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Euro(pean) Islam or Islam in Europe

If the 'clash of civilizations' in the Huntingtonian sense of the word, exists at all between Western civilization and Islam, its primary scene is undoubtedly Europe. This is because there is a significant number of Muslim minorities living in Europe, with their proportions ever increasing, and because over the recent period we have witnessed a series of conflicts between the Muslim minorities and the 'native' population of the recipient countries. Many hold the view that in Europe there is a real 'war of cultures', a 'Kulturkampf' going on. Even Gilles Kepel and Bassam Tibi, otherwise quite realistic analysts, believe that 'Europe has become a battle-ground'.[1]

Even though we should not mean it in the sense of a concrete battle-ground, it is definitely an 'ideological'[2] one, centred round the rather complex issue of 'Islam in Europe' and the 'dichotomy' of multiculturalism *vs.* 'integration', which have served as bones of contention for heated debates for a long time. The debate has numerous participants: learned scholars, politicians, intellectuals, journalists and different Muslim personalities, each one using their own kind of discourse.

The already marked presence of Islam in Europe and its becoming quite clearly 'visible' raises a very important question, considering the fact that Islam occupies here a lasting minority position, unlike in the Islamic world. The question to be answered is this: Is there a special 'Europeanized Islam' or 'Euro-Islam', characteristically different from mainstream Islam, or is it only justified to speak about the presence of Islam in Europe? Putting it another way; Euro(pean) Islam or Islam in Europe? On top of that, those emphasizing the conflicts between the European 'native' population and Muslim minorities consider the latter, with few exceptions, as a unified, homogeneous, usually radical bloc, the same way they are treating Islam itself as a unified bloc. But there is no such thing as unified Islam, the bloc of Muslim minorities in Europe is fragmented by lines of fracture. Similarly to several other questions, there is no unified 'Islam' or 'Muslim' opinion as to what Islam in Europe should be like.

Regarding the relationship between immigrant Muslims and 'native' European population, there are two intellectual trends, or, we might call them 'schools', totally different, practically contradicting one another.[3] One of them, based on Huntington's paradigm of 'a clash of civilizations', in fact presumes a war between democratic Europe and its 15-25 million Muslims 'imported' from 'intolerably' anti-democratic countries. Many experts trace it back to the irreconcilable contradictions between

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[1] KEPEL, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West,* p. 241; TIBI, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Democratic Peace and Euro Islam vs.Global Jihad,* p. xv.

[2] ZEMNI, "Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism", pp. 158-173.

[3] Cf. HARI, "Islam in the West".

values, such as *e.g.* individualism 'ranked above the tribe and the community' characteristic of the Jewish-Christian civilization *vs.* the 'group interest' represented by Muslims, above all the interest of 'the group named Muslims'.[4] The 'Darwinian struggle for life' between 'hyper-tolerant Europeans and hyper-aggressive Muslims' might lead to the annihilation of European culture.

The other school does not accept the former one, since it does not take into account those immigrant Muslim masses that already have democratic attitudes that have already become European, and cannot automatically be put in a row with the *jihadists*. This opinion holds that the dividing line runs within the Islamic world and it is between Islamic fundamentalists and the moderates standing opposite them. The most optimistic are of the view that this situation offers Europe an excellent chance to help distract Islam from *jihadism* and contribute to the long-awaited Islamic enlightenment.

'Eurabia' or the Islamization of Europe?

Several of the leading experts and publicists have serious misgivings about the not-so-distant future. 'By the end of the century Europe will be Muslim, part of the Arab West, the Maghreb'[5], says Bernard Lewis, doyen of Orientalists. Daniel Pipes[6] adds, 'The peaceable transformation of a region from one major civilization to another, now under way, has no precedent in human history. Timothy Garton Ash begins his essay written as a review for two books, which has subsequently stirred a heated dispute, with the following words: 'So the Muslims have won the Battle of Poitiers after all! Won it not by force of arms, but by peaceful immigration and fertility.'[7] And really: the identity based upon the idea of 'Christian Europe' is beginning to be questioned: In 16 of the 37 European countries Islam is the second largest religion, at the same time in 13 countries Islam does not enjoy the same status of acknowledged, official religion, and the accompanying benefits arising from this, as the other 'historical' Christian churches or religions. The nightmare of 'Eurabia', *i.e.* Europe as part of the world of Islam, comes up ever more frequently,[8] though realists consider it only as one of the possible scenarios.

The basis for the 'Eurabia nightmare' is provided by demographic data and trends. While in many European countries the 'native' population is decreasing (or, in the

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4   BLANKLEY, "Rising Euro-Muslim Tensions". In Blankley's view radical Muslims are trying to subordinate Western individual rights to their collective claims, and if the Western elite are not able to enforce these Western rights, the consequence will be inevitably violence.

5   "'Europa wird am Ende des Jahrhunderts islamisch sein'. Der Islamforscher Bernard Lewis über den Zustand der Arabischen Welt".

6   PIPES, "Muslim Europe".

7   ASH, "Islam in Europe". In 732, at Poitiers, the Visigoth army led by major-domo Karl Martell held back the Muslims pressing forward stormily. It is common knowledge that the Muslims' victory would have led to the complete Islamization in Europe.

8   Several such materials can be found on You Tube See *e.g.*: Europastan: The Islamíc Future of Europe (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2CPmc8OIoc&feature =related), The Last Days of Europe (http://www. youtube.com/watch?v= RbGz6iHcbTU&feature=related), Stop Eurabia (http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v= 3_K8CL8HzFo&feature= related) etc.

optimal case, slowly increasing) in number, among Muslim minorities birth rates are high: According to many sources it is more than three times that of non-Muslims. Thus, even though no new wave of immigration can be expected, due to the different birth rates the rate of the Muslim population in Europe is growing rapidly. Some, maybe exaggerated, estimations hold that by 2015 the Muslim population is Europe will have doubled, while the native population will have decreased by 3.5 percent, and by 2050, provided the current trends continue, 20 percent of Europe's population will be Muslim. At the same time, in spite of the anti-immigration measures taken in some EU member-states, the number of Muslim immigrants arriving in Western Europe annually in the mid-2000s was still estimated at almost one million, most of them arriving from the countries of the Middle East and North Africa by right of family reunification, or as a refugee, or illegally.[9]

These fears are deliberately exaggerated by many. A video on YouTube[10] says that not even a 1.9 fertility rate is enough to sustain a culture. Just for comparison: The figure for France is 1.8, the UK 1.6, Germany 1.3, Italy 1.2, Spain 1.1. It is not mentioned, however, that over the past five years fertility rates have, though slightly, increased: Between 2003 and 2008 France has shown a growth from 1.85 to 1.98, Germany from 1.37 to 1.41, while Italy from 1.26 to 1.3.

The video contradicts the data from France with one another: Among non-Muslim French the typical number of children is 1.8 children per family, while among Muslims in France this number is 8.1. The authors draw the conclusion: Within 39 years France will be an Islamic republic. However, the latter figure is hardly to be believed. According to authentic sources there is no country in the world with such high fertility rates. Somalia, topping the list of the Islamic countries, had 6.6 in 2008, Afghanistan had 6.58, Yemen had 6.41 and Mauritania had 5.69.[11] Of the Maghreb countries from which most of the Muslim immigrants arrive in France, the fertility rate in 2008 was higher than the French figure (1.98) only in Morocco (2.57), while in Algeria (1.82) and Tunisia (1.73) it was lower. There is no reason to assume that among Muslim immigrants in France the fertility rate should be multiple of that in their country of origin.

There are also other reasons why these apocalyptic visions are misleading. Europe is not at all the scene of a global, or even regional, civilizational, cultural or religious war. The Muslim presence is much rather a local problem, and it has not only – or maybe not primarily – a civilizational-cultural-religious character. The doubtlessly existing conflicts are a) not only civilizational-cultural, but at the same time they are social, economic and political conflicts, more precisely conflicts in which the different factors are hardly distinguishable from each other, b) such conflicts exist not only between Muslim immigrants and the native population, but also between non-Muslim immigrants and the native population, c) European Muslims can not at all be regarded as a unified bloc, on the contrary, they are extremely structured along many fracture lines. The fundamental problem is the question of the integration of Muslim

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[9] SAVAGE, "Europe and Islam – Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing".

[10] See Muslim Demographics. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-3X5hIFXYU

[11] The data given by Nation Master originate from the CIA. See http://www.nation master.com/graph/peo_ tot_ fer_rat-people-total-fertility-rate

minorities, but this is primarily a local question, which is determined by the special conditions of the recipient country.

It is noteworthy that the image of Islam as a peril threatening Europe has spread in the media and, subsequently, in the public opinion, only since the 1990s.[12] Earlier migrants arriving in the European countries had been registered according to their country of origin. 'The threat of Islam' getting in the focus of attention can be considered the consequence of a series of factors, of which we wish to highlight two: One is the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the eastern alliance, the marginalization of Communism as an ideology and the 'replacement' of the Communist/Soviet threat by the Islamic threat; the other is the general appreciation of civilization, culture, religion, and identity policy and, as part of this, the increased emphasis on 'otherness', on 'being different', in the new post-Cold War international system.

September 11th 2001, then the attempts in Madrid and London, gave a new impulse to this process, strengthening generalization, essentialization, shedding a negative light on Islam, blaming the basic principles of Islam for violent actions, for terrorism as such. Ever more frequently one could come across statements and views holding that the Islamic tradition is incompatible with such western – European – values as *e.g.* democracy or human rights. All this led to the heating up of the old-standing dispute as to whether or not a European Muslim can be expected to be loyal to European values. Self-assigned experts of Islam indulged in analysing Islam, primarily based on the Qur'an, the demand for which showed a sudden rise. Announcements made by some European radical Muslim imams and other religious leaders were given enormous media publicity. The conclusion usually was that Islam poses a serious inner threat, especially in countries trying to follow liberal multiculturalism in practice.

Methodological guiding principles to the problem of 'Islam in Europe'

The dispute about the European presence of Islam or Muslims has been in progress for a long time. At the same time, one of the special characteristics of the 'Islam in Europe' dispute is that in reality it is not about Muslims, it is much rather about Islam. About Islam, which, as a religious and cultural system, is thought to determine Muslims' behaviour, attitudes and reactions, and which is known to provide the conditions for them and to regulate and, at the same time, explain them. The actors in the main roles are not the Muslims, but Islam itself. This approach especially accentuates the contrast

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[12] There are exceptions though. French writer André Malraux said in 1956(!): 'One of the most important events of our age is the forceful expansion of Islam. Though most people undervalue its significance, the influence of Islam can be compared to that of early communism at the time of Lenin.' "Malraux on Islam". And in 1974 he made the following statement: 'The political unity of Europe is an illusion. Europe's political unity would require a common enemy, and the only real common enemy would be Islam'. CONAN and MAKARIAN, "Enquête sur la montée de l'islam en Europe"

between individualistic 'native' Europeans and 'collectivist' Muslims who are determined by Islam as a cultural system.[13]

European civilization – as the base of comparison – can only be considered as carrying positive values, the negative phenomena and processes we experience as occurring here, no matter whether we are speaking about racism, fascism or any other extremity, are all looked upon as exceptions, or as having personal motivations, but are never explained with the characteristics of European/western civilization. But in the case of Islamic civilization the situation is just the opposite, also individual negative acts are explained by the civilizational/cultural determination of Islam, and it is all the more true of acts committed as a group. After Islam had become 'the other' opposing the west or Europe, and since the latter has had a positive self-definition, it follows from this that 'the other' standing on the opposite side can, by necessity, only be negative. Of course, the negative picture is sometimes mitigated by using Islamism to replace Islam.

The 'Islam in Europe' dispute has been going on on different levels, with different participants – scientists, specialists, politicians, intellectuals, journalists etc. The participants of the dispute represent different positions, and the main dividing line between them, strangely enough, is not that of 'Westerners' or 'native Europeans' *vs*. Muslims. The most marked difference appears between different interpretations of Islam, with the 'totalists' or 'essentialists' at one end, and the 'secularized' interpretation of Islam at the other.

The roots of this division go back to the fundamental changes taking place in Europe following the Enlightenment, to the formation of modern nation states. The emerging 'European identity' that equated modernity with the essence of being European, required, on the one hand, the precise definition of European identity, and on the other hand the analysis of the stormy social, economic and political changes, and the understanding of their causes. The practices applied in the process of colonization were also formulated on a theoretical level. The increasingly confident western, mainly European, civilization treated as an axiom its own 'superiority' and priority, the universality of its values, it described western development as 'the civilizational process', and equated western civilization with Civilization (singular). It is a matter of common knowledge that determining our own identity is obviously done in opposition of the 'other', contrary to the 'other'. And in the case of the West, the 'other' was almost necessarily Islam.

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[13] Professor Sami Zemni, of Moroccan origin and currently living in Belgium, illustrates the above through a very suggestive example. If a Belgian husband beats his wife, it is judged negatively by the society. But this violent act will be regarded as the personal wrongdoing of the man in question. Searching the causes underlying this act, we would usually hear causes like he had been through hard times as a child, he had received beatings from his parents, the family may have had financial difficulties, etc. But if it is a Muslim man who commits a similar act, this contextualization disappears immediately. 'Wife-bashing' is exclusively explained by Islam, as one can always find a verse in the Qur'ān justifying the 'dominance of the man over the woman'. All this follows from the European self-image: Household violence never arises from the cultural characteristics of western/European civilization, it is always seen as inappropriate individual behaviour. In the case of Islam civilization, however, at least in the western eye, it arises from Islam itself. Cf. Zemni,*op. cit*.

Orientalism vs. social sciences

The turbulent changes did not leave sciences untouched either. A series of new disciplines of social sciences (sociology, economics, political science) came into being, which, at the beginning, were busy exploring the peculiarities of the development of western societies. As far as the non-western world was concerned, it was partly anthropology that was researching 'primitive' societies, but what proved to be dominant later was the emergence of Orientalism, the research into east. The 'Orientalist discourse' also lay the foundation for the essentialist image of Islam dominant in the west till our day, having representatives of a wide renown like Bernard Lewis.[14] It is not by chance that Orientalism, which has gone through serious changes over the past decades but has had a normative legitimacy till our day, and which represents a normative ideology, has become a coherent part of humanities and social sciences.

The social scientific research into the Islamic world started to flourish from the 1950-60s. Participating in this process, besides western researchers, were also researchers and scholars coming from Islamic countries, who graduated from western institutions of higher education, while at the same time the educational systems of the countries in the Islamic world also began to develop at a tremendous pace. During this period Orientalism seemingly fell into the background. Its role started to strengthen again when the concept of culture got into the focus and the processes having a civilizational-cultural background, for several reasons, strengthened in the international system.

From the point of view of our subject, the main impetus was given when Islam got into the focus of attention. Let us only think of the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, of 'Islamic fundamentalism gaining ground', or, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the eastern alliance and communism, of the nightmare of the 'Islamic threat', of the increasing Muslim presence in Europe, or the terrorist actions committed on behalf of Islam. Islamism – *i.e.* politicized and ideological Islam – has found its place on the scene of world politics. Simultaneously, there has also been a turnaround in social sciences, and modernity has been subject to heavy criticism by representatives of postmodern deconstruction. These changes, combined, resulted in 'making Islam into a battlefield of research'.[15]

Both Orientalists and social scientists are trying to describe their own epistemological and methodological background as the only one that is suitable to explore 'objective reality'. The Orientalists' position basically starts out 'from inside', approaching from the dogmatic and normative dimensions of Islam, and explaining everything from this angle. Based on the assumption of some kind of Islamic continuity, it regards Islam as a decisive, central factor of Muslim history. On the other hand, according to the social scientific approach, there is no such thing as Islam *per se*,

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[14]   It would fall beyond the subject of this paper to describe the dispute about Orientalism, in which Edward Said and Bernard Lewis played a decisive role. For details see ROSTOVÁNYI, *Az iszlám világ és a Nyugat,* pp. 67-73; Id., "Bernard Lewis és az iszlám világa".

[15]   ZEMNI, *op. cit.*

Islam has been embodied by concrete persons and organizations, motivated by very different interpretations. As a consequence, the subject of investigation must be Muslims, in their very diversity. Sami Zemni refers to this duality of approach as 'traditional or Orientalist' *vs.* 'genealogical-pluralist' approach.[16]

Historical background

The Muslim presence in Europe can be traced back to several centuries. It has obviously got only a symbolic significance that in the special literature the first great clash between the West (translate: Europe) and the Islamic world is linked to 1798, when Napoleon's expeditionary forces, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Mamluks, conquered Egypt. This date suggests as though earlier there had not been any relation between Europe and Islam, or the Islamic world. This picture, however, is false. Islam has been present in Europe right from the moment of its emergence, and it has exerted a serious influence on European – western – civilization. Only the projection back into the past of the conflicting relationship of the last decades resulted in the misconception that Islam is a 'foreign body' in Europe that has 'Christian' (or maybe Jewish-Christian) roots.

The expansion of Islam in Europe took place in four large historical waves. The first wave was the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily and the main part of Italy. The Berber commander Tariq ibn Ziyad first set his feet on European land, at the head of his forces, in 711 at present day Gibraltar, and lay the foundation there of a Muslim presence and power for as long as 781 years, up to 1492. The rapid expansion of the Muslim troops was stopped by major-domo Karl Martell in 732, at Poitiers in the Loire valley. Had this battle been won by the Muslims, presumably the whole of Europe would have been conquered by Muslims. Sicily and south-Italy got under Muslim authority in the 9th-11th centuries. The former was ended by the Spanish *Reconquista* as a side issue of the crusades, while the latter was put an end to by the Normans. Iberia under Muslim rule (or al-Andalus, by its Arabic name) was in every way the most developed part of contemporary Europe, and by way of immediate contacts it exerted a decisive impact on contemporary European (western) civilization. However, following the cessation of the Muslim power, it was only its influence that survived, since there were no Muslim communities any longer, as Muslims were expelled from Europe.

The second period was the 13th century when Mongol-Tartar troops, in the course of forging ahead westward, reached the Volga basin and the Caucasian territories. Within a few generations there were Muslim successor states, the khanates of the Golden Horde established in the area with considerable Muslim Tartar communities running along the Volga basin across the area reaching the Caucasus and the Crimean peninsula. These khanates were characterized by a strong army and highly developed commerce, in the course of which they established trading posts and colonies in different parts of the Russian Empire, *e.g.* on the territory of today's Finland, and the frontier-land of today's Poland and the Ukraine.

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[16] ZEMNI, "Is there a place for Islam in Europe?".

The third large wave was the period of Ottoman expansion in the Balkans and in Central Europe. As a starting point we can consider the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. During the expansion of the Ottoman Empire there were various Turkish ethnic groups settling down in the Balkans, on the territory of today's Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece. During the Muslim rule, aside from the immigrant Turkish groups, there were also different, primarily Slav ethnic groups converting to Islam mainly in Albania (where it resulted in a Muslim majority), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria. So the Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasian territories, not to mention Turkey, the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, are to be considered as native European Muslim population.

On the other hand, in Western and Central Europe there was no Muslim population for centuries, during the period of the formation of modern Europe or European modernity. The process of the Enlightenment and the Renaissance in Europe almost exclusively got in contact with Christianity, and it had no contact with Islam. The emergence of a marked Muslim presence in Western Europe took place during the fourth major wave, when, following the Second World War, tens of thousands of Muslim guest workers arrived in the Western European countries. This was partly the effect of the decolonization process, and partly due to the labour shortage that came about as a result of the restoration of the damage caused by the war and the post-war economic boom. All this, of course, does not mean that before the time of World War II there had been no Muslim communities in the Western European countries. However, at that time their numbers and roles were still rather restricted, the breakthrough occurring only after the great immigration wave following the Second World War.

It is apparent from the above that Muslim presence in Europe is not at all limited to Western Europe or the European Union, even if this is everybody's first association when they think of the 'Muslim question'. In this paper it is not possible to touch upon what exactly we mean by Europe, how much geographical and cultural Europe differ from one another, or where exactly the eastern borders of Europe run, anyhow the question of the Muslims living on the territory of Russia is not customarily treated as a European issue. Muslims in the Balkans, unlike those in Western Europe, are considered to be native Europeans, as they have lived in their Islamic religion for hundreds of years, and a significant part of them are local Slavs converted to Islam. On top of that, in more Western European countries there are Muslim communities that originate from one of the Balkan states. Knowing the enlargement strategy of the European Union it can be expected that within a relatively short time a considerable part of Balkan Muslims will become EU citizens, as their countries will accede to the EU.

Turkey is a special case as, on the one hand, there are large Turkish communities to be found in Western Europe, primarily in Germany, on the other hand Turkey explicitly expressed its intention to join the EU a long time ago. On the other hand, Turkey is not even considered to belong to Europe by many people either in the geographical sense of the word (a much larger part of the country belongs to Asia than to Europe) or from a civilizational-cultural point of view.

Table 1   Muslims in Europe

European Union	15-20 m
Balkans	8.5 m
Turkey	72 m
Russia	14 m

Source: The author's estimations based on EU, national and other statistics

Muslims in the European Union

Concerning the number of Muslims living in the European Union there are no precise data available, and the estimations show significant differences, between 12 and 25 million. The real numbers are likely to be closer to 25 million. Most Muslims live in France, then comes Germany, followed by the United Kingdom.

Table 2   Muslims in the EU countries

Country	Number of Muslims	% of population
France	6,000,000	10.0
Germany	4,000,000	4.9
UK	1,600,000	2.7
Spain	1,000,000	2.3
Holland	980,000	6.0
Italy	825,000	1.4
Belgium	400,000	4.0
Austria	385,000	4.7
Sweden	351,000	3.9
Switzerland*	330,000	4.3
Denmark	270,000	5.0
EU	**15-25,000,000**	**3.5-5.5**

*Switzerland is not a member of the EU
Source: national and EU statistics

The role of religion in the EU

In order to be able to analyze the position of Islam within the European Union, first of all we should touch upon the role of religion in general. This is because the picture is a

lot more complicated than what the cliché about European secularization following the Enlightenment suggests.

Religion plays a role of different degrees in the public life of Western European countries, and, in spite of the 'formal' separation of state and church, it is part of the political processes as well. The worldwide 'revival' of religions made its impact also in this area, leading to a re-evaluation of the role religion plays in public policy. Opinions are split upon the issue, which made itself felt in the dispute about the role of Christian values in European identity.

In the leading Western European countries, one extreme pole is represented by dominantly Catholic France, top-ranking in laicization, while the other pole could be the British Anglican 'state-church'. Germany is situated somewhere on the scale between these two, with its two longstanding religious traditions (Catholic and evangelical).

In general it can be stated that, in spite of the European secularized political culture, the state in most countries has been sharing certain religious communities in certain advantages, opposite to others. Fukuyama says that Europe has not been consistent in the domain of secularization, for this reason there are still certain religious community traditions surviving, inherited from the past, that are rewarding certain community rights.[17] Benefiting religious communities through guaranteeing community rights is in fact contradictory to individualism and the priority of individual rights that are characteristic of western civilization.

It is obvious that the problems related to Islam are inseparable from the situation of the given country's 'historical' religions and from the relationship between state and church(es) or religion(s) typical of the given country. The practices followed by several western countries do not ensure equal treatment for the different religious communities: Muslims are not granted the same rights as some Christian churches. It sometimes happens that Muslim communities seek a Christian 'ally' on the basis of religion as a common denominator.

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[17] Cf. FUKUYAMA, "Identity, Immigration & Democracy", p. 163.

Marginalization, peripherization

We have already spoken about the shift in proportions within the European population in favour of the Muslim minority, which, according to some estimations can be expected to be rather considerable. The difference in the age distribution is worth noting: The young have a much higher rate within the Muslim population. In the UK the rate of those younger than 16 years within the total population is 20%, while within the Muslim population it is one third. In France younger than 20-year-olds account for 20% and one third respectively, while in Germany younger than 18-year-olds account for 18% of the population and one third of the Muslim minority.

Opposite to the Muslim population becoming ever younger, the native European population seems to be ageing. While in the countries of the European Union in the mid-2000s the ratio was 35 pensioners per 100 active workers, according to some estimates this rate will grow to 75 by 2050, and in some countries (Spain, Italy) it may reach 1:1. Many economic analysts are of the opinion that further immigrations are inevitable conditions of survival, because of the necessity to make up for the loss of the inactive population.

The largest Muslim communities are made up by those having come from Turkey (in Germany, Holland, Denmark and Austria), from Morocco (in Belgium, Spain, France and Holland), and from Algeria (in France). The majority of Muslims living in the United Kingdom are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The Muslim minorities show a rather powerful concentration: In most Western European countries most of them live in geographically well definable regions. In Germany the bigger part of the Muslim population live in the vicinity of Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Dortmund, Essen, Munich and Hamburg, with one third of them in the Ruhr-district, in France the regions to be mentioned are primarily Île-de-France, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with one third concentrated in Paris; in the United Kingdom the Muslim-populated areas are London, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, the west coast of Scotland, with 2/5 of the Muslim population living in London.

Over 80% of Western Europe's Muslim population live in big cities with a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants. The corresponding rate among the non-Muslim population is around 60%. The rate of the Muslims within the population of some big cities is already considerable: Marseille 25%, Malmö 20%, Brussels, Birmingham, Paris 15%, London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Oslo, Copenhagen 10%.

The Muslim minorities in several countries can be characterized by cultural separation and social marginalization and peripherization. In many places the Muslim population live in enclaves ('ghettos'), separate from the rest of the population. The social indicators of those living in ethnic colonies are much worse than those of the native population. The unemployment rate in Berlin in 2004 was 20%, among 'foreigners' (*i.e.* not ethnic Germans) it was 38.4%, while among Turks between 16 -21

it was 52%. 48.2% of Germans between 15-65 and 18.9% of 'foreigners' are covered by national insurance.[18] Similar examples could be cited from several other countries.

The separation from the recipient society is a two-sided process. Muslim minorities in many Western European countries do not enjoy the same rights implied in citizenship as the 'native' population. Several of them have not even received citizenship, while others are nominally citizens, but in the social and cultural sense they are not. Using an apt metaphor, the Muslims are Western Europe's 'internal colony'[19]

The differentiation of European Muslims

The same way as there is neither a unified Islam nor a unified interpretation of Islam, we cannot speak about a unified 'European Islam' either, Muslims living in Europe, including those living in the individual countries, cannot be considered to be a homogeneous group, they do not make up a unified, monolithic bloc. On the contrary, they are extremely differentiated. In spite of the fact that the Islamic factor is strengthening in their identity, besides ethnic-sectarian, generational and socio-political differences, they also have different attitudes toward the recipient society, modernization, acculturation, and toward religion itself. For this reason we cannot speak about a Western European Muslim minority, only about Muslim minorities. The theory favoured by some experts, politicians and others, that speaks about the emergence of a parallel Muslim society, does not agree with the facts either. We can, at most, speak about parallel Muslim societies, as there are different Muslim communities that propagate or accept different interpretations of Islam.

European Muslim communities are very structured along different dividing lines. Let us see just some of them.

- Ethnic: European Muslims may belong to different ethnic groups (Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Afghans, etc). Some of the 'German Turks' *e.g.* are not ethnically Turks, but Kurds from Turkey.

- According to place of origin: There are tremendous differences between European Muslims, on the one hand, from the point of view of their countries of origin, and also according to their places of origin (city, vicinity or region).

- Sectarian: Similarly to other Muslims living in the world, the majority of European Muslims are also Sunni, but there are also considerable Shia communities among them, while many of them belong to different Sufi orders.

- According to different schools of religious law: Each of the four Sunni (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i) and the Shia Ja'fari legal schools are present among European Muslims, their weight varying from country to country. Among Muslims in France *e.g.* the most wide-spread is the Maliki, among Muslims in Germany the Hanafi legal school.

- Generational: The first generation of immigrants arrived in Western Europe following the Second World War, and by our day also the members of the third

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[18] LUFT, *Abschied von Multikulti. Wege aus der Integrationskrise*, pp. 162-163.
[19] LEIKEN, "Europe's angry Muslims".

generation are grown-ups. Individuals belonging to the different generations are characterized by very different ways of thinking.

• Moderates *vs*. radicals: Surveys suggest that the overwhelming majority of European Muslims represent a moderate attitude, the rate of radicals is usually estimated at 2-3%, the rate of ultra extremists is usually put at much lower than that.

• Attitude to religion: Though the effects of the re-Islamization process going on for decades can be felt very powerfully in Europe as well, Muslims in Europe have different attitudes to Islam as a religion. Some of them represent the 'totalist' approach to Islam (*i.e*. Islam determines and influences all spheres of life), while others believe that Islam is 'just a religion' that has no impact on 'secularized' spheres of life. Religiousness also strengthens among them, but according to the estimations of a comprehensive research paper of the European Union, about two thirds of them do not exercise their religion.[20]

• Attitude to the recipient society: European Muslims are split upon the question whether they want to separate from the recipient society or, on the contrary, integrate into it. Professor Abdullah Saeed calls these two groups of Muslims 'isolationists' or 'participants'.[21] The violent actions followed by the ever more intensive stigmatization of Muslims provoked a severe counter-reaction from Muslim communities. A part of them chose distancing from the recipient non-Muslim society, a certain degree of separation, keeping away from public events also concerning Muslims.

How Muslims and non-Muslims see each other?

The dividing lines between the Muslim and non-Muslim population only partly have a civilizational and cultural character, to a large extent they are economic-social-political divisions, more exactly, what we have to do with is the coincidence of civilizational, cultural, and, let us call it this way, structural fracture lines, and their mutual strengthening effect. All these mutual generalizations, the 'image of the enemy' and the intolerance toward 'otherness', have made large contributions to the negative judgement of 'the other party'.

Muslims and non-Muslims do not have an equally negative judgement of 'the other party'. Though both parties have a clear perception of the bad relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, for which both sides are blaming the other, Muslims attribute a lot more positive things to Westerners than Westerners to Muslims. (At the same time, Western European Muslims have much more positive views about Christians than in general, in the countries of the Islamic world). Muslim minorities much less consider Europe to have become the scene of 'the clash of civilizations' than the non-Muslim majority.[22]

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[20] "Islam in the European Union: What's at Stake in the Future?", p. iii.

[21] SAEED, *Muslims in Secular States: Between Isolationists and Participants in the West.*

[22] Cf. ALLEN and WIKE, "How Europe and Its Muslim Population See Each Other".

Of course, the differences between the individual countries are significant in this area. Among Germans the judgement on Muslims (*i.e.* Arabs) is much more negative than among the French and the British. 82% of Muslims living in Spain have a definitely positive opinion about Christians, at the same time, only 29% of the Spanish public think positively concerning Muslims. This gap exists in Germany as well, though it is somewhat smaller. In 2006, 58% of Germans thought a 'conflict with the Muslim population' probable, which is a twofold growth on 2004, 46% were afraid of a terrorists attack and 42% thought it possible that terrorists may hide among the Muslims.

The rate of those thinking positively among Christians is also higher among Muslims in France and in the UK than the rate of those thinking positively about Muslims within the population, but in these two countries the majority of the population have a basically positive judgement about Muslims.[23] (The rate of those thinking positively about Christians in Jordan is 61%, in Egypt 48%, in Pakistan 27% and in Turkey 16%).[24]

Diagram 1

Positive judgement concerning each other: Muslims *vs*. Christians

(those thinking positively about 'the other', %)

Source: "The Great Divide".

Pew summarized Muslims' and Westerners' opinions about the other party on the basis of five negative (violent, arrogant, selfish, greedy, immoral) and two positive (honest, generous) qualities that Muslim and non-Muslim people living in different countries attributed to the other party. Using factorial analysis and mathematical methods they have come to the final result, the so-called 'religious-cultural negativity index', in which '0' is the most positive and '7' is most negative value.

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[23] "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other. 13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey", p. 11.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 139.

Table 3

Religious-cultural negativity index

British Muslims	4.2	Spanish non-Muslims	3.5
German Muslims	3.2	German non-Muslims	2.8
French Muslims	2.7	British non-Muslims	2.5
Spanish Muslims	2.7	French non-Muslims	2.1

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007

Muslims and non-Muslims think extremely differently about a great variety of things. In general it can be stated that the Western European public judge much more negatively the same tendencies than the Muslims, or have different – worse – presumptions about the Muslims than what they think about themselves. Such issues are *e.g.* the questions of being religious or the strengthening of Islamic identity, the relationship between strengthening Islamic identity and the loyalty to the given state, the relation between strengthening Islamic identity and the consequences of living in a modern society, or the intention for integration or for separation.

Picking out just a single factor, the majority of non-Muslim respondents think that Islam and modern society are not compatible with each other, while the majority of Muslims believe they are. While most non-Muslims see it as a serious contradiction if somebody is a Muslim believer on the one hand and lives in a modern society on the other, the vast majority of the Muslim population see no conflict between the two. The only exception here is France where the rate of those who see no contradiction between the above two factors is 2% higher among the public (74%) than among Muslims.[25]

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[25] "The Great Divide ...".

Diagram 2

Is there a conflict between being a Muslim believer and living in a modern society?

Source: "The Great Divide".

## Image of the enemy, mutual radicalization

According to a survey of the documentaries, reports and talk shows of two German TV channels (ARD and ZDF) during 2005 and 2006 Islam was mentioned in a negative context in 81%, 'objectively', as a religion or culture, in 11%, and in relation to everyday life in 8%.

Diagram 3

The context of mentioning Islam in the programs of ARD and ZDF

a)

b)

Source: HAFEZ and RICHTER: *Das Gewalt- und Konfliktbild des Islams bei ARD und ZDF*.

Among negative contexts terrorism/extremism are topping the list, followed by the role of Islam in international conflicts, religious intolerance and fundamentalism/Islamization.[26]

Contributing to the above is the generally strengthened xenophobia, or, in the extreme case, Islamophobia, the events of September 11, 2001, then the 'mutually' negative consequences of the terrorist acts (especially the attempts of London and Madrid) carried out since then, which, on the one hand, confirmed the suspicion against Muslims in the native population, shifting the general Muslim-image

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[26] HAFEZ and RICHTER, *Das Gewalt- und Konfliktbild des Islams bei ARD und ZDF*.

powerfully in the negative direction, equating it with violence and terror, thus underpinning Huntington's civilizations paradigm, on the other hand, made most Muslims feel that all the measures restricting freedom rights for the sake of security, and the whole fight on terror, was primarily directed against them.[27]

Diagram 4

Do you think that the war on terrorism is really a war against Islam?

Source: "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 13.

We all remember the extreme statements made regarding Islam by the Italian author and reporter Oriana Fallaci, who had interviewed dozens of Arab/Muslim leaders before.[28] Holland, formerly known as the 'paragon' of freedom, tolerance and

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[27] When asked whether the war on terrorism is really identical with a war against Islam, 81% of Muslims living in Britain asked gave a 'yes' answer, and only 10% said a definite 'no'. "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects. Survey", p. 13.

[28] 'You don't understand or don't want to understand that a reverse crusade is in progress. … A war of religion is in progress, a war which they call *jihad*. Holy War. A war that might not seek to conquer our territory, but that certainly seeks to conquer our souls. That seeks the disappearance of our freedom and our civilization. … If we do not defend ourselves, if we do not fight, the *jihad* will win. … We Italians are not in the same position as the Americans: mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, hodgepodge of a thousand cultures. … Our cultural identity is so precise and defined by so many centuries, it cannot sustain a wave of immigration composed of people who in one way or another want to change our way of life. Our values. ... We have no room for muezzins, for minarets, for false teetotallers, for their fucking Middle Ages, for their fucking chador. And if we had room, I wouldn't give it to them. Because it would be equivalent of throwing away Dante Alighieri, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, the Renaissance, the Risorgimento, the liberty that for better or worse we fought for and won, our Patria. It would mean giving them Italy. And I won't give them Italy. FALLACI, *The Rage and the Pride*, http://italian.about.com/library/fallaci/blfallaci10.htm, http://italian.about.com/library/fallaci/blfallaci21.htm

liberalism, is a textbook example of the aforesaid. A series of Western European rightist parties have been forcefully demanding the tightening of anti-immigration regulations, often explicitly directed against Muslim immigrants. Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Pim Fortuyn and his party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), later Geert Wilders and the Freedom Party in Holland, the British National Party and its leader, Nick Griffin in the United Kingdom, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs and Jörg Haider in Austria, the list could be continued. These (extreme) rightist, radical parties are sharply anti-Islamist, their leaders and representatives often use rude insults to Muslims and Islam.

It is another question, of course, to what extent, if at all, it is justified to speak about Islamophobia as such, or it is 'only', using the words of Timothy Garton Ash, 'the well-known racism or xenophobia'[29] not only directed against Muslims, but against immigrants in general. Anyhow, the 2006 report of the EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) describes the strengthening of Islamophobia as a fact,[30] citing a series of examples.

The radicalization of the 'native' population can, of course, be thought of as a reaction to the radicalization of Muslim immigrants, and the violent acts carried out by Muslim extremists. Muslim radicalism had existed in Europe earlier as well, but in the 1980s and '90s it had external origins: In France it was the Shia from Lebanon, Iranians and Algerians who carried out attempts. However, by the 2000s, Islamist violence has become 'Europeanized', 'nativized', 'domesticated'. In Madrid in March 2004, in London in July 2005, attempts with severe casualties were made. In London, hardly two weeks after the attempts, another weirdly similar act failed after all the four bombs intended to explode, which had been placed in four different places, broke down.

One morning in November 2004, in Amsterdam, film director Theo van Gogh, who had not long before made his first film with Ayaan Hirsi Ali[31], the first part of

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[29] ASH, *op. cit.*

[30] "Muslims in the European Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia".

[31] Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one of the best-known representatives of European Muslims, often appearing in the media. She was born in a conservative Muslim family, in Somalia in 1969, later she lived in Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Kenya. As at the age of 22 her parents wanted to force her into a marriage, she fled to Europe and settled down in Holland. She soon learnt Dutch, took a university degree and got involved in political life; she became a Parliamentary representative. She mainly became famous for her statements sharply criticizing Islam. She basically makes the Islamic religion responsible for the backwardness of the Islamic world. 'From the day we are born we are imbued with religion, this is exactly the cause of our backwardness'. (ALI, *Az engedetlen*, [*Insoumise*] p. 66). In her judgement, violence and terrorist attacks can be traced back to Islam, which, in its present form, cannot meet the requirements of the modern age. 'We can clearly declare that Islam, in its current form, is not compatible with the western state of law' (*ibid.*, p. 52). Islam would require a comprehensive reform, but 'the century of Islamic enlightenment still has to be waited for (*ibid.*, p. 53). Hirsi Ali's way of thinking has changed in Europe so much that she has admittedly become an atheist. 'I reject religion as a moral standard, or as a set of regulations determining our lives. I especially reject Islam, because this religion overwhelms everything' (*ibid.*, p. 36). In 2006 the Dutch minister of immigration withdrew her Dutch citizenship when it came to light that in 1992, when she asked for asylum in Holland, 'she

Submission,[32] while heading to work on his bicycle, was stopped by a Moroccan, Mohammed Bouyeri, who shot at him repeatedly, then cut his throat with a knife, and thrust another knife with a threatening letter for Ayaan Hirsi Ali into his chest. This ritual murder has raised several intricate questions.

One of them is communication, the immense role of the media and the internet. There is evidence that Bouyeri had been inspired by different websites as to the method of carrying out the murder. A CD-ROM disc was found in his apartment with recordings of 23 executions carried out on 'Allah's enemies', including the beheading of Daniel Pearl,[33] which had stirred a great media outrage. The letter nailed on Theo van Gogh's chest was written in Dutch, with quotations in Arabic, apparently also deriving from the internet.[34] Bouyeri addressed the 'open letter' not to van Gogh but to 'the fundamentalist unbeliever' Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who 'had joined the crusade against Islam'.[35]

The Finsbury Park mosque in London and Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri[36] have become the 'symbol' of European Islamic radicalism. Some hold the view that London 'had been the epicentre of Islamic militancy in Europe' and that the British capital has turned into 'Londonistan'.[37] British authorities estimate the number of British Muslims actively taking part in – or at least supporting – terrorist acts at 16 thousand, with about 3 thousand of them having also attended the training camps of al-Qaeda.[38]

Among Muslim minorities, especially among young people belonging to the second or third generation, some kind of radicalization can undoubtedly be observed. Extremists account for about 1-2% of the European Muslim population. They are

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had given false data.' The wave of protest that broke out in the Parliament in the wake of the announcement, the decision was withdrawn. But Hirsi Ali resigned her seat as an MP, moved to the United States, where she started to work for the American Enterprise Institute.

[32] It was Ayaan Hirsi Ali who had asked Theo van Gogh to make *Submission*. As she writes in her book, the film was meant to transmit three messages. "The first is that men and also women can look up to Allah and address him. The believers can talk to God and can watch him closely. The second message was that the rigid interpretation of the Qur'an in the Islamic world causes unbearable suffering for women. … My third message is the last sentence of the film: 'I don't need to submit any more.' Self-liberation is possible, the individual's faith can be changed, critically reviewed and can be thought over to the depth where it turns out that the cause of the oppression is faith itself." ALI, *A hitetlen,* [Infidel] p. 487.

[33] Daniel Pearl was captured and beheaded by the Mesopotamian/Iraqi Jihad Organization of al-Qaeda (Tanzim al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn) led by Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi in Iraq. It was the first execution like this that was recorded on video and uploaded on the internet as well.

[34] BURUMA, *Murder in Amsterdam,* p. 4.

[35] "Open letter to Hirsi Ali".

[36] Because of his artificial arm ending in a hook, his nick name is 'Captain Hook'. In February 2006 the British authorities arrested him for rousing hatred and murder.

[37] PHILLIPS, *Londonistan,* p. 12.

[38] *Ibid*., p. 9. British Muslim Ed Husain, who was born in London, vividly describes the methods radical Islam uses to conquer young Muslims, including him, who 'quit' after five years and returned to normal British life. See HUSAIN, *The Islamist.*

typically young, middle class males having been through a 'cultural shock'. The reasons are dual: the 'repulsion' of Europe on the one hand, and the 'attraction' of Islam on the other. The following are some of them: the lack of receptivity on the part of the European society, 'ghettoization', the repulsion of secularism, materialism, personal crisis, identity crisis, the process of falling to a lower social class, marginalization, peripherization, re-Islamization gaining ground in Europe, and, eventually, some kind of escapism, protection, solidarity, guidance that radical Islamist communities offer.

A survey carried out in 12 British universities in 2008 suggests that 40% of Muslim university students support the introduction of *shari'a* in British law, one third would welcome establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate based on the *shari'a*, and 32% of those asked find murder committed in the name of religion acceptable (28% only if religion is being attacked, while 4% also in order 'to preserve and defend" religion). Though 54% of Muslims thought there is nothing that can justify murder on behalf of religion, the rate for Christians was 94%.[39]

A particularly great upheaval was sparked by the report released by a research team led by Professor Wilhelm Heitmeyer[40] at Bielefeld University in Germany, which, on the basis of questionnaire surveys among young Turks in Germany, came to the conclusion that the way of thinking of third generation Turkish youths was much more radical or 'more fundamentalist' on a number of questions than that of the former generations. It was not only shown by the fact that they think of themselves primarily as Muslims, but also by the intolerance toward people belonging to other religions.

The publication and evaluation of the research findings stirred a huge dispute.[41] Many critics doubted the objectivity of the research – and the researchers –, claiming that several questions asked on the questionnaires were biased. An important point of criticism against Heitmeyer and his team was that the strengthening of Islamic identity in their interpretation appears as radicalism, a step back toward pre-modern, while in reality it is a concomitant phenomenon of modernity.

The identity of European Muslims: Compelled to choose?

The last two decades have witnessed the appreciation of identities, so the role of different identities has spectacularly grown. Zygmunt Bauman had good reason to call our time the age of identity. Discussing all the complex questions related to identity is far beyond our scope, here we only wish to make two points clear. On the one hand, the strengthening of collective identities is a general phenomenon, on the other hand, the turn of the 20th-21st centuries is increasingly characterized by 'multiple identities', – as many of us are simultaneously members of more than one community – and the different identities are arranged into some sort of hierarchy, in which the main role is played by the so-called primary identity.

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[39] The survey was made by the Centre for Social Cohesion in 12 universities, among them Imperial College and Kings College, London. See: "Killing for religion is justified, say third of Muslim students".

[40] HEITMEYER ET AL., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus. Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland.*

[41] Among others see, SCHULZ, "Verlockendes Feindbild" , MEIER, "Netzwerk Islam".

The question of identities is an especially complex problem in the Middle-East or in the Islamic world. Bernard Lewis distinguishes three main 'circles' of Middle-Eastern identities: the identity according to descent (tribe, clan, family, ethnic group), according to geographical origin (settlement, vicinity, province, country), and according to religious community.[42] Everybody is part of more 'circles' simultaneously, which means that Middle-Eastern identities are 'multiple' identities in the first place, but it does not cause any problem. In traditional Muslim societies the identity of the individual is firmly determined by their birth, *i.e.* the social embeddedness of his parents on the one hand, and the social environment surrounding them – family, tribe, clan, belonging to one or the other wing of Islam, etc. – on the other. The identity of the individual is not in contradiction with the societal environment, on the contrary, it organically conforms to it.

It is in the case of Muslim minorities, primarily for the Muslim communities in Europe, that identity poses a real problem. Here the societal environment transmits a system of values and standards that, from many aspects, contradict the values which the individual has brought from his Muslim country of origin. In addition, it also exercises a strong pressure on the individual in order to support the adaptation to the dominant culture. In this different cultural environment everything has to be reviewed all the time. It is not by chance that imams and other religious leaders are flooded by questions on their websites concerning what is forbidden and what is allowed for a Muslim living in Europe. Borrowing Fukuyama's example, in Saudi Arabia it is no question whether or not it is allowed to shake hands with a female professor (not only because according to some interpretations of Islam a Muslim man does not shake hands with a woman, but also because basically there are no female professors[43]), while in Europe it is a real question.

For European Muslims determining their identity is an extremely hard task. Though they are easily identified by the recipient societies, – immensely simplifying and generalizing the problem, of course, assuming a high degree of homogeneity of Muslim minorities – identification is complicated for the Muslims themselves. Where is their homeland, their country? Is it in their country of origin, and should they be 'alien' in Europe, in their recipient country, in an environment totally different from the Islamic world, and should they aim to more or less 'Islamize' this environment and make it similar to their home? In addition, they can only seek to make it similar to an 'imaginary', an 'idealized' country, as their real countries of origin are not characterized by the conditions of 'real' Islam either. Or has Europe become their homeland forever, and accepting the European conditions, should they strive to shape a Euro-Islam, different from that of the Islamic world? They cannot even rely on their religious and political leaders concerning these questions, as they also represent extremely different approaches.

The identification process of European Muslims is to a large extent influenced by the 'meta-discourse' or the dominant 'meta-narrative' developed in the western world about Islam, which automatically considers Islam and enemy, a source of hazard, a

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[42] LEWIS, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, pp. 6-7.

[43] The situation is changing in this field (as well), today there are some female professors in Saudi Arabia, too.

threat.[44] This essentialist approach to Islam is rooted in an Islamic image that does not reflect the real situation, rather it is a 'product of a vision built up on the basis of a centuries-long dispute',[45] that has at least as many political as religious elements.

For the bigger part of the native population, identifying Islam with fundamentalism automatically groups European Islam in the category of the 'other', and this 'other' happened to be the counter-pole of western secular democracy. This intensified 'us' and 'them' discourse further deepened the existing gap, worsening the Muslims' chances for integration, weakening their intention for integration and strengthening their withdrawal into the 'parallel societies'.

Muslims living in Europe seem to be 'aliens', 'outsiders' from many points of view: A significant part of them do not yet 'feel at home' in Europe themselves, and most of the native population do not regard them as real Europeans either. The multimillion-strong, and rising, Muslim presence at the same time forces Europe's native population to rethink their own collective European (and national) identities. With time passing, the number and rate of Muslims born in Europe is rising, and Islam has clearly become one of the most important religions in Europe.

It is almost by necessity that, for the Muslims living in minorities in Europe, religion, more exactly the religious community, has become the number one factor of identity. According to Olivier Roy, the feeling that belonging to a minority has become conscious cannot primarily be traced back to demographic reasons, but to the alienation from the dominant secular culture, and the emphasis is shifted from a universal religion to religious communities surrounded by secularized societies.[46] An individual no longer becomes a real member of a community simply by birth, but, beyond this, they have to prove their faith and commitment. And a community is no longer an objective circumstance, rather reconstruction.

European Islam has undergone significant transformations in recent times, and processes like the deculturalization and the re-definition of Islam dominantly based on religious parameters have also strengthened. The latter is the interpretation of Islam as mere religion,[47] which is free from 'cultural deposits – occasionally also including the *shari'a*, – the secularization of Islam[48], or even of *shari'a*,[49] and the

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[44] CESARI, "Muslim identities in Europe: the snare of exceptionalism", p. 52.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] ROY, *Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah*, p. 36.

[47] Tariq Ramadan plays an outstanding part in this process.

[48] ROY, *op. cit.*, p. 41. In addition Roy makes the surprising statement that the secularization within Islam is taking place primarily 'on behalf of fundamentalism'. This statement, of course, seems surprising only for the first sight. As an apparent paradox, mainly as a result of the efforts of Islamists/fundamentalists, we can witness the concurrence of two, seemingly contradictory, processes: One is the desacralization of politics, the other is the Islamization of secular activities (which, in point of fact, continued to be secular). The 'overexpansion' of religion by Islamists necessarily leads to a new contradiction: The 'Islamic state' – or the state based on religion in general – is built on the ultimate dimension of politics. The redefinition of Islam as a 'mere religion' totally separates the spheres of religion and of politics.

[49]   CESARI, *When Islam and Democracy Meet,* p. 56.

deterritorialization[50] of Islam.

The Pew surveys of European Muslims suggest that their Muslim identity has strengthened, *i.e.* most of them live with an identity primarily as a 'Muslim.' When asked whether they chiefly consider themselves to be a Muslim or a citizen of the given state, most of the respondents chose the latter.[51] In a sample comprising the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France, only French Muslims produced a lower than 50% rate for those determining their identity primarily as a Muslim, but even here, the rate only slightly falls short of 50%.

46% of Muslims living in France primarily see themselves as Muslims, 42% as French, and 10% as both. Among Muslims living in the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany the Islamic identification is in fact equal with that of Muslims in Pakistan, Nigeria, and Jordan, and significantly higher than that of Muslims in Egypt (59%), Turkey (51%) or Indonesia (36%).

Diagram 5

Identity: What do you primarily see yourself to be?
(% of Muslim and non-Muslim population)

Source: *Muslims in Europe. 13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, 2006.

The non-Muslim – Christian – respondents gave just the opposite answers: They see themselves firstly as belonging to the given country, and only secondly as Christians. However, according to a British survey of 2007, though Muslims born in the United

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[50] ROY, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.
[51] "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity". The survey involved 13 countries, four of them Western European: the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain.

Kingdom attribute a decisive role to Islam in their identification, 93% of them determine themselves as British, English, Scottish or Welsh.[52]

The strengthening of Islamic identity is closely related to the increase of religiosity among European Muslim minorities, and it shows that the degree of secularization among the European Muslim population is much lower, while the degree of religiosity is much higher than among the non-Muslim population. Identification with Islam means more than simple religiosity.

According to 2007 surveys, 86% of British Muslims believed that religion was the most important thing in life, while only 11% of the broader British population gave similar answers to the question.[53] The role attributed to religion by Muslims is considerably greater than with the average British population, while it does not sufficiently differ from other British religious or ethnic minorities (Jews, Sikhs or Hindus).

Gallup made a survey in 2007 among the Muslim population of London, Paris and Berlin. The vast majority of those asked consider religion to be a decisive part of their lives: 68% of Muslims in Paris, 85% in Berlin and 88% in London. These rates are fundamentally different with the average population: 23% with the French, 36% with the Brits and 41% with the Germans. Gallup's 2009 survey resulted in the same findings: Religiosity is much stronger among the Muslim than among the non-Muslim (Christian) population of Western European countries.

Diagram 6

Is religion an important part of your life?
(% of 'yes' answers)

Source: *The Gallup Coexist index 2009*, p. 16.

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[52] MIRZA *ET AL.*, "Living apart together. British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism", pp. 37-38.

[53] MIRZA *ET AL.*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

Asked how strong Islamic identity is among the Muslim population of the given country, both the Muslim and the non-Muslim respondents responded similarly, judging it to be very strong or fairly strong. (The only exception was Germany, where only 46% of Muslim residents believed that the Islamic identity of Muslims living in Germany is very strong, compared with 84% of the general public). In the UK the rate of those presuming the strengthening of Islamic identity is higher among Muslims (77%) than among the public at large ((69%). In France and Germany the situation is just the opposite (58%; 68%, and 54%; 72% respectively).

The judgement of the strengthening Islamic identity, however, is exactly the opposite among the Muslim and the non-Muslim population. Most European Muslims judge all this positively, while non-Muslims judge it negatively.

Diagram 7

Is the strengthening of Islamic identity good or bad?
(% of the Muslim and non-Muslim population)

Source: *Muslims in Europe. 13-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, 2006.

All this very clearly shows how deep the division is between European Muslims and non-Muslims in the judgement about each other, as well as about the strengthening Islamic identity.

It is a common view in the Western European public opinion, and even among experts of the question that the increase of the role of the Islamic identity is accompanied by the decrease of national identity or loyalty (*i.e.* the identity toward the recipient country). According to Gallup's surveys, almost half of the British and German public was of the opinion that the Muslim inhabitants of their country were

not loyal to the country, while only 35-45% of the Germans, the French and the Brits believed the opposite, compared with 75-80% of the Muslim population.[54]

Diagram 8

Is the following statement true?
The Muslims living in this country are loyal to the country

Source: *The Gallup Coexist Index 2009*

Surveys seem to disprove the hypothesis. A large part of the European Muslim population do not see any contradiction between the strengthening of Islamic identity and the identity toward a given country, and Muslims' identification with the given country is not at all lower than that of the average population, what is more, in the United Kingdom it even exceeds it. British surveys made in 2006 show that almost 90% of the Muslims living in the United Kingdom see themselves as a member of the *umma*, the global community of Muslims. 93%, however, do not see any kind of contradiction between loyalty to the *umma* on the one hand, and loyalty to a given country, when the individual is a good citizen and is getting on well with the non-Muslim members of the society.[55]

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[54] "European Muslims Show No Conflict Between Religious and National Identities"; *The Gallup Coexist Index 2009*.
[55] "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 5.

Diagram 9

Do you feel yourself a member of the global Muslim *umma*?

Source: "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 15.

Diagram 10

Do you see a contradiction between somebody being loyal to the *umma*, and him being a good citizen getting on well with other members of the society?

Source: "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 16.

Another survey made among British Muslims in 2007 asked for opinions on two, seemingly similar questions. The majority (59%) did not agree with the statement 'I feel more solidarity with Muslims living in other countries than with the non-Muslims living in the UK'. An even larger part (66%), however, agreed with the following

statement: 'I feel as much solidarity with non-Muslims as with Muslims'.[56] On the other hand, characteristic differences could be observed between the different age groups. 62% of the 16-24 age-group agreed with the latter statement, while in the over-55 age-group it was 71%, and the rate of those who definitely disagreed was 33% among 16-24s, while among the over-55s it was 20%. This shows that younger Muslims have a stronger identification to members of their religious community than older Muslims.

The joint survey of Gallup and the Coexist Foundation published in 2009 produced quite surprising results compared with the hypotheses and the preliminary expectations.[57] In two of the three countries surveyed, the UK and Germany, the Muslim population shows stronger identification toward their country, in other words they are more loyal to their country, than the non-Muslims, and only in France is there a little advantage in favour of the non-Muslim population.[58] The BBC's evaluation of the survey findings was that European Muslims are more loyal to their country than it had generally been expected.[59]

Diagram 11

How strongly do you identify with the following?

Source: *The Gallup Coexist Index 2009*.

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[56]   MIRZA *ET AL*., *op. cit*., pp. 38-39.

[57]   *Gallup Coexist Index 2009*.

[58]   When asked: 'How strongly do you identify with your country?', the rate of those responding 'Extremely strongly' and 'Very strongly' was 77% of the Muslims and 50% of non-Muslims in the UK , 40% of Muslims and 32% of non-Muslims in Germany, and 52% of Muslims and 55% of non-Muslims in France. See the *Gallup Coexist Index 2009*, p. 19.

[59]   "Survey reveals Muslim attitudes". Cf. "Survey Reveals Muslims are More Integrated into Europe than Previously Thought".

Inclination to integrate or inclination to separate?

The inclination of Muslims to integrate or to separate is an extremely important question. This is another question that Muslims themselves and the non-Muslim population see completely differently. In most Western European countries the larger part of the public opinion holds that Muslims are unwilling to adapt to the local way of life and the customs, instead they choose separation. The rate of those thinking in this way is the lowest in France, but even here it is higher than 50% (53%).

Muslims themselves also see this question differently. 78% of Muslims living in France and 53% of Muslims living in Spain are of the opposite opinion. The UK also has a higher rate of those who assume that Muslims are willing to adapt (41%) than the rate of those who think they would rather separate (35%).[60] Germany differs from the above: here the majority of Muslims agree with the majority of the Germans: 52% think that Muslims are rather pro-separation, and only 30% think the opposite way.

Diagram 12

The Muslims living in your country are inclined to…

Source: "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 16.

One of the questions of the Gallup survey was focusing on what kind of neighbourhood the respondents would like to live in, one with the same ethnic and religious background as their own, one that is different from it, or a 'mixed' one, *i.e.* among

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[60] In the Pew survey two response opportunities were usually offered. The number of respondents giving either one or the other answer combined does not reach the total of 100%, because several of the people asked could not or did not want to answer. See "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity".

their neighbours there should be some with the same ethnicity and religion, and some with different ethnic and religious belonging.

Diagram 13

What neighbourhood would you like to live in?

Source: "Muslim views: Foreign policy and its effects", p. 16.

The responses showed that within each group asked, those preferring mixed neighbourhood were the majority, to a larger extent among Muslim respondents than among non-Muslims: 78% of Muslims in Paris would gladly live in a 'mixed neighbourhood', while 59% of the non-Muslim French, 63% of the Muslims in London and 58% of Brits in general, and 71% of Muslims in Berlin and 55% of Germans in general.[61]

One important measure of Muslims' integration or separation is the schooling of their children. The majority (60%) of Muslims in the UK would send their children to a mixed school (not to an Islamic school) if they had a chance to choose from the two opportunities. Those choosing the Islamic school account for 35%. But even in this case, the difference between the different age-groups is considerable, as the rate of those choosing the Islamic school is much higher in the younger age-groups: Among the 16-24s 37%, in the 45-54 age-group 25% and among over-55s 19% would be sending their children to Islamic school.[62]

It is a widespread view, too, that most European Muslims are urging the introduction of the *shari'a*. It is basically wrong. 59% of the Muslims in Britain prefer the British legal system to the *shari'a,* and 28% think the opposite. Here, too, the difference between age-groups is noteworthy.

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[61] "Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists".
[62] MIRZA *ET AL*., op. cit., p. 46.

Table 4

**Rate of British Muslims preferring the introduction of the *shari'a*,
broken down to age-groups (%)**

| Age-groups (years)	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
Prefer *shari'a*	37	32	26	16	17
Prefer British law	50	52	63	75	75
Does not know	12	12	11	8	7

Source: Munira Mirza et al. op. cit., p. 46.

Surveys do not at all confirm the widespread opinion that Muslim minorities themselves are the cause of their insufficient integration into the recipient societies. The latest, 2009 cohabitation index, based on attitudes toward other religions, shows that in the three countries having the largest Muslim population, France, Germany and the UK, the rate of 'isolated' people is higher among the 'native' population than among the Muslim population, in France almost half of the Muslim population declare themselves integrated, while the same rate among non-Muslims is less than half of it, and the situation in Germany is similar to this.[63]

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[63] Gallup's coexist index is the further developed version of the former religious tolerance index. Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statements on a scale 1-5: 1) I always treat people of other religious faiths with respect; 2) Most religious faiths make a positive contribution to society; 3) I would not object to a person of a different religious faith moving next door; 4) People of other religions always treat me with respect; 5) In the past year, I have learned something from someone of another religious faith. On the basis of the responses, three categories were set up: a) isolated: placing their own religion over all others, do not want to know about other religions and do not respect them either; b) tolerant: their attitude toward people with other religions is that of 'live and let live', but are not willing to learn from them; c) integrated: want to know more about other religions and want to learn from them, have a positive evaluation about religions, respect people with other religions and think that they respect them as well. See *Gallup Coexist Index 2009*, p. 10.

Diagram 14

Gallup Coexist Index

Source: The Gallup Coexist index 2009.

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