.

Sun, in opposition to K'ang, was for the immediate change and establishment of a new political order. For this he accepted the Western protection, material and political help. He was for a state based on local autonomy system composed of the family or clan. Lower level of this state was autonomous, however centralized from above. Sun favoured socialization or sharing everything. He supported socialism or “state capitalism”: state monopoly and private enterprise controlled by the state and rejected free trade. He was for an expert government in service of the people. This meant in practice that the government was for the people and concentrated on the livelihood of the people and not on profit-making.

To sum up, both state conceptions were in harmony with the European ideas on state organization. K'ang aimed to reform the Confucian state following the principles of a civic constitutional monarchical state. Sun, in opposition to him, favored republican, socialist or “state capitalist” principles. The most important difference between the Chinese and Western state-conception was the safeguarding by the Chinese, in a modernized form, of the examination system using Western scientific knowledge as study material. So, the Chinese answer to the Western challenge was a reform movement based on useful Western knowledge and the safeguarding in a modernized form of the Chinese traditions and the examination system.

Both tried to avoid implementing the sicknesses of Western expansionist society based on free trade, exploitation, money and profit-making in the service of individual aims. They were in search of a new model of state which was suitable for Chinese social characteristics. They realized that a modern Chinese model was necessary to be able to safeguard the freedom and

independence of the country. The Chinese “state capitalist” model concentrating on the livelihood challenged the Western model. But because of political circumstances they were not able to realize their ideas. Either the Chinese dynasty nor the revolutionary forces could manage the modernization process. The dynasty was overthrown, and the republican revolution ended in troubles. The revolutionary and anarchical circumstances made it impossible to realize the necessary reforms. The war lords profited from the anarchy. As a result of the internal anarchy Chinese society could not solve the question of how to be independent and free from the Western colonial powers who contributed to the making of the troubles.

K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen gave their own answers to the Western challenge of modernization concentrating on Chinese reality and traditions. It would be necessary to rethink their ideas and to involve them in the international political knowledge.

5.5. Mao Tse-tung on the New Democracy

The First and the Second World Wars showed the self-destructive effect of the Western capitalist colonization model. The two World Wars indicated the impasse of European civilization. But Chinese society was also in deep anarchy at that time and could not present any alternative to counterbalance the Western model.

In China it was Mao Tse-tung, the leading Chinese Communist politician, who, in his article *On New Democracy*, published in 1940 when the war of resistance began, continued the search for ways out of the crisis. The question was how to find the road to liberation. Here Mao emphasized the importance of the ancient principle “*seeking truth from facts*” when one is in search for new ways. More precisely he wrote the following:

“The scientific approach consists in “seeking truth from facts”, and the presumptuous approach of “assuming one's own infallibility” and “posing as the master to all” can never be of any help in solving problems” (Mao, 1954: 2).

In 1940, writing his political essay *On New Democracy*, Mao's aim was to change a politically oppressed and economically exploited China into a politically free and economically prosperous China; to change China, which had been ignorant and backward under the rule of the old culture, into a China that would be enlightened and progressive under the rule of a new culture (Mao, 1954: 3).

Mao realized that China, since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society, had changed into a *colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society* (Mao, 1954: 5). The politics in China were colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal; the economy was colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal; culture was colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. From all this he concluded that the revolution had to be directed against these dominant political, economic, and cultural forms. Its aim had to be the elimination of the colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal economy, politics and culture of the old China, and to build up the opposite to all these: a new economy, new politics and a new culture (Mao, 1954: 6).

Mao Tse-tung realized that China could not establish an independent civil capitalist state because international capitalism would not allow it. It was simply impossible because China was a colony. It was attacked by the international capitalism which would not allow the establishment of an independent sovereign Chinese capitalist state. Imperialism was moribund capitalism. It needed colonies. For independence people had to fight. Therefore, concluded Mao, China could be independent only as a socialist society. It had to establish something new, something different. China was in its fight of resistance. To be capitalist with the help of

the imperialists was a blind alley. Only an oppositional model, which was more suitable for Chinese traditions, could be an alternative for democracy and independence. As an example Mao mentioned the Kemalist Turkey which finally had to throw herself into the arms of the Anglo-French imperialism becoming more and more a semi-colony and a part of the reactionary world (Mao, 1954: 34).

In his words:

“In the international situation of today, the “heroes” in the colonies and semi-colonies must either stand on the side of the imperialist front and become part of the force of world counter-revolution or stand on the side of the anti-imperialist front and become part of the force of world revolution. They must stand either on this side or the other, for there is no third choice” (Mao, 1954: 34).

Mao believed that the Chinese bourgeoisie had made an alliance with imperialism and the feudal forces. But the rule of the European-American bourgeoisie was obsolete. He was convinced that the world revolution was necessary against imperialism. He regarded the Chinese revolution as part of the world revolution for independence and democracy. In his view the new democracy in China started after the First World War and after the Russian October Revolution. Its aim was to build up a democratic and independent China in the first phase and socialist China in the second phase: *first, the democratic revolution*; and *secondly the socialist revolution*. He emphasized that the two revolutionary processes were different in character:

The *preparatory step of the first democratic phase* started after the Opium war in 1840. It continued with the fight against feudalism and the foreigners: the movement of T'ai-p'ing's Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reformist Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the Northern Expedition, the War of the Agrarian Revolution and the Anti-Japanese War – one century's fight against imperialism and the feudal forces aiming to build up a democratic society.

In Mao's view the 1911 Revolution was a *bourgeois-democratic revolution*, not a proletarian-socialist one. Sun Yat-sen was the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which was a classical one till the beginning of the First World War and the October Revolution of 1917. After 1917, the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution changed in character and formed part of the proletarian socialist revolution. The First World War and the October Revolution marked a new era for the whole world. The world capitalist front collapsed, and the *liberation of the colonies* started (Mao, 1954: 10-11). Revolutions against capitalism, imperialism and colonialism represent a new phenomenon as part of the new world revolution: the *proletarian socialist world revolution*. Its aim is to establish a new democratic society under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It opposes imperialism and colonialism (Mao, 1954: 11-12). Chinese communist revolution is part of the proletarian-socialist revolution: a fight against capitalism, imperialism, and colonization. Its aim cannot be to establish the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Its aim is the establishment of a *new democratic society*, as a first step; and as a second step to establish the *socialist society* headed by the Chinese proletariat (Mao, 1954: 17-18).

In Mao's view the Chinese revolution was different to the Russian one. Russia was a country of militarist and feudal imperialism and the Russian proletariat did not unite with the bourgeoisie (Mao, 1954: 20). China was a colonial and semi-colonial country and the Chinese bourgeoisie allied with the proletariat against colonialism and the warlords. The Communists cooperated with the Kuomintang: they accepted that the principle of democracy had to be shared by all common people (Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, 1924, Mao, 1954: 26).

In Mao's view there were three systems of state in his age: *republics under bourgeois dictatorship*; *republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat*; *republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes*.

1. *Republics under bourgeois dictatorship*: These are the old democratic states, but after the outbreak of the second imperialist war there was no more democracy in many of the capitalist countries which came under the bloody militarist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. China cannot become a European-American type capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship. Such old democratic republics are already out of date.
2. *Republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat*: This form existed in the Soviet Union. But it was not suitable for colonialist, semi-colonialist countries. In China a third form was the only possibility: a new-democratic republic
3. *Republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes*

It is a necessary *transitional form of state for colonial, semi-colonial countries*, i.e. “*a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes*” (Mao, 1954: 24). In China this new-democratic state was an anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist front; a coalition of several revolutionary forces; a united front. The problem with this new-democratic front was that it made the work of democratizing difficult (Mao, 1954: 23-24).

What Mao wanted was, in his words:

“A dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries and collaborators is the kind of state we want today” (Mao, 1954: 25).

In Mao's eyes the problem with the Chinese bourgeoisie was that it compromised with the imperialists. They did not want to completely break with imperialism. So, the Chinese bourgeoisie was not able to solve the democratization of China (Mao, 1954: 20-21). Therefore in China there had to be two phases of the revolution: the bourgeois democratic and the socialist.

Mao believed that China could take neither the road of capitalism under bourgeois dictatorship nor the road of socialism under proletarian dictatorship (Mao, 1954: 38). Therefore he regarded the “*Three People's Principles*” of Sun Yat-sen as a good solution for *the minimum program of the Communist Party* which was basically in agreement with the political tenets of the Three People's Principles. The party wanted to realize them; there was a united front between communism and the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen in the stage of democratic revolution (Mao, 1954: 44).

Sun Yat-sen also protected cooperation with the Communists and he admitted:

“Communism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles” (Mao, 1954: 44-45, note 1: Dr. Sun Yat-sen, *Lectures on the Principles of People's Welfare*, 1924, Lecture II, quoted by Mao, 1954: 45).

Mao was in agreement with Sun in this:

“The three revolutionary political tenets of Nationalism, Democracy and People's Welfare, embodied in the Three People's Principles as re-interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924, basically agree with the Communists' political programme for the stage of democratic revolution in China. Because of this similarity and because of the carrying out of the Three People's Principles, the united front of the two doctrines and of the two parties came into existence. It is wrong to ignore this aspect” (Mao, 1954: 46).

However, Mao realized that there was a revolutionary and contra-revolutionary interpretation of the Three People's Principles and in this there was no neutrality. He emphasized that, in the

future, the “Three Principles of the People, San Min Chu I” of Sun Yat-sen had to be discussed from this point of view.

Mao Tse-tung could realize that the Western imperialist capitalist model could not be a solution for China because, as part of this system, China would never be independent and equal. To be a free and independent state China needed to elaborate an alternative model to the Western colonial capitalism. He aimed to establish an alternative model but he could only partly realize this. Later in the period of his personal cult and the cultural revolution he broke his own principle:

“The scientific approach consists in “seeking truth from facts”, and the presumptuous approach of “assuming one's own infallibility” and “posing as the master to all” can never be of any help in solving problems (Mao, 1954: 2).

Conclusions

In the Chinese culture there was a discussion about modernization or Westernization, i.e. the adoption of capitalism. There were three main groups: traditionalist, modernizer, and reform Confucianist.

Traditionalists rejected modernization, and defended the old Confucian traditions.

The modernizers rejected the old Confucian tradition and aimed for full modernization of Chinese economy and society.

The third group, the Confucian reformers, represented the middle way (mean): they accepted European-type modernization in all those fields where modernization was necessary and useful (commerce, the economy, science, technology) but they wanted to safeguard the traditional Confucian culture and its values in a reformed form. Confucian reformers were for the implementation of European knowledge and technology. However they were selective regarding the acceptance of the Western social model, its norms and values. They wanted to reform Confucian values in accordance with social needs. Actually, they represented the middle way between the two extremes, the traditionalists and the modernists (Ch'en, 1979: 426-452). In practice it meant adopting what was useful and necessary from the Westerners, for example, science and technology, but China had to safeguard its own culture. They were for a strong expert government concentrating on livelihood and for safeguarding the examination system and the self-cultivation.

Confucian reformers were divided into two main groups: the constitutional monarchists, led by K'ang You-wei, and the republicans led by Sun Yat-sen. The differences between them were analyzed in detail above. As a summary it can be said that both tried to give answers to the problems of their own age on the basis of the Chinese Confucian culture challenged by colonization and imperialism. Both represented the interests of the Chinese people. Both were for a united nation state and strong government serving the livelihood of the people. K'ang launched the Confucian reform. He was for a constitutional monarchy and gradual change. He believed that the constitutional monarch could guarantee the stability of the state which was necessary for the success of the reforms. Sun was for revolutionary change. He aimed to build up a republican united nation state based on families/clans and renewed Confucian values. He represented the idea of state capitalism serving the livelihood of the people. He favored the expert government, and the examination system based on modern knowledge. In reality China could not avoid the internal problems of troubles in the framework of the imperialist World. This made impossible the realization of a modern Confucian constitutional monarchy or a democratic nation state.

A third way was represented by Mao Tse-tung. He aimed to safeguard the independence of China and the Chinese people by fighting against colonialism and imperialism. He joined the world revolutionary movement and elaborated the Maoist way of social organization because

he believed that China could safeguard its independence only by establishing a different modern society. But history proved that the Maoist way of social organization ended in a dead-lock. However it contributed to the collapse of colonization and imperialism. China could remain independent.

Searching new ways for China, the Confucian reformers could safeguard Confucianism in a reformed form. It remained the basic moral setting guiding Chinese modernization. As such, it could produce alternative ideas for social organization. The economic success of Singapore and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping are a good example. There are discussions about “Confucian capitalism” between the Europeans and the Chinese politicians because Confucian capitalism is based on a strong government and concentrates on the livelihood of people. As such it continues to represent a challenge for the leading modernizer powers: Europe and the US. There is a hope that China could elaborate an alternative democratic model and could contribute to the gradual establishment of a democratic world and international organization. However not in the same way as the Europeans and the US imagine and want it.

6. The European Community and China

6.1. Renewing International Law and Human Rights After the Second World War

After the Second World War the League of Nations was renewed and the United Nations Organization was established with the aim of saving future generations from war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and to promote social progress. To this end it aimed to practice tolerance and living together in peace with one another as good neighbors, to unite to maintain international peace and security and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples (Brownlie, 1995: 2). Its Charter was made on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in 1944. The Charter was signed by the representatives of 50 country in 1945. The Republic of China was also among the member states. It became a permanent member of the Security Council as one of the great powers of the world beside the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the USA.

The principles of the renewed international law were declared in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and the principles of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The Republic of China became a member of the UN and contributed to the shaping of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The most important achievement of the new international organization was the rejection of imperialism and colonialism, the exploitation, slavery and racism. The decolonization efforts of the UN derived from the Charter principle of “equal rights and self-determination of the peoples” as well as from three specific chapters in the Charter – XI, XII and XIII – devoted to the interests of dependent peoples. The international trusteeship system and the Trusteeship Council were established in the framework of the UN. Since 1960, the United Nations has also been guided by the General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also known as the declaration on decolonization, by which the member states proclaimed the necessity of ending colonialism. Eighty-nine states voted for, but there were nine abstentions (Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, and France) (United Nations, 1998: 275; Brownlie, 1995: 307). The declaration on decolonization states:

“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of World peace and co-operation” (Brownlie, 1995: 309).

All people have the right to self-determination. Therefore in Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence immediate steps should be taken to enable people there to enjoy complete independence and freedom without any distinction as to race, creed or colour. It proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations because colonialism

prevented the development of international economic co-operation, impeded the development of dependent peoples and threatened world peace. It declared that

“All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity” (Brownlie, 1995: 309).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared the equal and inalienable human rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. Disregard and contempt for human rights resulted in barbarous acts. The Declaration rejected slavery, racism, and nationalism:

Article 1. “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.

Article 2. “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”

Article 3. “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”.

Article 4. “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms” (Brownlie, 2002: 19).

Article 15. “Everyone has the right to a nationality.

No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” (Brownlie, 1995: 21).

The Declaration acknowledged the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right of peaceful assembly and association. It recognized property rights. The Universal Declaration accepted the family as the basic unit of society:

Article 16.3 “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” (Brownlie, 2002: 21).

In 1963 the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Brownlie, 1995: 310- 327).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights aimed to become a common universal standard for all people including Europeans and Chinese. It specified the rights of the individuals. Therefore these rights should be taught all over the world. Teaching and education served as a means of bringing together the thinking of people world-wide. Among Canadian, American, French and Lebanese participants, P. C. Chang of the Republic of China (vice-chairman of the UN Commission of Human Rights and Delegate of the Republic of China), whose knowledge was rooted in Confucianism, also participated in the drafting of the declaration. Westerners and Chinese could cooperate in establishing common rules for individuals in 1948. It was an important meeting point of civilizations. Chinese Confucian politicians protecting peace were in agreement with the principles of the UN. They regarded the universal organization as an important step to promoting peace in the world.

In the framework of the United Nations there were also established economic international organizations with the aim of eliminating the economic causes of war: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Trade Organization. Because the International Trade Organization was stillborn the provisional agreement for the ITO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), became the agreement and the organization for establishing and enforcing, through dispute settlement, international trade rules. In 1995 this agreement on trade in goods became the World Trade Organization which was established by the eighth GATT round, known as the Uruguay Round. GATT was very successful in lowering tariffs, the major barriers to free trade. The WTO's objective was to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably. The WTO rules were the result of the negotiations between the members. GATT was the principal rule-book for trade in goods of the WTO. It was a non-discriminatory trading system: the members had to accept these common rules.

6.2. The Emerging European Union as a New Type Supranational-Intergovernmental Union of States

The rejection of colonization, slavery and nationalism by the new international organizations and law represented the beginning of a new period in the construction of Europe in the framework of the international organization. The liberation of the colonies, dependent territories and the aid for the developing states was also legally regulated in the Charter of the UN. The UN special agencies dealt with the organization of the economy, trade and finances in the framework of international organizations based on legal agreements. In the renewing of the international organization the European federalist opposition was very active. The European opposition to colonialism, imperialism, slavery, racism and chauvinism proposed many projects for the renewal of the European and international state organization. They regarded these phenomena as the extreme and deformed forms of state organization resulting in tragic impasses, and bloody wars. After the Second World War European civilization was in ruins and the federalist opposition had to face the facts and initiate the great reform, ie. European integration, serving as the basis of a New Europe in the framework of the renewed United Nations Organization.

On the basis of the totalitarian state development and the two world wars, European federalists strongly criticized the sovereign nation state system. They realised that national governments and politicians could not deal with the economic and political problems of the world economy. In the age of popular sovereignty people could easily protect political adventurers using nationalist slogans and rhetoric. Federalists concluded, therefore, that it would be necessary to transcend the national sovereignty if people (persons) and the states wanted to live in peace. Important manifests at the basis of the European peaceful cooperation prove it: after the First World War, for example, the most important were the Pan European Manifest of Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1922, the Briand Memorandum, 1929, the Ventotene Manifest of Spinelli and Rossi, 1941, the Declaration of the European Resistant Movement, 1944, Churchill's Speech at the Zurich University, 1946, the Message to the Europeans of the Hague Congress, 1948, the Preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951 and the Preamble of the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957. All these manifests for Europe refer to the dilemma of supranationalism versus sovereignty as being the most important problem of peaceful European international policy. Throughout history the enemies of federalism could successfully prevent the establishment of supranationalism in Europe till the Shuman Declaration, 1950.

The founding fathers of the European Community, Coudenhove-Kalergi, Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer, Spinelli and De Gasperi emphasised the necessity of transcending the dogma of

national sovereignty and implementing the principle of federalism (supranationalism) in European international organizations. They searched means of federalism for nation states. Coudenhove-Kalergi, for example, proposed establishing a two-chamber European Parliamentary Federation following the Swiss example, and representing the personalist and the autonomy principle at the supranational and at the state level. Altiero Spinelli, the leader of the Italian Federalist Movement, emphasised the necessity of the immediate establishment of the federalist institutions following the ideas of the American Federalist Papers and the Constitution of 1787. Another group of federalists, the so-called incremental or personalist federalists, including Denis de Rougemont and Henri Brugmans, appreciated the Swiss federation but they wanted to build up federalist Europe gradually. They rejected an immediate constitutional solution.

In opposition to the federalists, the leader of the functionalist thinkers, David Mitrany, rejected constitutional federalism. He believed that functional coordinating agencies could solve the cooperation among the nation states worldwide without giving up state sovereignty. The unionist politicians—among them Churchill—represented classical confederalism. Both functionalists and classical confederalists were in favour of safeguarding national sovereignty.

After the war Europe had three political alternatives: the federalist, the unionist, and the functionalist. The establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 showed the victory of the unionists in cooperation with the functionalists. It followed the classical European confederative model of intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign nation states. However it was based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and it accepted the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In legal harmony with these documents, the Members of the Council of Europe accepted The European Convention on Human Rights in 1953.

The constitutional federalist solution, representing the alternative of a kind of European parliamentary federation, was defeated: national sovereignty could survive. Neither the federalists, nor the unionists and the functionalists could start the European integration process. European international cooperation successfully re-established the previous system based on national sovereignty after the Second World War.

It was Jean Monnet who could find the way out of this impasse by proposing his supranational politics. He emphasised that there would never be peace in Europe if the sixteen states were reconstructed on the basis of national sovereignty. History proved that it was an illusion to believe in effective cooperation of sovereign nation states. Therefore it would be necessary to transcend national sovereignty and to create a Western federation (*fédération de l'Ouest*) if one wanted to establish peace in Europe. He acknowledged that this was a difficult task, but the only way: there was no other solution.

As an obvious consequence, Monnet rejected the idea of 'indivisible sovereignty'. He proposed surpassing national sovereignty by starting the struggle against the dogma of the 'indivisibility of sovereignty'. The essence of his idea was to gradually dismember the sovereignty of nation states following his federalist-functionalist method. The '*Monnet-method*' meant cutting parts of sovereignty from nation states and transferring them to independent supranational institutions organized following a federalist supranational institutional model. For example, with the establishment of the ECSC, Monnet separated the coal and steel production sector from the sovereignty of the six nation states and organized it independently, under the direction of the supranational High Authority. Thus emerged the core of an economic integration outside the national governmental sphere of the six states. Monnet believed that integration in one area would generate a chain reaction and more and more areas would be gradually transferred to a supranational level.

The Monnet-Schuman theory, declared in the Schuman Declaration, on the gradual transfer of sovereignty represented a new method of federation building. It was not an overall federation established by a constitutional assembly but a federation gradually built up starting with supranational sectoral cooperation in the field of coal and steel among six Western European countries under the direction of the supranational High Authority. The Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community. It laid the foundation of the two-level federalist-confederalist community institutional structure that still exists today. It equipped the ECSC with a Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers, and a Court of Justice. The Council's function was to coordinate between the governments of the member states and the High Authority (later Commission).

The Monnet-method worked in the economy: the Rome Treaties established the European Economic Community and the EURATOM. However, the supposed 'chain-reaction' was only partially successful in the area of political cooperation. Therefore the Monnet-method was discussed. The most important merit of the Monnet-method is that supranationalism was established in Europe as the means of peaceful cooperation among people and states. Economic federalist supranationalism contributed to the development of the two main oppositional forces of the European democratic policy: the intergovernmental unionist and intergovernmental federalist. Both accepted supranationalism based on subsidiarity and multilevel governance. As a result of the cooperation among them the Maastricht Treaty established a new type confederalist-federalist union of states based on subsidiarity. Thanks to the federalist initiatives and the compromises between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists the integration process could continue: governments gradually transferred, as shown by the Amsterdam Treaty, more and more competences to the supranational level. The Treaty of Nice made the enlargement of the EU possible. In 2002 the Euro was introduced.

As a next step there were two alternatives for the EU: either to establish the parliamentary federation with two-chambers, representing the interests of the citizens as Europeans and as citizens of the member states (proposed, for example, by Joschka Fischer), or the approach put forward by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004, which was based on the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2003. The latter meant a new type of intergovernmental-supranational union of nation states, i.e. federation-confederation of nation states based on multilevel governance and subsidiarity. Both were rejected but as alternatives remained alive.³

The questions raised which role has the European integration process played in world policy. Has it contributed to the democratization of the international law and the strengthening of the peaceful tendencies in World policy? Is federalist functionalism based on subsidiarity an alternative means of economic democracy among states on a world scale? Has the EU method

3 As a following step the heads of states or governments of the European Union achieved an agreement in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community which had to be ratified by the member states. The Treaty of Lisbon reinforced the values and objectives of the European Union. It took on most of the Constitution innovations. The most important of them: a permanent president; a foreign minister; greater powers to the EP; reduction of the size of the Commission; easier voting by changing voting rules; diminishing the usage of the veto right for the member states; a legally binding citizens rights charter. The new type of intergovernmental supranational union of states is based on the transfer of competences to the supranational level based on subsidiarity. Persons and the different levels of their functional, cultural, and historically developed territorial associations could safeguard their autonomy by establishing a unity. The Treaty of Lisbon continued the „council-type“ organization of the EU as an intergovernmental supranational economic union of states based on multilevel-governance and subsidiarity. Its goal is to make the EU more effective in the world economy and policy by giving it more coherent foreign policy and allowing it to take decision more quickly. Only the future will show what the Lisbon Treaty can bring for supranationalism in the practice of the EU.

contributed to the reform of the United Nations and the WTO? To answer these questions the survey of Chinese reactions to European integration could help.

6.3. The Acceptance of the European Community by China

Western colonization, imperialism, unequal treaties, economic exploitation – as described above- caused a lot of problems in the relationship between the two civilizations. In the 19th century the Chinese were regarded as uncivilized, as barbarians, by European colonizers. The arrogant and superior attitude of the European colonizers (British, French, Dutch, Portugal, German) towards China had increasingly given way to one of fear and hatred.

In 1949, China became a popular republic under communist rule. The nationalists fled to Taiwan. The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union made a mutual friendship agreement with each other. Privacy and private property were eliminated. In 1960, China broke its Soviet orientation. From 1964, Mao Tse-tung successfully started to build up his personal cult which resulted, between 1966-69, in the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution: it aimed to eliminate all that belonged to the past and to establish a Maoist society. It was a tragic period in the life of the intellectuals, the middle class and the older generation. Communist or Red China was unacceptable to the West. The Maoist cultural revolution was rejected, not only by the West, but by the Chinese opposition too. They could return to power only after the death of Mao Tse-tung when a new period in China's history started.

On the Chinese side the Western hegemony of the past has left a considerable legacy of resentment and suspicion against the Europeans. The Chinese only tolerated the humiliating position into which they had been placed by the European powers with reluctance and distaste and always regarded it as transitory and contrary to nature. They believed that China should be once again an important participant in world policy (Franke, 1967: 149). They were aware that it is possible for China to find its own way in the international system by safeguarding its cultural values. They were also aware that Europeans and Chinese have to cooperate in humanizing power policy.

The renewal of international law and of human rights after the Second World War contributed to the success of a renewed European and world policy. European civilization seemed to realize and admit the mistakes of the former expansionist policy which resulted in two world wars. It could successfully transcend its colonialist and imperialist past. The European integration process based on new international legal principles and the Monnet-method represented a new way. It was based on the peaceful cooperation of sovereign states in the framework of a supranational Europe. Member states could decide in what they wanted to cooperate as equal partners and what they regarded as national interest. The Western part of the renewed Europe was a peaceful region inside the UN based on European law and human rights in harmony with international law. For the Chinese it appeared as an attractive economic union of states. The gradual emergence of the new type European Community played an important role in the voluntary opening of China for the foreign investments based on equal treaties in the frameworks of international organizations.

After the Second World War, China's attitude towards Europe was negative. But with the explosion of the Chino-Soviet dispute and the successful establishment of the European Communities and the solidification of the Community in the 1960s, a positive attitude developed. The new type supranational-intergovernmental economic union represented a challenge for China. It was regarded as a peaceful autonomous economic and trading block, a common market area between the two great powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. Therefore Western Europe was no more fearful for China whose foreign policy was determined by

normative political goals depending on the international situation. China followed the Soviet line on the Community in the late 1950s but it took initiatives towards the Western Europe in the early 1960s. Finally it openly declared it would develop relations with the European Community in the mid-1970s (Kapur, 1986: 96).

After the collapse of the Soviet Block, China became more interested in cooperation with the EU because of the fear of the USA as superpower. So, after breaking with the Soviet Union, China's interest in the European Community has been continually increasing. The establishment of the European Economic Community was an important moment in this. The European Economic Community (EEC) meant the strengthening of the European position among the two great powers. China regarded the EEC as a peaceful economic and trading block and not as a competing superpower. But China hoped that the EEC would result in the establishment of a Europe that would be strong enough to counterbalance the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. So China's interest in the EEC as a rising peaceful political union was increasing. There was no reason to fear it. China realized that its political interest is to establish good relationships with the European Community (Kapur, 1986: 93).

The European Community's behavioral pattern towards China was different. It was principally influenced by economic factors because it was essentially an economic community. Its aim was to establish a single market and an economic and monetary union. The Sino-EEC relationship strengthened in the post-Maoist period when the reforms of Deng Xiaoping started. With the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, China created a new basis for Sino-EEC relations. The post-Maoist leadership defined new goals of internal modernization. These goals were essentially economic and they necessitated an interaction with the outside world. The advanced European technology was needed for accelerated modernization. European industry and technology could strengthen economic development in China. Therefore China became interested not only politically but economically in cooperation with the European Community. So the two partners could find a common economic ground. Chinese leadership abandoned its policy of playing off one European country against another. The Marxist strategy of exploiting the economic contradictions between the capitalist countries was also abandoned. In its place the emphasis was placed on accelerating economic relations with the Community using the Commission for this. Chinese leadership made it clear that it would be more interested in making contracts with West European countries than with Japanese or US enterprises.

EC-China diplomatic relationships were established in 1975 after the visit of the European Commissioner, Sir Christopher Soames. The European Commissioner, initiating the establishment of the diplomatic relationships between China and the European Community, emphasized in his speech at the dinner given by him in honour of his Chinese hosts in Peking, May 1975:

“Both of our society have recently emerged from the shadows of civil wars and wars between nations. We both look back with pride upon a long history. We both look forward confidently to the future. And we both share the same interest in achieving the greatest possible independence in what is an increasingly interdependent world. ... And we both want a world in which there will be sufficient for all – a world in which all countries will have achieved the dignity which comes from self-reliance and an equality of partnership.

Our two peoples have different philosophies and for various reasons – economic, historical and geographical – our relationship with the rest of the world are different. But China and the European Community have much to gain from the closer and more confident relationship which now opens up before us: both of us a people of yesterday, a people of tomorrow” (Kapur, 1986: 117-118).

In 1978 the EC and China signed the *Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China* in Brussels that established a Joint Committee (Kapur, 1968: 159-166). This agreement expressed the desire of the Council of the European Communities and the Government of the People's Republic of China to develop economic relations and trade between the European Community and the People's Republic of China on the basis of equality and the mutual advantage of the two Contracting Parties and to give a new impetus to their relations (Kapur, 1986: 159).

In 1979 the president of the European Parliament and the president of the Commission visited China. In this year the EC-China agreement on trade in textile products was signed (Kapur, 1986: 253:273). Sino-EEC relations improved during the last three years of the 1970s. The volume of trade increased and a wide variety of economic, scientific and cultural agreements were concluded between China and the European Community. But this did not last long. From 1981 the Community was behind the US, Japan and Hong Kong in the field of trade, the transfer of technology, or in the credit sector. The China-EC relations stagnated (Kapur, 1986: 94).

But China realized that the development of the Chino-EC relations was in the real interest of China. The European Community as an autonomous force within the international system was a better partner for China than Japan or the US. For political reasons China would have to continue to maintain optimal economic and political interaction with the EEC. The Community leadership had become increasingly familiar with Chinese thinking and strategy. The European Community had increasingly begun to accept the politicalization of relations through the institutionalization of Chino-EC political cooperation with the Council and through regular high level consultations with the Commission. These political interactions contributed to beneficial economic results. E. Davignon, vice president of the European Commission, declared when he visited China in 1983:

“Our relations are largely manifested in the economic and trade fields, but our starting point is political choice” (Kapur, 1986: 95-96).

In 1984 the *Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China* was signed (Kapur, 1986: 339-345). This agreement replaced the *Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China of 1978*, which was satisfactorily applied and started a new stage in economic relations. It desired, on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, the intensification and diversification of the trade between the EU and China and to actively develop economic and technical cooperation in line with the mutual interests of both China and the European Community (Kapur, 1986: 339). In the background of this there were the market economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping which successfully opened up China for participation in the world economy.

6.4. The Opening of China Through the Reforms of Deng Xiaoping

The success of the European integration process and the stabilization of the European Community contributed to the opening of China after the death of Mao Tse-tung. After the horrors of the cultural revolution, when new reforms were urgently needed in China, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) started the reform period based on the ancient principle mentioned by Mao Tse-tung: “*seeking truth from facts*”. Deng Xiaoping was an important reform politician. He had had a long experience in leadership with a realistic approach. Chinese people highly appreciated him. He put an end to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966

and he brought order into all spheres of work. He struggled against the Gang of Four. He tried to promote the Chinese economy and helped the Party in socialist modernization.

His reform work had several periods:

1975-1982 Deng launched the reforms aimed at opening up and economic reforms

1984-1988 This was followed by efforts aiming to establish a market economy

1988-1991 The Chinese authorities tried to regain control of the economy.

1992-1997 Deng succeeded in re-launching the economic and political reforms which resulted in a booming economy.

Launching the reforms

The first period, 1975-82

The *first period*, between 1975-1982, concentrated on the launching of reforms and the development of agriculture. It had *three phases*: 1975-1977; 1978-80; 1982 (Deng, 1984: 5).

First phase, 1975-77

In the first phase Deng launched economic reform. In his speech *The whole party should take the overall interest into account and push the economy forward* (1975) he outlined the two main periods of the economic reform. According to him, in the first stage the goal was to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system by 1980. In the second phase the aim had to be to turn China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology by the end of the century, that is within 25 years (Deng, 1984: 14).

In another speech *Respect knowledge, respect trained personnel* (May 24, 1977) he emphasized:

“The key to achieving modernization is the development of science and technology” (Deng, 1984: 53).

He emphasized that it is necessary to pay attention to education. He mentioned the example of the *Meiji Restoration* which he regarded as a kind of modernization drive undertaken by the emerging Japanese bourgeoisie. He was convinced that Chinese proletarians should and could do better than the Japanese (Deng, 1984: 53). He concentrated on consolidating the army, he dealt with the problems of the railways and other transportation, industry, and agriculture.

Deng aimed to correct the mistakes of the “Cultural Revolution”. In his speech *The “Two whatevers” do not accord with Marxism* (May 24, 1977) he raised the problem of the mistakes of Mao Zedong who admitted that he also had made mistakes and there had never been a person whose statements were all correct or who was always absolutely right. Mao acknowledged that if one's work was rated as consisting of 70 per cent of achievements and 30 per cent of mistakes, that would be quite all right (Deng, 1984: 51). Based on this Deng emphasised that to start to rethink and reform Maoism is justifiable.

Second phase, 1978-80

Following the *Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Congress* in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping led China on an ambitious reform process which has substantially changed the Chinese economic system as well as its relations with the world economy. This process was not a plan dictated from above but a process driven by a multitude of initiatives at various levels: central, local, individual.

In the second phase (1978-80) Deng concentrated on the correction of the mistakes of Mao Zedong made under the cultural revolution. In his speeches, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping opposed Mao's personality cult; he did all he could to encourage people to emancipate their minds.

Therefore he used Mao Zedong's own principle “*seek truth from facts*” to encourage Party members and the people to start reforms. His most important argument was the following:

“If we fail to seek truth from facts, all our meetings will be nothing but empty talk, and we will never be able to solve any problems” (Deng, 1984: 128).

Speaking about the importance of “seeking truth from facts” Deng emphasized the necessity of freedom of speech and economic democracy as the basis of a new economic prosperity. For economic prosperity, economic, scientific and institutional modernization was necessary. The economic modernization process needed decentralization: the various localities, enterprises and production teams had to be given greater powers of decision regarding both operation and management. There are many provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in China, and some of China's medium-sized provinces are as big as a large European country. They had to be given greater powers of decision in economic planning, finance and foreign trade – always within the framework of a nationwide unity of views, policies, planning, guidance and action (Deng, 1984: 157). Deng believed that the reform would result in an economic prosperity:

“Just imagine the additional wealth that could be created if all people in China’s hundreds of thousands of enterprises and millions of production teams put their minds to work” (Deng, 1984: 157).

He emphasized that the economic reformers needed to learn economic management and overcome bureaucratism.

Deng realized that economic democracy was impossible without democratic rights for the workers and peasants including the right of democratic election, management and supervision. Therefore, parallel with economic reforms, it was necessary to strengthen the legal system: democracy had to be institutionalized and written in law (Deng, 1984: 157). He initiated defining by law the relations between one enterprise and another, between enterprises and the state, between enterprises and individuals and so on (Deng, 1984: 158). To be able to do this huge legislative work Chinese had to study international law.

Emphasizing all these Deng launched the project of the socialist modernization of economy, science, technology and management under the leadership of the Central Committee and the State Council. He believed that the new historic mission of the Chinese working class was to turn China into a great modern and powerful socialist country under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party (Deng, 1984: 150). He was in search of a “*Chinese type modernization*” (Deng, 1984: 187) to be able to change the backward country and to turn it into a modern and powerful socialist state. He emphasized that economic modernization represented a momentous turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party.

Third phase, 1982

The third phase dated from the *Third Plenary Session to the Twelfth National Congress* of the Party in September 1982. Facts have shown that the Third Plenary Session was a turning point of great historical importance. The Party focused on economic development, and opened up new fields of socialist modernization.

In his *Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC. September 1, 1982*, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the followings:

“In carrying out our modernization program we must proceed from Chinese realities. Both in revolution and construction, we should also learn from foreign countries and draw on their experience. But the mechanical copying and application of foreign experience and model will get nowhere. We have had many lessons in this respect. We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with

Chinese characteristics – that is the basic conclusion we have reached after summing up long historical experience. China’s affairs should be run in the light of China’s specific conditions and by the Chinese people themselves. Independence and selfreliance have always been and will always be our basic stand. While we Chinese people value our friendship and co-operation with other countries and other peoples, we value even more our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country can expect China to be its vassal, nor can it expect China to accept anything harmful to China’s interests. We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. At the same time, we will keep clear heads, firmly resist corrosion by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country. We, the Chinese people, have our national self-respect and pride. We deem it the highest honour to love our socialist motherland and contribute our all to her socialist construction. We deem it the deepest disgrace to impair her interests, dignity and honour” (Deng, 1984: 395- 396).

Deng envisaged the tasks for a shorter and a longer time:

The major tasks of the 1980’s were the followings:

To step up socialist modernization

To strive for China’s reunification and for the return of Taiwan to the motherland; and to oppose hegemonism and work to safeguard world peace;

To elaborate on economic construction serving as a basis for the solution of the external and internal problems (Deng, 1984: 396).

For a long time to come, at least for the 18 years until the end of the century, it was necessary to do four things:

Restructure the administration and the economy, and make the cadre ranks more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and professionally more competent

Strive to build a socialist civilization which is culturally and ideologically advanced

Combat economic and other crimes that undermine socialism

Rectify the Party’s style of work and consolidate its organization on the basis of a conscientious study of the new Party Constitution (Deng, 1984: 396).

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the new period of modernization would result in new challenges therefore:

“We must do our work carefully and well. We must strengthen our Party’s unity with the people of all nationalities in our country, and with the people of the world. We must struggle hard to make China a modern socialist country that is highly democratic and culturally advanced. We must oppose hegemonism, work to safeguard world peace and promote human progress” (Deng, 1984: 397).

Establishing socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics

Between 1984-1988 the agricultural reform was followed by efforts aimed at establishing a *market economy*. After that, between 1988-1991, came a period of retrenchment when Chinese authorities tried to regain control of the economy. From 1992 Deng succeeded in re-launching a faster tempo which drastically changed the economic and political climate. New areas were opened for foreign trade and investment; new measures were announced in the key areas of enterprise management and price liberalization. The new Company Law entered into

force in 1994. The reform of the banking system was launched and the new taxation system was introduced. Such reforms have been enshrined in China's Constitution under the new formula of socialist market economy (A long term policy for China-Europe relations, Annex 1, 1995).

The historical facts show that the economic reform launched by Deng Xiaoping dramatically changed the economic and social landscape of China. It changed the economic structure of the country and brought about a dramatic revitalization of the Chinese economy and improved living standards. A Chinese kind of state-capitalism, a “*Socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics*” started to emerge concentrating on safeguarding Chinese cultural traditions. China voluntarily opened its economy and trade to the world and wanted to cooperate with the international community of states following the rules of the international law and agreements (A long term policy for China-Europe relations, 1995).

6.5. EU-China partnership: The acceptance of the Chinese Reform Process by the European Union

Thanks to the reforms of Deng Xiaoping EU-China relations developed dynamically in parallel with the opening of China. There were four main periods in the EU-China relationship which were characterized by partnership policies. Partnership came gradually closer and closer: It started with comprehensive partnership, continued with maturing partnership and was followed by a closer partnership.

In the first period from 1975 till 1984 diplomatic, trade and economic relations were established.

In the second period, from 1995, the EEC outlined its long-term policy for China and Europe.

In the third period, from 1998 till 2006, the aim was the realization of a comprehensive partnership and a more effective EU policy.

The fourth period started with the aim of establishing closer partnership from 2006.

China's main problem was transforming a communist country with a different civilizational background into a market economy able to be involved in world trade and the world economy dominated by Western (European and US) ideas and methods. China's problem was also the EU's problem because the EU realized the economic and military importance of China. After the Tiananmen square incidents, which blocked EC-China relations in 1989, the relations largely normalized in 1992. Deng Xiaoping could stabilize the economic reform process and China continued to open up to the European Union and the World. The EU protected China's efforts to participate in international organizations. Parallel to all this, the EU realized the necessity of updating its China policy in a global view.

In 1995, the European Commission published its first Communication on China entitled *A longterm policy for China-Europe relations*. In this the Commission analyzed the Chinese reform and its achievements. The Commission admitted that the new-type peaceful European Union and the voluntary opening and the rise of China as an economic power represented enormous opportunities and challenges to the EU and the international system. China had already become one of the largest economies in the world and it was an important military power. Therefore it was in the EU's interest to redefine its relationship with China and to develop a long-term relationship with the rising world power. The new policy was action-oriented and not merely declaratory (A long term policy for China-Europe relations, 1995).

In the 1995's *Communication* the Commission declared that the EU had shared interests with China in the field of global and regional security and economic and other global issues, like

the environment and global resources, scientific and technological development, illegal immigration, the control of disease and crime. Therefore the EU had to be present in the world's most dynamic market. An active role for EU business in China was essential. World economic stability and the stability of Asia depended on how China could learn and implement the international economic and trade rules and methods. Therefore the Commission decided that the EU would support the participation of China in international organizations and help China to realize the reforms by assisting in training economic, business, trade and international legal experts. With the same aim, the EU also decided to finance development projects in the framework of its technical and financial assistance programme. It also financed projects to support economic modernization, business and management education and teaching programs on the functioning of the European market economy. In 1994 the China-Europe International Business School was set up in Shanghai.

With the aim of making possible the regular exchange of opinions and discussing mutual interests there were regular ministerial meetings from 1994 organized between the EU and China and between the Commission and China. Bilateral discussions and dialogues were also organized about economy, trade, finance, scientific questions, and about human rights. The EU encouraged the development of European Studies in China and Chinese Studies in Europe. (A long term policy for China-Europe relations, 1995).

Parallel to the opening up of China for a freer flow of ideas, the EU also aimed to improve the situation of human rights in China by establishing a dialogue over human rights issues.

Seeing the successes of the Chinese reform, the EU-China partnership gradually strengthened. In 1998 the partners started to speak about a *comprehensive partnership*, in 2003 a *maturing partnership* and in 2006 about a *closer partnership*.

Comprehensive partnership started in 1998 when the European Commission released the Communication *Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China*. It declared that most of the initiatives within the 1995 strategic document were already underway. The new communication aimed at engaging China further in the international community, supporting China's transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights and integrating China further in the world economy by bringing China into the WTO and supporting economic and social reform. It proposed the establishment of EU study centers for the Chinese to study the European society. Regarding the EU, it emphasized the necessity of closer coordination of the member states' policy. (Building a comprehensive partnership with China, Brussels, 25.03.1998. COM (1998) 181. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/com_98/index.htm).

In 1998 the *First and Second EU-China Summits* were organized, which extended the political dialogue between the two partners. The *EU-China science and technology cooperation agreement* was also signed in this year.

In 2000 China concluded a bilateral market access agreement with the EU which was an essential milestone in China's WTO accession process. In 2001 (15.05.2001) the Commission published the Communication *EU strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and future steps for a more effective EU policy*. It strengthened the aims outlined in the 1998 declaration and defined the ways of their effective realization in an instructive manner. It suggested ways of making EU policy more effective by defining short and medium term objectives with a view to the Union's longterm objectives. The communication emphasized the growing importance of China as a trade and investment partner for the EU because of its huge market.

But EU politicians realized that China was not always an easy partner for the EU because of its political system and the human-rights concerns. The EU's aim was to support China's transition to a market economy and an open society based on the rule of law and the respect

for human rights. To improve the chances of political change the EU was engaged in *human rights dialogue* which was aimed at encouraging China to respect and promote human rights. The EU could achieve China's ratification of the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. But there remained much to do in the field of human rights. Therefore the EU believed working together to promote the human rights situation in China would not only help China's integration in the international community but also underpin economic reforms and growth (EU strategy toward China, 2001: 10-12). Despite the difficulties, the EU acknowledged that it was in the EU's interest to engage China further. Under engagement the EU understood developing comprehensive relations which allowed for working towards a common understanding on all issues of concern, in support of multilateral problem-solving wherever this applied on international and regional issues (EU strategy toward China, 2001: 7). The EU's interest was bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation with China in the framework of the UN and the WTO.

Beside bilateral cooperation, both China and the EU also realized the importance of cooperation in the framework of international organizations. The UN and the WTO, for example, could help to outbalance EU superiority in the bilateral relationship because both, EU and China, had to behave following the rules of the international organizations. International organizations could help them to become real equal partners. They could play an important role in problem-solving between China and the EU.

The most important achievement for the “comprehensive partners” was the acceptance of China as a member of the WTO in December 2001.

6.6. China and the International Organizations, UN, WTO

China's own policy of gradual opening and economic modernization resulted in seeking integration in international structures: China has been a member of the IMF and the World Bank since the early 1980s; it participates in regional forums such as APEC and has actively started negotiating membership of the World Trade Organization. China was one of the 23 original signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948. After China's revolution in 1949, the government in Taiwan announced that China would leave the GATT system. Although the government in Beijing never recognized this withdrawal decision, nearly 40 years later, in 1986, China notified the GATT of its wish to resume as a GATT contracting party. The accession process started and China became a member of the WTO on 11 December, 2001. The European Union protected China in this and, as already mentioned above sought to accelerate the progress toward China's membership of the WTO. The EU had taken a leading role in the negotiations because China was a developing economy and had not yet a fully-fledged market-economy system. The integration of China in the WTO was in the interest of the EU, too.

China as WTO member became an active participant in the world economy and economic globalization. It agreed to open and liberalize its regime in order to better integrate in the world economy. It also agreed to offer a better environment for trade and foreign investment in China in accordance with the WTO rules. China accepted, for example, that it will provide non-discriminatory treatment for all WTO members. It also accepted that the WTO agreement will be implemented in China in an effective and uniform manner by revising China's existing domestic laws and enacting new legislation fully compatible with the WTO Agreement. (http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm)

With China's membership the WTO took a major step towards becoming a truly world organization. The near-universal acceptance of the WTO rule-based system could serve as the basis of a gradual emergence of a peaceful world economic cooperation and world peace.

China has been a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN since 1971. Since taking its place in the UN, China's relations with the world have normalized on the basis of international law. China is a fully equal member of the "the family of nations", accepting the rules of the cooperation among nation states. But China rejects the policy of intervention in other countries' affairs. Strict non-interference policy causes problems in participation in peace keeping. Despite these problems, the renewed China and the EU-China partnership can contribute to the reform of the UN.

6.7. Outlook: Maturing and Closer Partnership

The EU-China relations developed dynamically after China's becoming a member of the WTO. The situation changed for the EU because China, as a member of the WTO, became a global economic player. It plays an important role, for example, in the Asian regional policy. The huge Chinese market is very attractive to the EU because its economic system needs new markets. China as a great power motivates the EU to strengthen supranational economic policy in all those field where supranational cooperation is necessary. Without the coordination of the member states' China policy, the EU would not be able to profit from the Chinese market. Therefore the EU, as a regional organization inside the UN, has to reform its integration process.

Realizing the importance of the EU-China cooperation and the effects of China's WTO membership, the European Commission updated its earlier communications on EU-China relations in 2003. To this end the Commission adopted a *policy paper* entitled *A maturing partnership shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations*. According to the policy paper the EU and China have an ever greater interest in working together as strategic partners to safeguard and promote sustainable development, peace and stability. Europe has a major economic and political stake in supporting China's successful transition to a stable, prosperous and open country that fully embraces democracy, free market principles and the rule of law. The EU and China have shared interests and the EU promotes China's voluntary economic opening. There is a dynamic development in China-EU relations: relations which were largely confined to the areas of trade, investment and financial/technical assistance have expanded to cover a multitude of sectors. A regular political dialogue was established (China-EU annual summits; ministerial troikas; political directors troikas, meeting of the Chinese foreign minister and EU ambassadors in Beijing). These changes brought about a new maturity in the relationships.

EU admitted also that China is an increasingly important global player. Regarding global policy the EU and China have shared responsibilities in promoting global governance. China, as a newly emerging power, could play an important role in the common effort to reconcile the interests of developing and developed countries. China can use its influence to promote peace and stability in Asia by furthering regional integration. Based on shared views on the importance of multilateral systems and rules for global governance, EU and China can strengthen the United Nation's system and its role in regional and global conflict resolution (*A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations, 2003: 1-11*).

The EU is in permanent dialogue with China about human rights and the ideas for civil society. This dialogue is one of the most interesting parts of European-Chinese relations. It is about moral rules and different concepts on social organization of two civilizations which,

during history, successfully influenced each other. There is a centuries-old challenge – response relationship between Europe and China. The discussion is about different concepts of social organization which could result in civilized life by influencing each other. The *human rights debate* is important because the two civilizations can further motivate each other to improve their mistakes. However, it is well known that the human rights issue is one of the most problematic fields of the EU-China cooperation.

EU-China cooperation, as above mentioned, could achieve important success in economic, commercial and political cooperation. It could solve most parts of the former problems caused by the above mentioned unequal treaties and other colonizer tactics. Historically developed frustrations and wounds have been cured by the EU. The EU and China could find an appropriate problem solving mechanism for trade and economic problems. In 2004 the EU became the biggest trading partner of China. China became the second biggest trading partner of the EU.

In 2006, a policy paper of the Commission on EU-China trade and investment admitted that China was the single most important challenge for the EU trade policy. EU-China trade increased dramatically and doubled between 2000 and 2005. Europe's open market contributed to China's export-led growth. Europe has also benefited a lot from the growth of the Chinese market (law labour wages, law prices) (A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment, 2006, 1). However, with European investments, Chinese competitiveness could increase and the Europeans complained because of the absence of fair market competition and inadequate legal protection in China (A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment, 2006: 9). Therefore, the EU emphasized that Europe's interest was a fair, open and stable trade policy with an economically strong China. EU defends its interests and wants to solve the trade problems between China and the EU through dialogue and negotiations. If it fails the Commission will use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve trade issues with China and to ensure compliance with multilaterally agreed rules and obligations. This means that the EU and China regard the international institution as the place to solve problems between China and the EU, based on the agreements and rules. Besides international arbitration the EU also maintains its right to use trade defense measures as an instrument to ensure fair conditions of trade between China and the EU as with other countries. But the EU will use these measures carefully and only when it is justified. The EU continues to prefer dialogue as the means of conflict solution in economic and trade issues (A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment, 2006: 13). The EU admits that there is political pressure in the EU to resist further openness to Chinese competition because Europe seeks reciprocity from China in a trade partnership of equals. Europe should accept fierce competition. But China should ensure that it is fair competition (A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment, 2006: 15).

Despite the human rights issue and the fair trade issue the Commission, in its Communication in 2006, launched the *EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities programme*. Here the EU Commission declared that EU-China relations could become closer because China continues its policy of opening up to the world and the EU's goal is to protect and encourage this trend. The EU welcomes China's increasing openness to dialogue. The emphasis is on encouraging China's own efforts of opening up socially and economically by necessary reforms. The EU regards the development of the EU-China relationship as a long-term goal. The EU realized China's interest in the EU which offers the largest market in the world and enjoys world leadership in key technologies and skills. The EU plays a central role in finding sustainable solutions to today's challenges: on the environment, on energy and on globalization. Therefore the EU and China could mutually influence each other. Europe and China can do more to promote their own interests together than they will ever achieve apart. Both the EU and China realized that China has to safeguard its internal stability which

contributes to economic growth and which is the key to the success of reforms. As the partnership strengthens, expectations and responsibilities on both sides increase. As China's biggest trading partner, the EU trade policy has an important impact on China as do China's policies on the EU (EU-China, 2006).

The way forward: The EU should continue to support China's internal political and economic reform process for a stable and strong China which fully respects fundamental rights and freedoms, protects minorities and guarantees the rule of law. Further the EU and China has to renew the 1985 Trade and Co-operation Agreement on the basis of the new achievements of the EU-China partnership. Therefore, at the 9th EU-China Summit in 2006 leaders agreed to launch negotiations on a new extended *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)* to update the basis for the EU-China cooperation.

In conclusion, the EU-China relations are basically economic, trade, and investment relations based on common negotiations and agreements. China's former problems regarding the unequal treaties are mostly solved. But the tone of the Commission Communications shows the survival of the superior mentality of the European politicians towards China as a developmental state. The tone of the Communications is based on the belief of the EU's superiority in social organization and human rights. Europeans continue to represent towards China a kind of “*trusteeship mentality*”: the EU is the developer, China is the implementer of the ideas and plans of the EU politicians because Westerners know everything better. European “*trusteeship mentality*” is justified by *Eurocentric images* and beliefs. A renewed form of the trusteeship mentality appears in the European attitude towards human rights. EU Commission Communications show how old mentalities, attitudes, and stereotypes could survive in a renewed historical scene.

Despite this fact, there is a significant improvement in the European attitude towards China. In this the WTO and the UN plays an important role. “EU-China-WTO-UN” mutually can influence each other to respect international law and human rights and reform what is necessary. However the EU, as the representative of European civilization, has to accept that Chinese democracy will gradually develop in its own way and will not be the same, as what the EU would like.

7. Conclusions

Human civilization is a stream which is the result of the mutual influences of different civilizations. From this point of view there is a long way behind the cooperation between the Chinese and the European civilization. The Chinese is more ancient than the European. It influenced the European civilization till the 18th century. It contributed to the European Enlightenment. The 19th and 20th centuries were dominated by the European civilization which was often very aggressive. The 19th century was the century of the British Empire. The 20th century was the century of the US. European civilization ended in a dead-lock with the First World War and collapsed during the Second World War. The European integration process could bring fresh progress in Europe. During the 19th and the 20th century European civilization influenced the Chinese, and the modernization period started. Our age is characterized by the balance of power between Europe and China. It seems that the 21st century will be the century of China's progress.

Both the European and the Chinese civilization contributed to the state and international organization of mankind. China and Europe represent different models of social organization. Therefore their meetings and mutual influences were on the one hand useful and educative for each other. On the other hand the meeting of the two civilizations had a lot of painful element, first of all in the period of European colonization which resulted in many troubles. So, the China-Europe relationship can be regarded, on the one hand, as a clash of civilizations with Europe the main troublemaker. On the other hand this relationship may also be seen as a process of coming together, and enrichment of both tradition. History proved that Chinese intellectual tradition is a good basis for cooperation between the two civilizations: Chinese ancient civilization of philosophers has a lot of similarities with the European. It gradually adopts Western capitalism in a Chinese way. A new social organization form is in developing.

This essays shows well that there is a centuries-old challenge-answer reaction between the two ancient and different civilizations. The history of the Europe-China relationship represents problems, agreements, positive and negative influences on each other. A clear view of that past and of the role of the Europeans in it is very necessary for peaceful cooperation:

European civilization is based on Greek and Roman state philosophy and Christian religious moral principles. Chinese civilization is based on Confucian philosophy.

European civilization produced, on the one hand, the basic principles of the democratic civil state, international law and international human rights: a representative parliamentary system, suffrage, pluralism, equal political and civil rights, popular sovereignty, self-determination, universal human rights, universal organization and international law and European supranationalism. On the other hand, European civilization adopted the Greek and Roman slave system, developed racism and nationalism throughhau history and spread these phenomena all over the world in the period of Europe's expansion. It pursued a colonial policy and established national empires. The European colonial model was based on slavery and racism legally justified by a belief in the superiority and mission of the European colonizers.

Western European national empires continued the model of the Roman Empire. The capitals of the nation states worked as centers of the national empires. The most important center in the 19th century was London. This type of colonial empire successfully developed the profit-oriented capitalist market economy system as a world system. This contributed to the development of the military technology which helped the successes of colonialism. Therefore capitalist expansionism was strongly welded with the institution of war and military force in Europe. Finally, profit-oriented capitalism - without an overview - proved to be self-destructive. But European civilization was able to elaborate the welfare state model and successfully established a Single European Market.

European economic, trade and market expansion and the European social organization challenged the Chinese civilization which was a rationally organized peaceful agricultural society concentrating on livelihood when it met the Europeans. Confucian moral principles, education, self-cultivation, respect for the elders, ancestor worship, filial piety, patriarchalism, the examination system played an important role in it. These principles appeared in rituals which were necessary to insure the livelihood of people in a non-profit oriented agrarian society.

In the first phase of the meeting of the two civilizations, Europeans highly appreciated Chinese rationalism and natural philosophy. Confucianism was an important subject for European missionaries as a collection of basic moral rules directing the behaviour of persons. Studying Confucianism, Europeans discovered natural philosophy and Enlightenment. When the Europeans developed market and profit-oriented world capitalism the Chinese realized the necessity of the reform if they wanted to safeguard what they had. They accepted Western knowledge and technology but did not appreciate the Western colonial mentality, imperialism and uncontrolled profit orientation serving the interests of a ruling elite. Among Chinese philosopher politicians there were those who could realize the importance of capitalism but they rejected its colonialist/neo-colonialist form. They were in thinking about an alternative capitalist solution serving the livelihood of the people. For a Confucian thinker, the real question was how to use money and profit for rational investment aimed at realizing livelihood for everybody. There were those who rejected the whole capitalist system as self-destructive and proposed communism based on collectivity of property. There were who rejected the Confucian tradition and wanted to adopt the European market economy and the civil nation state.

During the reform period the Chinese monarchy collapsed and the new republicanism resulted in a long period of troubles contributed to by the European colonial powers. As a result of permanent troubles China could not establish a strong leadership for modernization as it had happened in the case of Meiji Japan. Therefore China was not able to pursue economic modernization from above. Neither the Chinese dynasty nor the Chinese republican politicians were able to direct modernization.

The problem of China started with the Opium War. The European ruling mentality and the system of unequal treaties, supported by the more developed European weapons, resulted in a "half colony", or a "hypocolony" (colony of all nations) status for China, - as Sun Yat-sen expressed it. But the European colonial powers could never possess the country. China, like the other states under colonial/semi-colonial rule, had to fight for freedom. By fighting against foreign domination over the country China contributed to the gradual collapse of colonialism and the development of a more democratic Europe.

The colonial model, slavery, racism, nationalism strongly damaged positive Chinese images of the European civilization. After two devastating world wars, the Europeans could finally realize their state and international organization mistakes and started to construct a new Europe in the framework of a renewed international organization. The principles of the

renewed international law and international human rights represented a better basis for building up a peaceful relationship between China and Europe. The principles of the new European Community were also attractive for the Chinese. But China was not able to establish its own alternative model after the Second World War and the troubles in China continued. Mao Tse-tung established his personal cult and the Chinese had to face the extremism of the Cultural Revolution. Only after the death of Mao Tse-tung could China start a new reform period in an improved historical scene.

The new reform of Deng Xiaoping was influenced by the vision of Confucian capitalism elaborated and successfully implemented by the Singaporean politicians. Confucian capitalism was based on the challenge of solving the livelihood of the people by using capitalism. The idea was to use money and profit for rational investments aimed at realizing livelihood. The emerging Chinese Confucian capitalism aims to become an alternative social organization model alongside European liberal democracy. Both, Western and Chinese capitalism, have positive and negative elements. Therefore dialogue and harmonization between them is necessary.

The EU-China partnership aims to find the necessary consensus between the two civilizations to be able to cooperate peacefully on a bilateral level and on a multilateral level in the framework of the UN and the WTO. The human rights dialogue could mutually influence both civilizations. It could contribute to the drafting of a "*common moral codex of mankind*". The peaceful cooperation of the two civilizations could result in the renewing of the international organization. The dialogue between Europe and China can help to transcend the world of troubles and to start the third phase which is the gradual building of a peaceful world, a Universal Commonwealth, as Leibniz, and later K'ang You-wei imagined it.

In our age there is a chance that the meeting of the two civilizations can positively influence the history of mankind by finding the means of establishing a *democracy among states*. The opposite of this, the continuation of the period of troubles, is also imaginable. To avoid this, both the EU and China needs further democratic reforms to be able to influence each other. China needs to elaborate Confucian capitalism, the EU needs to reform the principles of the union and transcend democratic deficit. How to do that is open to discussion.

One thing is sure, European studies should be involved in Chinese education and Chinese studies in European education.

8. Literature

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United Nations Organization homepage:
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